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PART 1 – Introduction
1.1 The Tibetan Government in Exile and Soft Power
Tibet. Few regions have inspired the imagination of the West to the extent that Tibet did. Tibet is 
an issue which has received almost constant international media attention in recent years. While 
working on this paper, not a day passed without Western online newspapers publishing articles on 
the situation in Tibet or the Dalai Lama. Particularly the events surrounding the Beijing 2008 
Olympics  turned  Tibet  into  an  unavoidable  political  event,  even  for  those  only  marginally 
engaged in international news consumption.  In March 2009 the 50th anniversary of the Lhasa 
uprising was marked by protests around the world.
While in many ways the Tibetan situation is very special, from a certain perspective it is by no 
means unique. There are countless peoples around the world struggling for self-determination or 
political representation. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization1 counts more than 
fifty member groups. Within China itself, numerous minorities face a similar fate to that of Tibet: 
Mongols, Zhuang, Yi, Hui, or Uighurs are only a few examples. But none of these groups seem to 
attract levels of international attention and support anywhere near those attracted by the Tibetans. 
Why? Why this prominence of the Tibetan issue? Beyond doubt, numerous factors are involved 
in explaining this phenomenon.  One major  factor, I  argue in this  paper, is  the  Tibetan exile 
government's soft power. Soft power is the ability to attract others to one's own purposes in order 
to get the outcomes one wants.
I use the theory of soft power, as proposed by Joseph Nye, as an analytical framework to delve 
into the question of why Tibetans, a population of around six million, less than 150,000 of which 
live  in  exile,  with  a  small  elite  that  has  access  to  modern  channels  of  international 
communication, has achieved such comparably vast levels of support around the world. Why has 
the Tibetan cause managed to engender so much appreciation and support in the West? To a large 
extent, I propose, the answer to this question is: soft power.
1 http://www.unpo.org/content/view/7783/240/ (accessed: 29.4.2009).
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The main arguments put forth in this paper are based on an analysis of the resources that produce 
soft power for the Tibetan exile leadership. As will become clear below soft power depends both 
on  the  context  and  on  the  recipient.  For  instance,  one  could  analyze  the  Tibetan  exile 
government's soft power with regard to India: It could be explored which soft-power resources 
the Tibetan leadership disposes of in its relations with the host country.2 Or one could look into 
the role that the leadership's soft power plays in its relations with the Tibetan exile community: 
The collective representation of Tibetans as a unity has internal costs. Criticism of the leadership 
is  not  confined to the Tibetan Youth Congress'  criticism of the Dalai  Lama's middle path;  a 
modern, educated class of exiled Tibetans is increasingly voicing its concerns. What role does the 
soft power of the Tibetan government in exile (TGE) play in the reconciliation of opposing forces 
within the exile community? One could also study how soft power attracts the Chinese civil 
society to advocate a solution to the Tibet question that would be acceptable to the Tibetan exile 
government. Or one could explore the Tibetan exile leadership's soft power with regard to the 
international community. Although an analysis of the TGE's soft power in relation to each of 
these spheres would give different results, certain aspects of these contexts are also related. For 
instance,  if  the  TGE  attracts  foreign  acknowledgement  of  its  cause,  say,  in  the  form  of 
international celebrities speaking out for Tibet, this in turn can enhance its attractiveness within 
the  exile  community. This  paper  focuses  specifically on  the  Tibetan exile  government's  soft 
power in relation to the international context and here, in particular, to the West. This focus draws 
from the fact that Western political support is of strategic importance to the TGE.3 
In an analysis of soft-power resources one can distinguish between those resources that attract 
elites of other countries and those resources more attractive to wider publics. I do not make this 
distinction here, because the TGE's soft-power resources that attract foreign elites (politicians, 
pop stars, actors) to the Tibetan cause seem to be the same that also attract wider publics. I use 
the term 'wider publics' in this context and not 'masses,' because the 'masses' in the West tend not 
to be attracted to and aware of the Tibetan cause to the same extent as societal strata with higher 
levels of education.
Before outlining the research questions, the relevance of this paper in the context of international 
development studies shall be briefly discussed.
2 In India, Tibet is represented by the Tibetan exile government as a zone of geo-strategic or military significance 
for India, which is quite a different approach to that followed regarding the West (see Barnett 2001:293).
3 See section 3.13.3 'Objectives of the TGE in Practice.'
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1.2 The Soft  Power of  the Tibetan Government in Exile in the Context of 
Development Studies
In what way is an inquiry into the Tibetan exile government relevant to the study of international 
development? How is soft power, a theory of international relations,  of public diplomacy, of 
political science related to development? Answers to these questions are conditional upon one's 
definition of 'development.'
The discussion regarding a definition of development has been going on for decades, and it might 
not be exaggerated to assume that there are as many definitions as there are people engaged in the 
subject.4 I agree with Norberg-Hodge's (2001:332) view when she asks, “what criteria for judging 
a  society  could  be  more  important  than,  in  social  terms,  the  well-being  of  people  and,  in 
environmental terms, sustainability?” I see 'human development' as being a process leading to the 
overall  enhancement  of  well-being,  of  satisfaction,  happiness  and  freedom  for  all  people 
involved, in line with their own preferences. My notion of 'development' has been influenced 
mainly by the Bhutanese concept of development as the maximizing of Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) and by Amartya Sen's concept of development as freedom.
Maximizing GNH as opposed to GNP, as a maxim for the Bhutanese development process, puts 
the focus not only on socio-economic progress, but also on “less quantifiable factors such as the 
emotional and spiritual well-being of the people” (Mathou 1999:615). This approach implies an 
“explicit commitment to preserve Bhutan's cultural heritage and natural environment” (ibid.). In 
Development as Freedom, Sen sees development as “a process of expanding the real freedom that 
people enjoy” (Sen 2000:3). An important aspect to this concept is the expansion of people's 
freedom of choice, to determine the way they want to live. Lack of substantive freedoms can 
result from a number of circumstances, among which Sen lists “a denial of political and civil 
liberties by authoritarian regimes and [...] imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in 
the social, political and economic life of the community” (ibid:4). Political and civil rights are 
thus a decisive aspect to this conception of development.
When judging the reality of what seems to have been occurring in Tibet since the beginning of 
the  Chinese  occupation  in  the  1950s  with  regard  to  the  aforementioned  perspectives  on 
development, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that development, in the sense of enhancing 
4 On different ways of interpreting and defining 'development,' see Nederveen Pieterse (2008).
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freedom or maximizing GNH, has not come about for the Tibetan people. Quite on the contrary, 
overwhelming  evidence  suggests  that  what  has  been  happening  in  Tibet,  from  a  Tibetan 
perspective  can  best  be  described  using  terms  like  'regression,'  'setback'  or  'negative 
development,' to take a moderate stance. International discourse on Tibet has frequently described 
the  situation  using  terms  like  'colonialism,'  'cultural  genocide'  and  'systematic  human  rights 
violations.'
Countless organizations and scholars have exposed the magnitude of Chinese atrocities in Tibet 
over the decades to some extent, and information on the various kinds of Tibetan suffering under 
Chinese rule is widely available and known. Particularly during the Great Leap Forward and the 
ensuing  Cultural  Revolution  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Tibetans died  as  a  result  of  Chinese 
occupation and policies. Ziemer (2001:236-7) refers to information compiled by the TGE and 
Amnesty International when stating:
Between 1949 and 1979, 173,221 Tibetans were killed after being tortured in prison; 156,758 Tibetans 
were summarily executed; 432,705 Tibetans were killed in fighting; and 92,731 more 'struggled to 
death.'  In all,  more than 1.2 million Tibetans have been killed, out of a population of just over 6 
million. The typical government reprisal for calling for an independent Tibet, carrying a Tibetan flag, 
or possessing or distributing books by H.H. the Dalai Lama includes long periods of imprisonment, 
often  accompanied  by  torture,  solitary  confinement,  and  forced  labor.  Over  6,000  Buddhist 
monasteries have been destroyed, and the monasteries’ religious texts, statutes, and artifacts have been 
burned, broken, or sold abroad.
A  2008  Amnesty  International  report  states  that  “[f]reedom  of  religion,  expression  and 
association of Tibetans continued to be severely restricted [...] Peaceful expressions of support for 
the  Dalai  Lama continued to  be  harshly  punished.  Efforts to  pass  information  abroad about 
crackdowns against Tibetans were harshly punished” (AI 2008). Any form of political dissent 
within Tibet appears to be encountered by Chinese authorities with harsh reprisals, frequently 
involving torture and death. Religious activity is tightly controlled and repressed. International 
media repeatedly reports on human rights violations in Tibet, including torture, arbitrary arrest, 
inhibition of religious freedom and the exclusion of Tibetans from political participation. Time 
and again, the situation Tibetans face in Tibet leads to demonstrations, protests and uprisings, 
despite the invariable oppressive reactions they engender. Countless studies and reports relate the 
immense suffering of Tibetans under Chinese rule. Hundreds of thousands of Tibetans have fled 
into exile. What kind of development is taking place in Tibet when the Tibetan perspective is 
taken into account?
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A discussion on 'development' in Tibet hinges on one's perspective. Beyond doubt, economic 
development has taken place in Tibet since the PRC came to power and particularly since the 
opening  of  China  to  the  world  economy and  the  subsequent  economic  expansion.  By  some 
(important) measures, 'development'  has indeed taken place. China is modernizing Tibet. It is 
investing,  building  infrastructure  and  promoting  industries.  Per  capita  income  is  rising, 
employment is being created and certain social indicators, such as life expectancy and literacy are 
reportedly  improving.  In  a  March  2009  CNN  interview, the  director  of  the  China  National 
Association of International Studies, Victor Gao, states:
[I]f you look at the track record over the past fifty years, life expectancy for the Tibetans have [sic] 
almost  doubled,  and  Tibet  has  been  achieving  double-digit  growth  rates  ever  since  1994;  living 
standards have improved significantly, and infrastructure build up – including the major railway – has 
been completed. So I think if you look at the track record over the past 50 years, facts speak for 
themselves (Gao 2009).
A March 2009 Report on the Economic and Social Development of Tibet, produced by the China 
Tibetology Research Center  and available at  the official website of the Chinese government, 
publishes a number of social and economic indicators for Tibet:5 From 1959 to 2008, total GDP 
of Tibet increased from 174 million to 39,591 billion yuan; GDP per capita increased from 142 to 
13,861 yuan over the same period. GDP growth was particularly strong since 1984,  when it 
totaled  just  over  1.3  billion  yuan.  The  report  continues  that  “average  life  expectancy  is  an 
important index of human development. The current average life expectancy in Tibet is 67 years 
[...] In contrast, the figure was only 35.5 in old Tibet” (CTRC 2009). Before the “democratic 
reform,” the illiteracy rate in Tibet was 95%. According to the report, the illiteracy rate has been 
reduced to under 2.4%.
In a statement to Reuters, the Dalai Lama noted: “I recognize that in all these years, the Chinese 
have modernized Tibet in certain ways. They have built schools, hospitals, roads, houses. But at 
the same time, they are introducing political education in schools and this is based on Chinese 
culture. The risk is of the extinction of our culture” (cited from Barnett 2001:314).
When a group of people is largely deprived of ownership and participation in its development 
process, when it suffers under foreign occupation and repression by an authoritarian regime, what 
can it do? Or better, what can an exile government do when it fears “cultural extinction” in its 
homeland while  facing a  political  and economic power as  vast  as China,  with  an  estimated 
population of over 1.3 billion and with more troops than there are Tibetan civilians?
5 The following is cited from (CTRC 2009).
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This question is not easy to answer, and an attempt at answering it would exceed the scope of this 
paper. As argued below,6 a major objective of exile governments tends to be the mobilization of 
international  financial,  moral  and  political  support.  The  Tibetan exile  government  has  been 
extremely  successful  in  the  mobilization of  such  support,  even  though it  has  ultimately  not 
achieved the regaining of its homeland.
In many ways the Tibetan case is quite unique. But nevertheless, an analysis of some factors that 
have led to certain successes, might possibly be applicable to other cases where groups of people 
perhaps face a similar challenge. As is subsequently argued, soft power has played a substantial 
role in producing some desirable outcomes for the Tibetan leadership.
In my judgment, knowledge of soft power can be very useful for a wide variety of development 
objectives.  When  significant  hard  power  resources  are  lacking,  as  is  the  tendency  in  many 
developing societies and unrepresented peoples, soft power7 can be a valuable resource. When a 
group is dependent on international support to further its cause, knowledge and application of soft 
power can be of  much help.  When, say, an oppressed indigenous society manages to attract 
considerable numbers of individuals to its values and purposes, particularly within the powerful 
Western countries,  pressure  can be  exerted  on  the  oppressing government  and funds  can be 
raised.  Additionally, when  decisions  are  made  over  the  distribution  of  loans  or  grants,  soft 
'attractive'  power  is  certainly  involved.  The  availability  of  hard-power  resources  and  the 
importance of soft-power resources can be said to have a negative correlation: The scarcity of 
hard-power resources increases the importance of soft-power. The ability to attract international 
attention, followers and supporters, or lack thereof, can be decisive for the success or failure of a 
social endeavour. In a sense, the present paper is a case study of this ability. The Tibetan exile 
government has been highly successful in attracting attention and support from around the world.
1.3. Research Questions
My intention in this essay, in a nutshell, is to explore and analyze the soft-power resources of the 
Tibetan government in exile in the international context. Using soft power as a theoretical lens 
6 See section 3.13.2 'Objectives of Exile Governments in Theory.'
7 In the sense of a resource per se that can contribute to the achievement of objectives, not as a complement to hard 
power.
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through which the Government in Exile shall be examined, the following research questions will 
be addressed:
What are the soft-power resources of the Tibetan government in exile?
How has the TGE's soft power contributed or not, to approaching the achievement of 
its objectives?
An endeavour to answer these questions raises a number of further questions: What are soft-
power resources? What is the Tibetan government in exile? What are its objectives? In what ways 
have some of these objectives been accomplished? This paper is structured in accordance with 
these questions.
1.4. Chapter Outline
An introduction to the theory of soft power is offered in Part 2, which seeks to explain soft power 
and to define the term soft-power resources. Part 3 outlines the structure and organization of the 
Tibetan  government  in  exile.  It  introduces  the  three-branch  political  system  and  addresses 
representational claims, the position of the 14th Dalai Lama, the TGE's relation to exile Tibetan 
'NGOs,' the process of democratization of the exile government, the status of women, Tibetan 
Buddhism and politics,  as  well  as  the  TGE's  approach to  the  exile  struggle.  Part  3  ends by 
examining the TGE's objectives, particularly in relation to the international sphere. Part 4 deals 
with one major objective of the TGE – that of achieving international support. A brief analysis 
will attend to the degree of international support that Tibet has attained in recent years. Parts 5, 6 
and  7  analyze  the  Tibetan exile  government's  soft  power  resources.  Part  5  introduces  and 
discusses the Myth of Tibet, demonstrating how it acts as a soft-power resource for the TGE and 
as fertile ground for Tibetan identity representations. Part 6 deals with the person of the 14th Dalai 
Lama  as  an  agent  of  soft  power,  and  Part  7  looks  as  how  the  values  represented  and 
communicated by the TGE act as soft-power resources. The conclusion, Part 8, returns to and 
endeavours to answer the above research questions.
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PART 2 – The Theory of Soft Power
2.1 Introduction to the Theory of Soft Power
Part 2 of this paper constitutes the theoretical outline for the arguments to follow in the latter 
sections. It intends to give the reader an overview of the theoretical concept of  soft power, the 
lens through which the success of the Tibetan exile government in attracting international support 
shall be examined further on.
First  and  foremost,  soft  power  will  be  explained  as  a  theoretical  concept  and  a  number  of 
examples are given for clarification of the theory. In a next step, soft power is contrasted with 
hard power. After a brief historic overview of the term soft power, the importance of soft power 
in the global information age will be addressed. The term soft-power resources will be defined in 
the  ensuing section.  Part  2  ends  with a  discussion  on using the  theory of  soft  power as  an 
analytical tool.
For the purpose of this essay, soft power is described and used in the sense that Joseph S. Nye, 
Jr., who coined the term, understands it. This section is mainly based on Nye's 2004 publication 
Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics.8
2.2 What is Soft Power?
What is  soft  power? It  is  the ability to  get what  you want  through attraction rather than through 
coercion or  payments.  It  arises  from the attractiveness of  a  country's  culture,  political  ideals,  and 
policies (Nye 2004a:x).
In simple terms, power can be defined as “the capability of acting or of producing an effect.”9 
Nye (2004a:2) defines power as the “capacity to produce desired outcomes” (ibid:150) and, more 
specifically, as the “ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants.” 
The behaviour of others can be influenced in a variety of ways. One of these ways is to get others 
to want what you want by attracting and co-opting them. In essence, this is the wielding of soft 
power.
8 Nye (2004a).
9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, available at: 
http://collections.chadwyck.co.uk/home/home_mwd.jsp (accessed 16.2.2009).
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Soft power is power that arises through attraction. In world politics, a country can achieve its 
desired outcomes because other countries, attracted by the example it sets in terms of values, 
ideology, culture, or policies, want to follow it. “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in 
world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its 
level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. [...] This soft power – getting others to want 
the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Nye 2004a:5).
Insofar as soft power involves the changing of other people's or nation's preferences, it can be 
interpreted as a type of manipulation. However, soft power often functions at very subtle, often 
undeliberate levels, as suggested by some of the examples below. Soft power can be defined as a 
type  of  influence  resulting  from  the  creation  –  deliberate  or  unintentional  –  of  a  positive 
association with oneself in others.
If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place 
– in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction – soft power is at 
work (Nye 2004b:2).
Nye (2004a:6; 2004b:2) makes the important distinction between soft power and influence. While 
influence can also be based on hard power in the form of threats or payments, soft power is 
essentially attractive power. Soft power goes beyond the power gained by argument or through 
persuasion, even though that might be an important part of it.
In the case of soft power, the question is what messages are sent and received by whom under which 
circumstances, and how that affects our ability to obtain the outcomes we want. Messages and images 
are conveyed partly by government policies at home and abroad, and partly by popular and higher 
culture. But the same messages are 'downloaded' and interpreted with different effects by different 
receivers in different settings. Soft power is not a constant, but something that varies by time and place 
(Nye 2004a:44).
An important aspect of soft power is the fact that it is not entirely in governments' hands, nor is it 
ever  entirely  controllable  by  government  or  anybody  else.  Beyond  doubt,  government  and 
particularly foreign policies have a strong impact on a country's soft power. But the civil society, 
non-governmental actors, popular and high culture, and values associated with culture are equally 
important in increasing or reducing soft power. “[S]oft power [...] is in part a social and economic 
by-product rather than solely a result of official government action” (Nye 2004a:32). 
Soft power also depends on the recipient. One and the same policy or phenomenon can produce 
differing effects in different contexts. “American films that make the United States attractive in 
China or Latin America may have the opposite effect and actually reduce American soft power in 
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Saudi Arabia or Pakistan” (Nye 2004a:12). In Iran, for instance, “the same Hollywood images 
that repel the ruling mullahs may be attractive to the younger generation” (ibid:13).
Soft power so far has been portrayed as being mainly a phenomenon concerning governments. 
Although Nye concentrates his conceptualization of soft power on nation states and, in particular, 
the United States of America, he does explicitly state that soft power is not limited to countries. 
Many non-state actors are highly relevant in terms of soft power on the international stage. NGOs 
have the capability to attract followers, which forces governments to take them into account both 
as allies and adversaries (Nye 2004a:90). Organized religious movements have had soft power for 
centuries.  “The  Roman Catholic  church is  organized on  a  global  scale,  and many Catholics 
around the world adhere to its teachings on issues like birth control and abortion because of 
attraction, not coercion” (Nye 2004a:94). Corporate brand names equally possess soft power, as 
do intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. Nye 
(2004a:30-2;90-8) projects that the trends of the information age10 will contribute to an increase 
in the soft power of non-state actors.
Soft power has always been a key element of leadership. The power to attract—to get others to want 
what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda—has its roots in thousands of years of human 
experience.  Skillful  leaders  have always understood that  attractiveness  stems  from credibility  and 
legitimacy. Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun (Nye 2004b:4).
Nye (2004a) illustrates the concept of soft power using various real world examples both at the 
general level and the more specific level of international relations of the past and present. A few 
of these examples shall now be cited to further clarify the concept of soft power to the reader.
“Much  of  American  soft  power  has  been  produced  by  Hollywood,  Harvard,  Microsoft,  and 
Michael Jordan” (Nye 2004a:17). Since 2008, Barack Obama appears to be a major source of soft 
power for the United States.
“Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.” (ibid:5) At the personal level 
for instance, the larger or physically stronger partner in a relationship is not necessarily the more 
powerful one. Where power resides, depends on “the mysterious chemistry of attraction” (ibid). 
Similarly, in  business,  leadership  is  not  only  a  question of  command power, but  leading by 
example  and  attracting  others  to  one's  own  purposes  are  important  elements  of  successful 
leadership.  “It  is  difficult  to  run  a  large  organization  by  commands  alone”  (ibid).  Another 
10 See section 2.5 'Soft Power in a Global Information Age.'
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example given by Nye relates to present-day methods of community-based policing, which strive 
to make the police “sufficiently friendly and attractive that  a community wants to help them 
achieve shared objectives” (ibid:6).
In the arena of international relations, according to Nye, the United States is currently the country 
with the largest soft-power  ressources,  the closest  competitors  being the countries  of Europe 
(ibid:75). Measures11 for American soft power include: the number of immigrants it attracts each 
year, which is six times that of second-ranked Germany; the fact that the United States is by far 
the world's number one exporter of films and television shows; the number of foreign university 
students enrolled (28 percent of all students studying in a foreign country were enrolled in the 
United States); or the fact that the USA ranks first in Nobel prizes awarded in physics, chemistry 
and economics (ibid:33-4).
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union engaged in a massive campaign to foster its soft power, 
attempting to promote the attractiveness of its communist system. “The USSR [...] placed great 
emphasis on demonstrating the superiority of its cultural and educational systems, spending large 
sums on the arts” (Nye 2004a:74). It attracted many people in Europe due to its resistance to 
Hitler, and many in Asia and Africa because of its opposition to European imperialism (ibid:73). 
The Soviet Union's soft power declined after its brutal invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
In these cases, its “hard power actually undercut its soft power” (ibid:9).
Presently, there are certain countries that enjoy greater influence on the stage of international 
relations than their military or economic power would suggest. A typical example is Norway, 
which has been contributing actively to peace talks concerning conflicts in the Middle East, Latin 
America or Asia during the past two decades. These contributions have exposed Norway as a 
peacemaker. Such a status is associated with values that are shared with many other nations, and 
hence has enhanced Norway's soft  power in the international political arena (Nye 2004a:10). 
Other scandinavian countries or Canada enjoy similarly high levels of soft power due to their 
propagation of peace, their dedication to multilateralism, and their relative generosity concerning 
foreign aid.
11 The following figures are from 2004.
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2.3 Soft Power and Hard Power
The aim of this section is to clarify the difference between hard power – the power to coerce, and 
soft power – the power to attract (Nye 2004b:1).
There are a variety of ways to achieve desired outcomes. In terms of affecting the behaviour of 
others, “[y]ou can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can 
attract and co-opt them to want what you want” (Nye 2004a:2). In effect, these are the three types 
of power in the field of international relations according to Nye's conceptualization. The first two 
types, military and economic power, fall into the category of hard power. The latter is soft power.
Hard power as well as soft power relate to the ability to affect the behaviour of others according 
to one's own preferences and objectives. The distinction between them is one of degree, both 
regarding the types of behaviour involved and the tangibility of the resources employed (see 
Table 1).
Table 1: Power
Hard Soft
Spectrum of Behaviours                     coercion    inducement
Command
agenda
setting          attraction          Co-opt
Most Likely Resources                            force           payments
                           sanctions    bribes
institutions   values
                     culture
                     policies
  Source: Nye (2004a:8)
According to Nye's model, behaviour for influencing others ranges along a spectrum with one 
extreme being command power and the other being co-option. Coercion – usually  military – and 
inducement – usually economic – are the prevalent types of behaviour linked to command power.
Co-optive power – the ability to shape what others want – can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture 
and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others 
fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. [...] Soft-power resources tend 
to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behaviour, whereas hard-power resources 
are usually associated with command power (Nye 2004a:7).
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However,  Nye  also  points  out  the  imperfection  of  this  relationship:  Sometimes  countries 
exercising command power enjoy a power status that is in part based on attraction caused by the 
existence of myths. Both Hitler and Stalin for example tried to develop myths of invincibility or 
inevitability,  thereby attracting others (ibid:9). In other cases command power can be used to 
build institutions which later act as agents of soft power. Hard power can thus in certain situations 
create soft power. A vibrant economy can produce hard power resources for, say, payments or 
sanctions,  but  can at  the same time act  as a  source of attractiveness.  Along the same lines, 
economic and military decline is likely not only to affect hard power, but also attractiveness, 
hence soft power. Hard power can also undermine soft power, as has been observed in the case of 
countless military aggressions.12 Nye argues that American military aggressions in Afghanistan 
and particularly Iraq undercut American soft power considerably, as had been the case during the 
Vietnam War (Nye 2004a:26-7; 35).
Despite these inconsistencies, the relationship between hard and soft power, the different types of 
behaviour involved and the respective resources required,  is strong enough to act as a useful 
model (Nye 2004a:8).
Table 2:  Three Types of Power
Behaviours Primary Currencies Government Policies
Military Power coercion
deterrence
protection
threats
force
coercive diplomacy
war
alliance
Economic Power inducement
coercion
payments
sanctions
aid
bribes
sanctions
Soft Power attraction
agenda setting
values
culture
policies
institutions
public diplomacy
bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy
  Source: (Nye 2004a:31)
12 “As was observed during an Aspen Institute round table, 'soft power supports the exercise of military and hard 
economic powers, and arrogant or unjust use of hard power can erode soft power'” (Bollier 2003:17, cited from 
Hocking 2007:33).
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Table 2 summarizes this section, clarifying once again the distinction between the three types of 
power  according to  Nye's  conceptualization,  in  terms of  behaviours,  primary  currencies  and 
government policies.
2.4 Brief History of the Term Soft Power
The history of the term soft power is recent. The term was first introduced by Joseph S. Nye in 
his 1990 publication  Bound to Lead.13 In the ensuing years, the term entered public discourse, 
being used by scholars, editorial writers, and political leaders around the world (Nye 2004a:xi). 
According to Nye (2004a:150), he builds his concept on what Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz 
called the 'second face of power.'14
The term soft power is now generally accepted and widely used.15 Particularly in relation to the 
foreign policy approach of U.S. President Barack Obama and his administration, the  term soft  
power  is  frequently used in international  media.16 However, the battle for foreign 'hearts and 
minds'  fought  by  political  leaders  is  by  no  means  recent.  Melissen (2007:3)  points  out  that 
“[r]eferences to the nation and its image go as far back as the Bible, and international relations in 
ancient Greece and Rome, Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance were familiar with diplomatic 
activity aimed at foreign publics.” The invention of the printing press in the 15th century had a 
massive impact on the remoulding of foreign public opinions in Europe. The French  Ancien 
Régime in  particular  put  tremendous effort into  influencing its country's  reputation,  which it 
considered one of the prime sources of a nation's power. Another example is Turkey under Kemal 
Atatürk, which endeavoured considerably to alter its identity and image as perceived in foreign 
countries (ibid.).
In 1939, British realist E. H. Carr classified power in international relations in three categories: 
military power, economic power, and power over opinion (Nye 2004a:8). “Power over opinion, 
[...] the third form of power, [...] is [...] not less essential for political purposes than military and 
economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has 
always been a necessary part of the equipment of political leader” [sic] (Carr 2001:120).
13 Nye (1990); see also Nye (2004a:150).
14 See Bachrach/Baratz (1962; 1963).
15 See for instance Melissen (2007:4), Hocking (2007:33), Anon. (2006).
16 For example Astier (2008); Harris (2009); Kristof (2009).
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Over the past  years,  numerous publications on soft  power have been released. For  example, 
Joshua Kurlantzick's (2007)  Charm Offensive: How China's  Soft  Power Is  Transforming the  
World,  concentrates  on  how  China's  soft  power  is  aiding  it  in  the  accomplishment  of  its 
objectives, particularly in Asia and Africa, but also in the international sphere at large. It was 
described as “a well-researched examination of China's 'peaceful rise'  by way of soft power” 
(Gomez 2007). In The Arts of Influence: Soft Power and Distant Relationships, Hugh MacDonald 
(2008) applies the concept of soft power on workplace relationships. The New Public Diplomacy  
– Soft Power in International Relations, edited by Dr Melissen (2007), gives insight into how the 
theory of soft power has entered the study and practice of international relations.
The term soft power has become integral part of the discourse regarding public diplomacy and 
international relations.
2.5 Soft Power in a Global Information Age
While advocating the importance of taking soft power into account in world politics, Nye (2004a) 
makes  numerous  references  to  the  current  global  information  age.  Globalization  and  the 
information and internet revolution are transforming the context in which political and power 
struggle take place. Borderless virtual communities and networks are changing politics. Many 
transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations will enjoy increasing levels of soft 
power, and attract citizens without consideration of national borders (Nye 2004a:30-2). 
Particularly in the current information age, where the transmission and processing of information 
has become very cheap, Nye expects soft power to gain importance relative to the other types of 
power.
The countries that are likely to be more attractive and gain soft power in the information age are those 
with multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues; whose dominant culture and ideas 
are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy); and 
whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies (ibid:31-2).
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2.6 Definition of Soft-Power Resources
In behavioural terms, Nye defines soft power as attractive power. In terms of resources, soft-
power  resources  are  understood  as  the  assets  that  produce  such  attraction.  “In  international 
politics, the ressources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization 
or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, 
and in the way it handles its relations with others” (Nye 2004a:8).
The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive 
personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having 
moral authority (Nye 2004b:2).
Corresponding to the intangibility  of soft  power, the resources that  produce it  tend to  be of 
intangible nature. Nye (2004a:11) states:
The soft  power of  a  country  rests  primarily  on three resources:  its  culture  (in  places  where  it  is 
attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign 
policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.)
Nye (ibid.) defines culture as a “set of values and practices that create meaning for a society.” If 
these values and practices are attractive to others, they have the potential to create influence. 
“When a country's culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests 
that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the 
relationships of attraction and duty that it creates” (Nye 2004a:11).
For example, the United States benefits from its universalistic culture, because many throughout 
the world feel attracted by it (Nye 2004a:11-13). The values associated with Tibetan culture and 
religion,  such  as  compassion,  tolerance,  peacefulness  or  non-violence,  are  attractive  to,  and 
shared by many Westerners. Such values are examples for soft-power resources that benefit the 
Tibetan exile government, as will be argued in this paper.
Political  values  can  be  another  major  soft-power  resource.  Groups  striving  for  political 
representation in autocratic countries will be attracted by the political value of democracy as 
embodied by the more democratic countries. If a political value is shared by others, it will act as 
an attractive force benefitting those that communicate it. Many political “values like democracy, 
human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive” (Nye 2004a:x).
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Soft power can also stem from a country's foreign policies. If these are seen as hypocritical and 
illegitimate, they will tend to alienate and repell many people, as was the case with the USA 
resulting from the  Iraq  War (Nye 2004a:14).  But  if  foreign policies  are  seen to  have  moral 
authority, and are communicated in a way that makes them seem to correspond to other people's 
interests, they can be a strong soft-power resource.
The  values  a  government  champions  in  its  behaviour  at  home  (for  example,  democracy),  in 
international institutions (working with others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human 
rights) strongly affect the preferences of others (Nye 2004a:14).
But soft-power resources are not entirely in the control of governments. Cultural attraction can be 
a soft-power resource that  is largely outside government control.  Shared values are hence an 
important soft-power resource. In relationships between states or groups of people, shared values 
and purposes have considerable implications in terms of exerting influence and power. Shared 
values can indicate an “observable but intangible attraction” (Nye 2004a:7). Every value that a 
certain group communicates as being inherent in its culture and way of life or to its politics, that 
is shared in another group, can act as a soft-power resource.
The charisma of a central political figure or the leader of an organization can also act as a soft-
power resource (Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King are a few examples). 
If a leader is widely respected and perceived as committed to a just cause, to values that people 
can identify with, his statements will receive attention and his personality will attract people to 
supporting his agenda.
“[A]ttraction often has a diffuse effect of creating general influence, rather than producing an 
easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up 
political capital to be drawn upon in future circumstances” (Nye 2004b:3).  Nye makes it quite 
clear that the possession of soft-power resources do not necessarily lead to desired outcomes. It 
depends on many factors, particularly on the recipient.  “Attraction does not always determine 
others' preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the 
outcomes of behaviour is not unique to soft power. It  occurs with all forms of power” (Nye 
2004a.6). Nye uses World War II as an example: Eventhough Britain and France had more tanks 
than Germany, France fell in 1940. The “advantage in military power resources did not accurately 
predict the outcome of the battle” (ibid.).
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Major soft-power resources are thus shared values, the engagement in causes that are perceived 
as just, and a charismatic political leader. Many more examples of soft-power resources could be 
listed here, however for the purpose of this section, i.e. the clarification of the term, we will stick 
with the broad definition of  soft-power resources as being the  assets that produce attraction in 
terms of soft power.
2.7 Using the Theory of Soft Power as an analytical Tool
Soft  power  is  a  recent  theory  and  it  has  not  been  embraced  entirely  without  critique.  Jim 
Hoagland, columnist for the Washington Post,  for instance, complained that the concept of soft  
power, similar to globalization, is too “elastic” to be useful (cited from Nye 2006). Nye (ibid.) 
counters  that  Hoagland  “fails  to  understand  the  difference  between  power  resources  and 
behavior.” As discussed above,17 the possession of soft-power resources do not automatically lead 
to desired outcomes.
Nye (2006) argues that
it’s quite possible to quantify sources of soft power. One can, for example, measure and compare the 
cultural,  communications,  and  diplomatic  resources  that  might  produce  soft  power  for  a  country. 
Public opinion polls can quantify changes in a country’s attractiveness over time. Nor is hard power as 
easy to quantify as Hoagland seems to believe. The apparent precision of the measurement of hard 
power resources is often spurious and might be called “the concrete fallacy” – the notion that the only 
important resources are those that can be dropped on your foot (or on a city). That’s a mistake. The 
United States had far more measurable military resources than North Vietnam, but it nonetheless lost 
the Vietnam War.
Whether  soft  power actually transforms into concrete and tangible outcomes depends on the 
context and on “the skills with which the resources are converted into outcomes” (Nye 2006).
Soft power is a reality. Although it might not be the most straight-forward theory to apply, given 
the intangible nature of soft power, the model does help to explain the surge in Western support 
for the Tibetan cause in recent decades.
17 See section 2.6 'Definition of Soft-Power Resources.'
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Part 2 has set the theoretical foundation for exploring the soft-power resources of the Tibetan 
exile government. Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve desired outcomes through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments, and examples have been provided to draw a clearer 
picture of the concept. Soft-power resources have been determined as the assets that produce 
attraction in terms of soft power, for instance an attractive personality, shared values or policies 
perceived as just. The following part introduces the Tibetan exile government.
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PART 3 – Outline of the Tibetan Government in Exile – Structure, 
Organization, Objectives
3.1 Introduction to the Tibetan Government in Exile
In line with an approach to the central research questions of this paper, Part 3 offers an outline of 
the Tibetan government in exile.18 Vast literature has been published on the TGE. The following 
account is tailored for the purpose of this essay: To explore the soft-power resources of the TGE 
and to examine how they have contributed to the possible achievement of its objectives. Part 3 
deals with some central questions regarding the exile government: Who are we talking about 
when we speak of the exile government? Who does it  represent? How is it  organized? What 
position does the 14th Dalai Lama hold? In what ways are exile Tibetan NGOs related to the 
TGE? Can the exile Tibetan political system be described as democratic? What status do women 
have? What is the relationship between religion and politics? How does the TGE approach the 
exile struggle? What are the TGE's objectives?
In 1951 the  Seventeen-Point Agreement19 was signed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
and the Tibetan government, granting Tibet internal autonomy and allowing China suzerainty 
over Tibet in foreign affairs. In the ensuing years the resistance movement in Tibet as well as 
China's aspiration to political dominance intensified, leading to the Lhasa uprising in 1959 and 
the flight into Indian exile of the 14th Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader of Tibet. A 
mass  exodus  out  of  Tibet and  into  the  neighbouring  countries  of  India,  Bhutan  and  Nepal 
followed (Korom 1997a:1). By 1962, about 85,000 Tibetans had arrived in exile. In 1980, the 
number of Tibetans in exile had reached around 100,000 (Methfessel 1995:37). According to 
official figures of the exile leadership, there are currently around 122,000 Tibetans in exile. The 
majority  of  Tibetans in  exile  live  in  53  settlements20 in  India,  Nepal  and  Bhutan  (Roemer 
2008b:31).
18 For an account on the early years of the Tibetan diaspora and the struggles associated with the settlement in new 
environments, see Roemer (2008a:58-87). For a discussion on early Tibetan history until the Chinese occupation, 
see von Brück (2004:11-39). On the invasion of Tibet and its aftermath, see Heath (2005:91-111). For a Tibetan 
perspective on the political circumstances of the Chinese occupation from 1950 to 1959, including the early 
Tibetan exiles in the 1950s, see Tethong (2000:42-53).
19 For a detailed account on the Seventeen-Point Agreement, see Goldstein (2007:99-113), on the implementation of 
the Seventeen-Point Agreement, see Goldstein (2007:301-313).
20 Most of these Tibetan settlements were constructed during the 1960s.
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Immediate necessities after arriving in exile included the installation of a central administration 
for governing the exile community, the establishment of educational facilities for the refugee 
children, and the planning for the economic development of the people (Boyd 2004:24). The 
major objectives at this point were the creation of an independent economic basis for the refugee 
communities, and the conservation of the traditional Tibetan culture (Methfessel 1995:42). The 
14th Dalai Lama initiated the establishment of a Tibetan exile government on Indian soil.21
McLeod Ganj, a former British hill station 500 km north of New Delhi, on the slopes above the 
town of Dharamsala in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, became the seat of the Tibetan 
government in exile (TGE) in 1960. The town, also known as “Little Lhasa” (Kollmar-Paulenz 
2006:174), has become almost entirely Tibetan: one finds Tibetan shops, hotels and restaurants, 
Tibetan schools and Buddhist temples. The Tibetan government district is located in Gangchen 
Kyishong, half  way between Dharamsala  and McLeod Ganj (Methfessel  1995:42).  The main 
duties of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the executive organ of the TGE, include the 
organization  and  administration  of  the  refugee  community, and  the  guiding  of  the  Tibetan 
struggle for national self-rule (Phuntso 2004:125). Buddhism and democracy, a combination of 
traditional  values  with  Western political  concepts,  are  the  main  principles  characterizing  the 
structure and policies of the CTA (Roemer 2008a:90).
3.2 Who does the Central Tibetan Administration represent?
Phuntso (2004:126) states that “[t]he Tibetans, both inside and outside Tibet, recognise the CTA 
as  their  sole  and  legitimate  government.  It  is  also  increasingly  recognised  as  the  legitimate 
government and true representative of the Tibetan people by parliaments around the world.” The 
statement is a self-portrayal of the CTA, reproduced from an official CTA publication (CTA, cited 
from Roemer 2008a:88). Roemer's (ibid.) approach is somewhat more critical: “This statement 
portrays the CTA as sole representative of the Tibetan nation, which enjoys national loyalty and is 
internationally  recognized in that  position.  But  the  reality  shows that  the  CTA lacks  official 
international recognition and also struggles with the loyalties within the Tibetan community.”
21 For details on the dynamics between the 14th Dalai Lama, Nehru and the PRC leadership in the early 1960s see 
Guha (2008:306-41).
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It is a fact that the CTA has not been officially recognized by a single country in the world as 
being the legitimate government of Tibet. “Most foreign governments acknowledge that Tibet is 
now a part of China. [...] International law affecting China also covers Tibet and in that sense 
confirms Chinese sovereignty” (Heath 2005:251). Numerous parliaments and heads of state have 
indeed invited the Dalai Lama22 and this is tantamount to a certain acknowledgement of the Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetan cause. However, on most occasions the Dalai Lama was invited, at least 
officially, as a religious and spiritual leader, not as the political leader of the exile government of 
Tibet, that  seeks support  for the achievement of autonomy or independence for his occupied 
homeland.
Roemer (2008a:90) argues that the “fact that no sovereign state recognized the CTA did not alter 
the position of the functioning  de-facto legitimate leadership of the 14th Dalai  Lama and his 
officials in the exile Tibetan community as a whole.” The claim to legitimate representation of 
the Tibetan nation derives from a direct link between the CTA and the pre-1959 government in 
Lhasa, the capital of Tibet.23 The establishment of the exile government originally followed the 
same structure and employed the same personnel as the Tibetan government prior to Chinese 
occupation. The old elite was recognized by the government of India and most international 
organizations to act on behalf of the Tibetans in exile (Roemer 2008a:88-90). “The single most 
important  variable  underlying the  successful  initial  adaptation  of  the  Tibetans,” according to 
Melvyn Goldstein,  is  the  continuation of the traditional  political  structures,  which proved to 
possess a high “adaptive capacity” (cited from Roemer 2008a:89-90).
Although the CTA under the authority of the Dalai Lama is widely accepted among Tibetans, the 
loyalties are not  entirely undisputed, as the example of the Shugden controversy illustrates.24 
Nevertheless, the political strength of the CTA within the exile community is considerable. It is 
mainly based on the Tibetan peoples' loyalty to the Dalai Lama. Roemer (2008a:96) cites Tsering 
Wangyal saying: “Most people do and will continue to recognize Dharamsala [the CTA] as the 
only legitimate Tibetan Government as long as it is headed by the Dalai Lama.”
22 See section 4.5 'Western Government and Parliamentary Support for Tibet.'
23 For information on the Tibetan government around 1951, see Goldstein (2007:2-13).
24 The worship of Dorje Shugden, an obscure three-eyed deity, was banned by the Dalai Lama, since he views it as 
harmful to the Tibetan cause. The unquestioned power of the Dalai Lama over Tibetan affairs is considered 
problematic  by  Shugden-followers.  Disagreements  are  both  spiritual  and  political.  For  more  detail  on  the 
Shugden controversy, or “Shugden affair”, see Chhaya (2007:187-194); Lopez (1998:188-196). The controversy 
also illustrates the power of the 14th Dalai Lama within the Tibetan exile community, see Roemer (2008a:97-8).
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3.3 The Charter of the Tibetan Refugee Community
In  1961  the  first  draft  of  a  constitution  for  Tibet,  the Constitution  for  Future  Tibet was 
promulgated by the newly formed government in exile. This draft constitution was continuously 
reworked  over  the  years.  At  the  urging of  the  Dalai  Lama,  a  Tibet Constitution  Redrafting 
Committee was established in 1990, with the task to “formulate a draft democratic constitution 
for future Tibet [for the case that Tibet should become autonomous or independent] and a charter 
for the Tibetans while in exile” (TGE 2).25 The Constitution for Future Tibet was drafted for an 
independent  Tibet  and  “could  not  be  faithfully  implemented  in  an  exiled  setting”  (Tsomo 
2004:156). A document was prepared for the interim period in exile, the Charter for Tibetans in 
Exile. After circulating a draft of this charter with 108 articles among exile Tibetans “to elicit the 
public's response and suggestions” (ibid.), the charter was passed by the 11th Assembly of the 
Tibetan People's Deputies (ATPD) and the Dalai Lama. It was promulgated on 14 June 1991.
According to the Tibetan government in exile (TGE 2)26, essential elements laid down by the 
charter include:
- to uphold the principles of non-violence as laid down in the teachings of Tibetan religious traditions;
- to be a social welfare and federal democratic Republic;
- to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as specified by the United Nations;
- to emphasize the promotion of the moral and material welfare of the Tibetan people to achieve their 
common goal of Tibet's independence;27
- to provide to all Tibetans equality before the law and the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Charter without discrimination of sex, race, language, religious status, social origin, or 
economic position;
- to endeavour to conform to the generally accepted principles of international laws of host countries.
The Charter of Tibetans in Exile consists of 11 chapters with 115 articles and outlines the rights 
and duties of  the  exiled community. “The Charter  is  the supreme law governing the Central 
Tibetan Administration and is binding on all Tibetans under the jurisdiction of the Government-
in-Exile [...] It [...] complies with International Law and more importantly with the laws of India” 
(Tsomo 2004:156).
25 In the following, abbreviations followed by a number in brackets refer to citations from websites.
26 On the Charter, see also Boyd (2004:26).
27 It should be noted here, that this statement is in contradiction with the aspiration to 'genuine autonomy' as laid 
down in the Strasbourg Proposal, promulgated by the Dalai Lama in 1988, which has since then been the basis 
for the TGE's approach. This inconsistency could indicate incoherence in the policy approach of the exile Tibetan 
political elite, or an out-of-dateness of the website.
29
The system of government provided for by the Charter of Tibetans in Exile consists of executive, 
legislative and judicial branches. The Charter also provides the Dalai Lama with “controlling 
mechanisms to intervene in every governmental affair” (Roemer 2008a:94). The 14th Dalai Lama 
is hence the ruling institution of the Tibetan exile government and “holds ultimate legislative, 
executive and judiciary powers  – competences that  are still  determined by the Indian hosts” 
(ibid.).28
3.4 The Position of the 14th Dalai Lama
The exact nature of the Tibetan state is difficult to define; perhaps the most useful theoretical definition 
is that of legitimacy based upon charismatic authority, as proposed by Max Weber (Ardley 2002:86).
In order to gain insight into the functioning of the Tibetan government in exile, it is essential to 
understand the particular position and meaning of the Dalai Lama for the Tibetan people, and his 
position within the exile government.
The institutionalization of the Dalai Lama began in 1578, when the Mongolian lord Altan Khan 
named the Gelugpa29 monk Sonam Gyatso (1543-1588) 'Dalai Lama' (='Sea of Wisdom'). In fact, 
Sonam Gyatso was the third Dalai Lama, as the first two were named retrospectively. Arguably, 
the  Dalai  Lama  is  the  most  famous  tulku,30 an  incarnate  lama  that,  while  having  reached 
enlightenment, voluntarily chooses rebirth purely out of compassion for other beings (MacMillin 
2001:173). The meaning of the Dalai Lama for Tibetan people is illustrated by the fact that each 
“Dalai Lama is understood as a manifestation or emanation of the bodhisattva31 of compassion, 
Chenrezig, who is himself seen as the patron deity of Tibet, and – in some myths – the progenitor 
of the Tibetan race” (MacMillin 2001:173; von Brück 2005:10).
28 In  practice  the actual  interference  of  the  14th Dalai  Lama in  daily  government  business  is  decreasing,  as  a 
statement of the current Kalon Tripa ('Prime Minister'), the head of the Kashag ('Cabinet'), conveys: “The Charter 
says, His Holiness is the head of government, as well as the head of state. [...] His Holiness has the final authority 
to make any executive decision. [...]  If  we propose anything as advice to His Holiness,  the convention, the 
tradition is that the advice of the kashag is not binding on His Holiness. He has his free will to take any decision 
and that would be binding on the kashag. [...] But now already His Holiness delegates his power more and more 
to the kashag and therefore he doesn't like us to report to him and take his approval on each and every decision” 
(Interview with Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rinpoche by Dagmar Bernstorff on 29 March 2003, cited from: Phuntso 
2004:127-8).
29 Gelugpa  is the politically dominant of the four major Tibetan Buddhist monastic oders (the other three being 
Kadampa, Kagyüpa  and  Sakyapa,  while Bon is the traditional Tibetan religion and not a Buddhist monastic 
order). See von Brück (2004:17).
30 According to Tibetan belief, the term tulku refers to “the bodily emanation of an enlightened being who is able to 
choose the manner, time, and place of his reappearance on earth” (MacMillin 2001:183).
31 A  boddhisattva,  according  to  Buddhist  belief,  is  a  being  that  refrains  from  entering  nirvana  in  order  to 
compassionately help others to attain enlightenment.
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The current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, was born in 1935.32 He is “the fourteenth in a line of 
reappearing lamas, who since the innovations of the 'Great Fifth'33 Dalai Lama (1617-1682) in the 
seventeenth century, have assumed preeminent religious and temporal powers within the Tibetan 
hierarchy” (MacMillin 2001:173). Throughout history, the magnitude of the various Dalai Lamas' 
powers have varied.  Currently however, given the exile situation,  the 14th Dalai  Lama is the 
“single most important figure around which Tibetan identity circulates” (MacMillin 2001:173f).
The status  of the  Dalai  Lama in  the exile  community  is  not  lowered by the  introduction of 
democratic elements to the TGE.34 “Tibetan people's loyalty to him and his leadership remained 
as absolute and unqualified as ever” (Thinley, cited from Roemer 2008a:95). The loyalty to the 
person of the 14th Dalai Lama and the political legitimacy of his power are based on “traditional 
perspectives, according to which he has a divine personality” (Roemer 2008a:95).
Roemer (2008a:98-9) also demonstrates that the Dalai Lama has considerable influence on the 
life of Tibetans within the boundaries of Tibet itself. In 2006, for example, the Dalai Lama urged 
Tibetans to stop wearing wildlife skins and furs as clothing. Despite his absence from Tibet, his 
statement that seeing Tibetans wear furs made him wish “not to live anymore” provoked, within 
days, spontaneous fur-burning campaigns across Tibet in early 2006. By the summer of the same 
year,  wearing  furs  as  clothing  had  become  so  “'politically  incorrect'  that  it  had  virtually 
disappeared.” This is but one example and should be considered with caution. But according to 
Roemer (2008a:99), because of the 14th Dalai Lama's “divine personality, he is a unifying symbol 
for all Tibetans and remains an unquestioned leader, despite his present exile status. His authority 
underpins the legitimacy of the CTA as a continuation of the central government in Lhasa.”
“The Dalai Lama is very strongly identified with Tibet both by Tibetans and non-Tibetans [...] for 
many Tibetans and non-Tibetans, where the Dalai Lama is, there is Tibet: the soul of Tibet need 
not stand on the soil of Tibet” (Lopez 1998:184). In his 1962 autobiography, the 14 th Dalai Lama 
noted: “I am a mortal being [...] but [the Tibetans] believed that Dalai Lama represented Tibet 
and the Tibetan way of life, something dearer to them than anything else. They were convinced 
that if my body perished at the hands of the Chinese, the life of Tibet would also come to an end” 
(cited from Barnett 2001:299).
32 On 14th Dalai Lama's history, see Gyatso (1995); (2001).
33 For details on the 'Great Fifth' Dalai Lama see von Brück (2008:77-85).
34 See section 3.9 'Democratization of the Tibetan Government in Exile.'
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The Dalai Lama's affairs are dealt with by his private office, the Office of His Holiness the Dalai  
Lama (OHHDL). It provides secretarial assistance and takes responsibilities for matters related to 
the Dalai Lama. The main responsibilities of the OHHDL include:
- Organizing the Dalai Lama's schedule, planning appointments and travels;
- Handling his diplomatic, governmental and personal correspondence;
- Acting as the liaison between the Dalai Lama and officials of the TGE (OHHDL 1).
3.5 The Executive
The  executive  branch  of  the  Tibetan exile  government  is  embodied  by  the  Central  Tibetan 
Administration  (CTA) headed  by  the  Dalai  Lama and  the  Kashag,  his  cabinet  of  ministers. 
Kalons – the members of the cabinet or  Kashag – lead the different departments of the CTA 
(Boyd 2004:26).
The Kashag consists of a maximum of seven 'ministers' called Kalon. Earlier, the Kalon, as well 
as the Kalon Tripa (the 'prime minister') were appointed by the Dalai Lama. Since an amendment 
to the Charter of Tibetans in Exile effectuated in 2001, the Kalon Tripa is elected directly by the 
people. In autumn of 2001 an election was held and 80 percent of the votes went to Lobsang 
Tenzin, the 5th Samdhong Rinpoche (Phuntso 2004:126-7).
The responsibilities of the Kashag include the execution of policy decisions made by the ATPD, 
and the supervision of the CTA with its departments.
The  CTA is  organized  into  various  departments  responsible  for  the  daily  administration  of 
Tibetan  affairs  in  exile.  Each  department  is  headed  by  a  Kalon. In  the  following,  short 
introductions  to  each  of  the  departments  are  offered.  The  Department  of  Information  and 
International Relations is dealt with in greater detail,due to its greater relevance to this paper's 
research questions.
The Department of Religion and Culture, founded by the Dalai Lama in 1995, is responsibe for 
the  preservation  and  promotion  of  Tibet's  spiritual  and  cultural  heritage.  It  supports  223 
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monasteries  and  15  nunneries,  with  11,067  monks  and  1,230  nuns.35 The  department  also 
supervises  various  cultural  institutions,  for  example  the  Central  Institute  for  Higher Tibetan 
Studies at  Sarnath  in  Varanasi, the  Library  of  Tibetan Works and Archives and  the  Tibetan 
Institute of Performing Arts, both in Dharamsala (Boyd 2004:27; Phuntso 2004:130).
The Department of Home oversees refugee settlements throughout India. It is responsible for the 
rehabilitation  of  Tibetan  refugees.  This  department  is  organized  into  four  main  divisions, 
responsible for administration, agriculture, planning and development, and welfare, respectively. 
It also liaisons with international organizations that support the rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees 
(Boyd 2004:27; Phuntso 2004:131).
The  Department  of  Finance oversees  and  formulates  the  CTA annual  budget.  Its  income 
generation  activities  used  to  focus  on  the  running  of  business  enterprises  (in  areas  such  as 
handicraft industries, wool and yarn production, agro-processing, transport or tourism). After a 
policy decision by the Kashag, calling governmental entrepreneurial activity in competition with 
private enterprises 'violence' (many of these businesses were also running losses), activities now 
focus on collecting annual voluntary contributions from the Tibetans in exile. The department 
administers the Dalai Lama's Charitable Trust, the Tibetan Administration's Welfare Society and 
the  Social  and Resource Development Fund,  which are non-profit  registered societies for the 
development of the Tibetan community in exile (Boyd 2004:27; TGE 2; Phuntso 2004:131).
The  Department of Education oversees 85 schools throughout India, Nepal,  and Bhutan, that 
educate over 27,000 students. 34 of these schools are run by the Department of Education, the 
remainder by the government of India. The department also runs a child sponsorship scheme and 
provides scholarships for higher education (Boyd 2004:27; TGE 2).
The Department of Security is mainly concerned with the physical well being and safety of the 
Dalai Lama. It also runs reception centers for newly arriving Tibetan refugees in Kathmandu, 
New Delhi and Dharamsala. It supports refugees in their quest for employment or small-scale 
business entrepreneurship, or for the admission into schools and monasteries. The department 
also monitors developments in Tibet and China (Boyd 2004:27; Phuntso 2004:132).
35 Figures from the CTA Department of Religion and Culture from 2002, and from the CTA Planning Council 
Tibetan Demographic Survey of 1998, cited from Phuntso (2004:130).
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The Department of Health, responsible for the health needs of the refugee community in India, 
Nepal and Bhutan, runs health centers in in most of the settlements and six hospitals. It covers the 
costs for emergency treatment of poor Tibetans and, in collaboration with the  Tibetan Medical 
and Astro Institute, it seeks to integrate modern with traditional Tibetan medicine (TGE 2).
The  Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) is responsible for ensuring 
that the Tibetan cause is well publicized and that journals and brochures are printed regularly for 
this  purpose (Boyd 2004:27).  Phuntso (2004:133) states that  the DIIR “educates Tibetan and 
international public opinion on the political, human rights and environmental conditions in Tibet 
via print media, radio and Internet.” In other words, it promotes the exile struggle and current 
conditions in Tibet among all Tibetans and the international public. It also serves as a protocol 
office of the CTA.
The DIIR is responsible for the international affairs of the CTA. The origins of the DIIR lie in the 
Chisee  Lekhung  ('Foreign  Office')  of  the  pre-1959  administration  in  Lhasa.  In  exile,  the 
corresponding Information Office was at first operating under the Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama 
in  New Delhi.  In  1972  the  Information  Office was  transferred  to  Dharamsala.  International 
demand for information on Tibet was growing, and the CTA “felt the need to instil political, 
human  rights  and  environmental  consciousness  among  the  Tibetans” (TGE  1).  In  1989  the 
Information Office was  expanded and renamed  Department  of  Information and International 
Relations.  Since 1990, under the DIIR there is  an  Environmental and Development Desk,  an 
office that focuses particularly on the promotion of Tibetan environmental issues. Furthermore, 
there are 'Desks' for particular geographic regions:  An Africa and Middle East Desk, a Chinese 
Desk, a UN Desk and an EU Desk, as well as a  Tibet Support Group Desk. They all support the 
work of the DIIR in their specialized field. 
The DIIR supervises and heads the so-called Offices of Tibet, which function as embassies of the 
CTA in currently 13 countries worldwide.  The following is a list  of their  locations and their 
respective  year  of  establishment:  New Delhi  (1960),  Kathmandu  (1960),  New  York (1964), 
Geneva (located in Zürich during the period 1964-1991), Tokyo (1975), London (1981), Paris 
(1992), Canberra (1992), Budapest (1993), Moscow (1993), Pretoria (1997), Taipei (1997), and 
Brussels (2001). The work of these offices centres around lobbying sovereign governments and 
transnational organization like the UN and EU. They maintain contact with Tibetans in their 
respective area, and organize the participation of Tibetan delegates to conferences on issues such 
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as the environment, human rights, women's rights, or development. Many of these offices also act 
as potent fund raisers for the CTA, contributing significantly to a considerable increase in CTA 
budget during the 1990s (Phuntso 2004:133; Roemer 2008a:102;115).
Figure 1 gives an overview of the organizational structure of the Central Tibetan Administration.
Figure 1: Organizational Structure of the CTA
  Source: Roemer (2008a:95)
3.6 The Legislature
Article 36 of the  Charter of Tibetans in Exile  states: “All legislative power and authority shall 
rest in the Tibetan assembly, and such legislation shall require the assent of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama to become law” (TGE 3).
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“The  notion  of  electing  common Tibetans as  representatives  [...]  constituted  a  watershed  in 
Tibetan  history.  It  [...]  neutralized  the  class-based  political  monopoly  of  the  aristocracy” 
(Thargyal 1993:39). Roemer (2008a:99) states: “Despite the 14th Dalai Lama being vested with 
sweeping  powers,  the  CTA has  a  legislative  organ,  which  fulfills,  at  least  symbolically, the 
demands of a democratic system.”
Tibet's democratically elected36 exile parliament – the so called Assembly of the Tibetan People's 
Deputies (ATPD) – is the legislative branch of the government in exile. The right to vote for the 
membership  in  this  parliament  is  conferred  to  all  Tibetans  having  reached  the  age  of  18. 
Candidates must be at least 25 years old. The legislative power of the ATPD, as well as that of 
local assemblies in settlements, is subordinate to Indian state law (TGE 3).
The ATPD consists, in theory,37 of 46 elected deputies. According to Roemer (2008a:100), “the 
present ATPD serves as a symbol of an institutionalized exile Tibetan nationalism by following 
the idea of regional and religious quotas.” The three provincial regions of Tibet (Ü-Tsang, Amdo 
and Kham) are each represented by 10 deputies (at least two of which must be female). The five 
Buddhist sects (Nyingma,  Sakya,  Kagyu,  Gelug and  Bon) is represented by two deputies each. 
There are also two representatives elected by the Tibetan refugees in Europe and one by those in 
North America. Up to three deputies are nominated to the assembly directly by the Dalai Lama38 
(TGE 2). “The composition of the assembly emphasizes the claims of the CTA to represent all 
Tibetans,  despite  regional  heritage,  religious  affinities  or  current  place  of  living”  (Roemer 
2008a:100). However, it should be noted that the majority of Tibetans, those who have not left 
Tibet, have no possibility to voice their opinion by voting. In this respect, the ATPD “acts only 
symbolically as it is not legitimated to decide about the future of Tibet” (anonymous interview, 
2006, cited from ibid.).
The  assembly  meets  half-yearly,  usually  in  March  and  September.  It  can  be  called  for 
extraordinary  sessions,  should  this  be  necessary.  As  most  deputies  are  not  residents  of 
Dharamsala,  there  is  a  standing  committee  for  periods  between  sessions,  consisting  of  12 
members (Boyd 2004:27).
36 See section 3.9 'Democratization of the Tibetan Government in Exile.'
37 In  the 2006 election,  the Dalai  Lama renounced this  right  to  appoint  three members  directly to the ATPD, 
appointing only one (see Roemer 2008a:193).
38 See the above footnote.
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The  main  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  ATPD include  election  of  members  of  the  Cabinet, 
examining the decisions of the kashag and its administration in the light of policies and programmes 
adopted by the Assembly, enacting laws and frame rules and regulations, issuing policy decisions, as 
well as controlling and overseeing the finances, including the expenditure of the government-in-exile. 
The  Assembly  also  oversees  the  functioning  of  the  local  Assemblies  [Assemblies  of  the  Tibetan 
settlements],  the  work  of  the  Tibetan  Freedom  Movement  subcommittees  [...]  It  hears  public 
grievances and petitions of Tibetans in exile, and monitors the aspirations and problems of the Tibetan 
people, inside and outside Tibet. The Assembly also approves the appointment of the Supreme Justice 
Commission, the highest judiciary body. Today the Parliament is not only a law-making body. It has 
become more and more a multi-funcional institution, performing a variety of roles – many of theses are 
interrelated (Tsomo 2004:159).
Members of the ATPD play an intermediary role between the CTA and the population. Deputies 
hold contact to local assemblies of Tibetan communities, which represent legislative power at the 
regional level (Boyd 2004:27-8).
The  Assembly  also liaises  with  Governments,  Parliaments,  NGOs and  individuals  throughout  the 
world in order to gain support for Tibet, and lobbies for support from the Government, political parties, 
organizations and the people of India (TGE 2).
It is important to note that, according to the Charter of Tibetans in Exile, every decision by the 
ATPD must  be  approved  by  the  Dalai  Lama  in  order  to  become  an  act.  From conducting 
anonymous interviews with members of the 13th ATPD in 2003, Roemer (2008a:101) concludes 
that the legislative organ has developed into something like a “debating circle without relevance 
in realpolitik.”
3.7 The Judiciary
Article 62 of the Charter of Tibetans in Exile states: “There shall be a Tibetan Supreme Justice 
Commission  vested with  judicial  powers  suitable  to  the  temporary and  special  needs  of  the 
Tibetan Administration and citizens-in-exile” (TGE 3).
The judicial  branch of  the  TGE is  represented by  the  Tibetan Supreme Justice  Commission, 
headed by the Chief Tibetan Justice Commissioner. This commissioner is appointed by the Dalai 
Lama and must be supported by two thirds of the ATPD before taking office. The Commission is 
responsible for adjudicating conflicts within the exile Tibetan communities in India, but all court 
decisions are subordinate to Indian law (ibid.).
37
A permanent committee of Jurors, consisting of three citizens, assists in the judicial proceedings 
of the  Chief  Tibetan Justice Commissioner and is  appointed by him in consultation with the 
Kashag. If necessary, the Chief Tibetan Justice Commissioner can appoint an ad-hoc jury of up to 
nine Tibetan citizens with experience in matters of law, in addition to the three permanent jurors 
(ibid.).
The Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission shall be the supreme appellate court regarding legal issues 
involving individuals  and public institutions  of  the  Tibetans in-exile.  In  [sic] shall  be the highest 
judicial authority of the Tibetan Administration (TGE 3).
3.8.1 Introduction to Exile Tibetan NGOs
All  Tibetan exile  NGOs,  at  the  time of  their  founding,  have received acknowledgement  and 
blessing  from  the  Dalai  Lama.  This  provides  them  with  a  firm  position  within  the  exile 
community, but on the other hand obliges them to a certain degree of loyalty to the Dalai Lama 
and hence to the CTA (Roemer 113). In this sense, the validity of the term 'non-governmental 
organization'  might be questioned. Furthermore,  all  NGOs receive financial support  from the 
CTA. Roemer (2008a:114) judges that “a totally independent functioning of the NGOs is almost 
impossible.”
Tibetan exile NGOs are particularly active in the education sector, instructing Tibetans in schools, 
monasteries and community centers. They also organize campaigns, demonstrations, prayers and 
other community activities. Their NGO-status enables them to cooperate with other activists in 
the international sphere. Through their links with international NGOs they also receive donations 
from Tibet Support Groups (TSG).
There  are  numerous  exile  Tibetan NGOs,  engaged  in  a  variety  of  activities.  The  following 
account introduces the three largest and most widely known: The Tibetan Youth Congress, the 
Tibetan Women's Organization, and the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy.
38
3.8.2 Tibetan Youth Congress
The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) is the only exile Tibetan NGO that articulates clear dissent to 
the CTA in its political outlook and strategy. In this sense, it acts as a sort of opposition to the 
CTA. On the one hand, the TYC rejects the Middle-Way Path39 – renouncing  independence for a 
genuine autonomy of Tibet – pursued by the CTA and the Tibetan leader. It intends to achieve full 
independence for Tibet. On the other hand, the TYC rejects the strategy of non-violent struggle 
adopted by the TGE, on the grounds that it has not worked, and due to the problem that any 
action in the struggle for a self-determined Tibet (including hunger strikes and self-immolation) 
can be interpreted as violent. It also criticizes the 'democratic system' of the TGE, claiming that, 
due  to the  mixture of  religious and secular affairs, the  system has  little  to  do with Western 
democratic ideals. Although the TYC objects to the Dalai Lama's approach to the exile struggle, 
it claims loyalty to him, at least on the surface (see the TYC goals below). Hence, TYC members 
find themselves in a somewhat contradictory situation (Roemer 2008a:108-9).
According to the self-portrayal of the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) on its website (TYC 1), it is 
the largest and most active non-governmental organisation of Tibetans in exile and currently 
counts more than 30,000 members worldwide. It was founded in 1970, uniting mainly young 
Tibetans from the first generation having completed education in exile.
The TYC pursues the following goals:
- to work under the leadership of the Dalai Lama for the common good of the government and people 
of Tibet
- to unify the forces without consideration of localities, religion and class
- to imbibe the religious precepts and conventional Tibetan good manners amongst youths, considering 
the richness of the Tibetan culture and carry on its tradition
- to fight for the complete independence of Tibet as the definitive goal cherished by the Tibetans in as 
well as outside Tibet even by sacrificing oneself (Norbu 2004:393-4).
According to Norbu (2004:395), himself a member of the TYC, as a matter of policy, the TYC 
involves itself only in issues that are national in dimension and participates in activities with 
repercussions on the national struggle. Norbu (ibid.) also states that the TYC's “outreach and 
activities at national and international levels including its connective relationship in Tibet have a 
positive effect on the Tibetan Freedom Movement itself.” 
Since 1974, the TYC publishes the magazine Rangzen ('Freedom') in both Tibetan and English 
(Norbu 2004:396).
39 See section 3.13.3 'Objectives of the TGE in Practice.'
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The TYC has frequently triggered international attention through the staging of hunger stikes. For 
example, the distinctive hunger strike in New Delhi in 1998 was forcibly broken up by the Indian 
police,  and ended with the self-immolation of Thupten Ngodup (Ardley 2002:49-50).  On 10 
March 2009, the TYC again launched an “Indefinite Fast for Tibet” which was called off 10 days 
later, “after gaining assurances from the European Parliament that they will actively pursue their 
support for the Tibetan cause” (TYC 2). According to the TYC President, the “campaign has run 
its course and achieved substantially its objectives” (ibid.). The position of the exile government 
remains  that  hunger  strikes  are  a  type  of  violence  and  are  therefore  incompatible  with  its 
approach in the exile struggle.
3.8.3 Tibetan Women's Association
Counting  around  13,000  members,40 the  Tibetan Women's Association  (TWA) is  the  second 
largest  Tibetan  exile  NGO.  The  TWA, founded  in  1959,  was  a  continuation  of  women's 
organizations that appeared after the overthrowing of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, particularly of 
the Lhasa Patriotic Women's Organization set up by the PLA in 1953. It is currently the only 
women's organization in exile (Thonsur 2004:335). During the 1960s and 1970s, the TWA was 
mainly engaged in the creation of working and educational opportunities for Tibetan women, e.g. 
by opening handicraft centers. When, with the changing politics of the TGE in the 1980s, the 
status of women changed, allowing them to actively participate in politics,41 the TWA began to 
focus  more  on  the  political  sphere  and,  in  particular, the  international  community  (Roemer 
2008a:110).
In 1995, the TWA participated in the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, held in Beijing. 
Through this event, the TWA could raise awareness of the situation in Tibet, and Tibetan women 
became known in the international women's rights arena. As Roemer (2008a:111) puts it, “the 
Tibetan involvement in the UN conference helped considerably to re-frame and expand the exile 
Tibetan  struggle  as  a  whole  through  the  innovative  introduction  of  the  Tibetan  women's 
discourse.”  In  the  following  years,  the  TWA joined  an  international  network  emphasizing 
women's rights and set up bureaus in Canada, Great Britain, India, Japan, Nepal and Switzerland. 
One  example  of  tangible  support  resulting  from  the  international  network  was  the  project 
40 See TWA (1).
41 See section 3.10 'The Status of Women.'
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'Stitches of Tibet' (employing and educating Tibetan women in India) which was supported by a 
Danish NGO (Roemer 2008a:193).
The TWA supports the political position of the CTA internationally “through the promotion of a 
'feminized' exile Tibetan struggle” (Roemer 2008a:111). Apart  from political engagement, the 
TWA operates on the community level:  child care,  individual  support  of women in terms of 
employment  and  education,  social  welfare  assistance  and  health  care  matters  belong  to  its 
activities (Thonsur 2004:335).
3.8.4 Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy
Until 1996, a Desk for Human Rights and Democracy had functioned under the DIIR. That year, 
the Desk was transformed into the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), 
changing the judicial status to that of an NGO. This widened the possibilities of political action 
and  increased  access  to  international  fora  and  conferences  from  which  the  CTA would  be 
excluded because  of  its  governmental  representative  claim.  “In this  regard,  the  TCHRD [...] 
expands the CTA's access to the international community” (Roemer 2008a:112).
Within the exile community, the TCHRD is active in educational activities, organizing workshops 
and publishing teaching materials related to the TGE's version of democracy. In the international 
context, the TCHRD promotes the respect for human rights of Tibetans (Roemer 2008a:112).
3.9 Democratization of the Tibetan Government in Exile
It seems overstated to call the political system of the TGE a democracy. It remains a fact that the 
ultimate executive decision in government matters, both in the  Kashag and the ATPD, remains 
with the 14th Dalai Lama. However, there are certainly democratic elements to the system, and a 
certain process of democratization has evidently taken place over the past five decades.
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What is outstanding about the process of democratization in the Tibetan exile polity is that the 
process was initiated from above and, more precisely, from the person of the 14th Dalai Lama. 
The Dalai Lama is “probably the only ruler in the world, who has voluntarily given up political 
power step by step, on his own initiative and without pressure from below” (Phuntso 2004:126). 
“Tibetan democracy is different from that of other countries because it did not cost any struggle 
or  human  lives.  It  originated  from  the  political  incumbent  himself”  (Mangtso,  cited  from 
Thargyal 1993:34).
As a first step in the democratization process, in 1961 the Dalai Lama initiated the establishment 
of an exile parliament, which replaced traditional secular and ecclesiastic offices and abolished 
hereditary  privileges  for  occupations.  In  1963  a  first  Tibetan  'draft'  constitution42 was 
promulgated, which curtailed the Dalai Lama's powers and began to embed them in democratic 
structures (von Brück 2005:11). Von Brück (ibid.) argues that the practice of democracy in the 
given situation is difficult. In order to develop a democratic mentality, it takes time, education 
and possibilities for economic development. When, in 1960, a year before the announcement of 
the constitution, first elections took place,43 “[m]ost Tibetans had never imagined participating in 
government, much less heard of voting; politics had been the business of monks and noblemen 
for  centuries” (Avedon 1984:107).  Lodi  Gari,  chairman of the seventh assembly of  deputies, 
noted: “A lot of people go into the election tent and just pray to His Holiness. 'I don't know any of 
these candidates, but please let me chose the right one to help the Dalai Lama and the people'” 
(cited from Avedon 1984:108). According to an opinion survey conducted by the ATPD in 1997, 
regarding the question of the further proceeding of the community in its exile struggle, “[s]ixty-
five percent of the Tibetan refugee community said that they had implicit faith in the Dalai Lama. 
Whatever he decided would be acceptable to them” (Office of Tibet New York 1).
The 14th Dalai Lama proceeded with attempting gradually to democratize the community and the 
structures of the TGE, despite the broad sections of society that reacted with incomprehension: 
Would one  not  assume  that  the  Dalai  Lama,  worshiped  as  Chenrezig,  the  Bodhisattva of 
compassion,  had  a  more  informed  judgement  than  a  parliament  operating  with  altering 
majorities?  (Tethong 2000:91;  von Brück 2005:11). It has even been argued that precisely this 
trust  and faith in the leadership of the Dalai Lama would make the system democratic, even 
without voting, as he truly represents the Tibetan people (Edin, cited from Ardley 2002:190). By 
42 It was labeled 'draft' because it had no approval of the six million majority in Tibet. For details on the 1963 'draft' 
constitution, see Avedon (1984:107-9).
43 Exile Tibetans voted representatives for their region of provenance and monastic order.
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many Tibetans the Dalai Lama is also considered to be generally more knowledgeable about 
international happenings through his travels than any Tibetan deputy, which further underlines his 
authority.
The adoption of the Charter for Tibetans in Exile in 1991 has been described as a “decisive step 
towards genuine democracy” (Tsomo 2004:156). It  effectively replaced the draft  constitution. 
“The legislature,  constitution and charter  have all  been seen as  major  steps  towards the  full 
implementation of democratic principles in the Tibetan government” (Ardley 2002:44). Since the 
promulgation of the charter, further changes have occurred. While in former years the  Kalon 
Tripa ('Prime Minister') was appointed, he is now elected democratically (Boyd 2004:26).
Ardley (2002:85), examining the Tibetan case in the light of theories of democracy, concludes 
that  the  theories  are  of  little  help  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  matter. With regards  to 
democracy, the Tibetan exile polity is indeed a unique case, with several special factors: “[T]he 
nature of the Tibetan state; the lack of parties and an opposition in Tibetan exile politics; the 
attitudes of the Tibetan people; and the position of the unelected Dalai Lama.”
In  2003,  over  four  decades  after  the  democratic  process  was  initiated,  Dagmar  Bernstorff 
interviewed  Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rinpoche, who answered the question “Do you have the  
impression that the Tibetan people are getting more familiar with democracy?” in the following 
way:
Better. But  His  Holiness  is  impatient.  We also feel  some kind of  impatience.  The people are  not 
picking up this kind of spirit. But it is understandable, to change people's attitude needs some time. We 
had hoped that the second generation Tibetans-in-exile would be completely changed. But that didn't 
happen. Now the third generation might be better (cited from Phuntso 2004:128).
The Dalai Lama often emphasizes the importance of democracy for the exile Tibetans. One factor 
is surely a preoccupation with what will happen after his death.
A critical  voice  regarding  democratic  claims  of  the  TGE  is  that  of  Richard  de  Jongh.  He 
commented  that  “the  Dalai  Lama's  power elite  misuses  the  word  democracy because  it  still 
dominates  exile  Tibetan politics  through 'democratic'  manipulation to  perpetuate  the  existing 
patrimonial structures. The introduced reforms touch only the surface of Tibetan society but do 
not change the traditional system” (de Jongh, cited from Roemer 2008a:91).
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Ardley (2002:88) argues that the process of democratization must be put into the appropriate 
perspective. It is only a couple of decades since democratization had begun, and what has been 
achieved in this time period is considerable. If no genuine democracy has been achieved, then at 
least  a  development  “toward  an  environment  in  which  debate  and  freedom  of  speech  are 
commonplace.”  In  democratic  terms,  unsurprisingly,  Ardley  (ibid.)  speaks  of  “a  vast 
improvement on the traditional pre-1959 government.”
According to Roemer (2008a:99), the legislative organ (the ATPD) of the TGE fulfills, at least 
symbolically, the demands of a democratic system.
Indeed, the 14th Dalai Lama is head of the government but this post is more and more only theoretically 
[sic]. During recent years, his direct influence in exile politics has diminished and the ATPD became 
mature and more powerful. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable degree of dependency on the 
Dalai Lama among the Tibetan deputies. In this regard, the progress of the democratic transformation 
process of the exile Tibetan political system during the last decades is still questionable and not yet 
finished (Roemer 2008a:101).
3.10 The Status of Women
Must the Dalai Lama reincarnate as a man?
[Dalai Lama:] 'It can be a woman or a man. The institution of the Dalai Lama must change according 
to the times' (Chhaya 2007:239).
The position of women in the  Tibetan exile  community and in Tibetan Buddhist  tradition is 
ambiguous.  Thonsur (2004:339), (a man) taking an unequivocal pro-Tibet stance, states that 
“Tibetan women enjoy great freedom and lead content lives.” According to him, Tibetan Women 
“have felt that there is gender discrimination in Tibetan society but it is minimal and therefore 
women have always been mindful in prioritising the issue of the national struggle” (ibid:338). 
Traditionally, in pre-1959 Tibet, as in most societies women had an underprivileged position (von 
Brück 2005:12)
Within Tibetan Buddhism, there are teachers and teachings that support the notion that attainment 
of enlightenment is irrespective of gender. In Buddhist cosmology there are female deities and in 
history there are enlightened females such as Yeshe Tsogyel, however renowned women teachers 
and  nuns  have  been  scarce.  While  women  have  the  potential  to  full  Buddhahood,  their 
subordinate social position inhibits its realization (von Brück 2005:12). The subordinate role of 
women in Tibetan society is suggested by the Tibetan saying “If you want to be a servant, make 
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your  son  a  monk;  if  you  want  to  have  a  servant,  make  your  daughter  a  nun”  (cited  from 
MacMillin 2001:197). Although there are a number of nunneries allowing for spiritual practice, 
education and hence freedom to a certain extent, in Tibetan Buddhism there is no lineage of fully 
ordained nuns. Although it is frequently proclaimed that they enjoy high levels of independence, 
“Tibetan  women  traditionally  have  occupied  a  lower  status  than  their  male  counterparts” 
(ibid:198).
In pre-1959 Tibet, religious and thus political power was in the hands of men. After the diaspora 
began, the 14th Dalai Lama committed himself to improving the situation of women in Tibetan 
exile society and started a number of initiatives to ameliorate the standing of women. Since 1987 
he was a strong advocate of the reintroduction of a Bhikkhuni, a fully ordained female Buddhist 
monastic order. He commissioned studies to trace the lineage of Tibetan nuns back to the first 
nunnery founded by the Buddha, the tradition of which is still alive in China. He inspired Tibetan 
nuns to become ordained in this Chinese tradition (in Taiwan) to empower them to study as 
equals  to  men in  Indian  institutions.  By  means  of  these  initiatives,  according to  von Brück 
(2005:12-3), the prerequisites for a new social role for Tibetan women have been established.
In  Tibetan exile  politics,  women  are  underrepresented,  but  they  are  represented.  In  the  14th 
Kashag ('Cabinet'), one out of eight Kalon is one woman.44 In the previous Kashag, two women 
were represented (Boyd 2004:27). In 2006 the structure of the Central Tibetan Administration 
was run by 685 officials working at headquarters in Dharamsala. The male:female ratio was 
79:21 (Roemer 2008a:93). The Charter of Tibetans in Exile provides that at least two of the ten 
deputies  representing  the  three  Tibetan regions  –  U-Tsang, Kham and  Amdo –  in  the  exile 
parliament  have  to  be  female.  The  corresponding  Article  37  of  the  Charter  thus  ensures  a 
minimum of six women in the ATPD (Thonsur 2004:334).
Thus it seems the status of Tibetan women in exile is improving. Women remain underprivileged 
in Tibetan society, as in most other societies around the world. But particularly when comparing 
with pre-1959 Tibet it appears that women are gaining ground socially, culturally and politically.
44 For the composition of the current Kashag see http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=18 (accessed: 25.4.2009)
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3.11 Religion and Politics – Tibetan Buddhism and the TGE
Kollmar-Paulenz  (2006:174)  maintains  that  since  the  authority  of  the  Dalai  Lama  is  not 
legitimized  through  democratic  elections  but  founded  in  religion,  the  TGE  is  ultimately 
religiously authorized. The Tibetan culture is  characterized by a  particular  interplay between 
religious forces and political processes; politics and religion are institutionally connected (von 
Brück 2008:43). This is exemplified by the composition of the parliament in exile, where each 
monastic order is represented separately. The clergy is privileged in the Tibetan exile 'democratic 
system,'  since  monks  can  vote  two  representatives  to  the  ATPD: one  for  their  region  of 
provenance and one for their religious order.
The  Charter  of  Tibetans in Exile stresses religious freedom. Article 10 states:  “All  religious 
denominations are equal before the law” (TGE 3). However, moral education in schools shall be 
rooted in Buddhist teachings (Article 17/8). Education shall also “endeavour to disseminate a 
non-sectarian and wholesome tradition of Buddhist doctrines” (Article 17/11). 
Tibetan culture  is  thoroughly characterized by Tibetan Buddhism (von Brück  2008:43).  The 
belief system of Tibetan Buddhism is complex and will not be dealt with here.45 It is important to 
stress that Tibetan exile culture, religion and politics are closely related. Interestingly, while in 
Western countries “the introduction of the religious into the political is primarily viewed as a 
negative force” (Ardley 2002:166), in the Tibetan case it is perceived positively:
The  widely  held  view  is  that  in  Tibet  religion  brought  harmony  and  peace.  A commonly  held 
assumption is that this peace and harmony had developed because the people had not lost sight of the 
importance of spirituality in all aspects of life, including politics (ibid:166).
This phenomenon will be dealt with in greater detail in Part 7 ('Values Represented by the TGE 
as Soft-Power Resources').
45 On Tibetan Buddhism, see von Brück (2008:127-79).
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3.12 The TGE's Approach to the Exile Struggle
The approach of the TGE to its exile struggle, which began with the arrival of the 14th Dalai 
Lama in India in 1959, went through a significant change during the early 1980s. This change in 
the political focus (discussed below) was in line with a change in the objectives of the TGE in its 
struggle, from total independence to genuine autonomy for Tibet.46 This section introduces the 
Tibetan exile struggle and illustrates the shift that occurred in the 1980s.
During the first decades in exile, expectations in the power of the UN to help the exile Tibetans 
were high, and the exiled political elite of Tibet used the wide international attention it gained 
during  the  early  years  of  its  struggle  to  lobby  for  its  cause.  Three  UN  General  Assembly 
Resolutions  were  passed:  in  1959  (1353/14),  in  1961  (1723/16)  and  in  1965  (2079/20), 
expressing the General Assembly's concern with human rights violations in Tibet (Morris and 
Scoble, cited from Roemer 2008a:81).47 But due to the influential position of the PRC in global 
politics,  these  resolutions  had  little  effect  on  its  policies  regarding  Tibet.  Since  Beijing's 
membership in the UN and its obtaining a permanent seat in the Security Council, the PRC has 
the power to block any possible resolution on Tibet.
Appart from its hopes in the UN, the second major approach of the Tibetan exile government in 
its initial struggle was that of maintaining bilateral relations with Beijing. There were numerous 
negotiations between Dharamsala and Beijing, particularly after Mao's death in 1976. The 14th 
Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Thondup visited Beijing in 1978, and exile Tibetan fact-finding 
missions to Tibet followed in 1979, 1980 and 1984. However, the outcomes of these contacts 
remained negligible (Roemer 2008a:82).
When it became increasingly clear that neither the UN, nor bilateral contacts with Beijing would 
further the Tibetan case, the CTA changed its political focus at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
exile government decided to internationalize the Tibetan issue. According to Shakya (1999:413), 
the  moment to internationalize  the  Tibetan issue was  opportune: “In the  late  1980s,  popular 
political  culture  in  the  West was  rapidly changing.  The ideological  confrontation which had 
characterized popular politics had given way to concerns about moral issues such as the human 
rights, environment, ecology, the right of indigenous people and the fear of the proliferation of 
46 See section 3.13.3 'Objectives of the TGE in Practice.'
47 For an account on the Tibetan government's appeals to the United Nations before going into exile, see Goldstein 
(2007:59-81).
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nuclear weapons.” These changes were perceived by the TGE and its supporters, and campaigns 
were orchestrated accordingly.
The nationalist demand for independence was de-emphasized and issues of environment, ecology and 
coercive birth-control policy were highlighted. More importantly, the campaign also emphasised the 
preservation of Tibets unique cultural tradition [...] The Tibetans found a receptive audience in the 
West (Shakya 1999:413).
The  TGE's  newly  adopted  strategy,  a  “political  offensive  [...]  we  can  think  of  as  their 
'international campaign'” (Goldstein 1997:75), appears to have been finalized following a series 
of high-level meetings between key Tibetans and supporters from the West that took place in 
New York, Washington and London in 1986 and 1987. According to Goldstein (1997:138), the 
“history of these developments has not yet been well-documented and details are still sparse.” 
One important innovation of this strategy was that the Dalai Lama should carry not only the 
religious,  but  the  political  message  of  the  Tibetan exiles  to  the  United  States  and  Europe, 
especially to fora of government.
With  the  help  of  Western  supporters  and  donors  and  sympathetic  U.S.  representatives  and 
congressional  aides,  a  campaign was launched  to  gain  American  support  for  the  exile's  cause,  in 
essence,  to  redirect  the significance of  the Tibet Question from the arena  of  geopolitical  national 
interests to the sphere of core U.S. values – to the U.S. ideological commitment to freedom and human 
rights. The goal was to create a momentum that would lead the United States to support Tibet because 
it was the just and right thing for freedom-loving Americans to do (Goldstein 1997:76).
One  emphasis  of  the  new  strategy  was  put  on  international  NGOs.  According  to  Thupten 
Samphel from the DIIR, the central concept of the Tibetan exile government's new grassroots 
policy was the so-called 'snowball effect', by which one NGO was approached by the CTA which 
would then carry Tibet-related issues to other NGOs (interview with Thupten Samphel, DIIR, 
Dharamsala,  May  2002,  cited  from  Roemer  2008a:82).  “The  CTA reacted  to  political 
developments and looked for a more promising niche to generate support for the exile Tibetan 
struggle” (Roemer 2008a:82). The exiled Tibetans no longer presented their issue as one package, 
but rather split it into various issues that could more easily be taken up by various international 
activists. Since the political focus changed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between efforts that aim at returning to a free homeland, and those for international support.
Especially during the last two decades, exile Tibetans have taken up several Western political key 
issues,  like  human rights,  non-violence,  environmental  protection,  women's  rights  and peace  [...]. 
Through the presentation of these topics to an international audience, the exile Tibetans, with the 14th 
Dalai Lama in the lead, have been increasingly successful in terms of generating international financial 
support and awareness. The exile Tibetans have managed to create an impression as propagators of 
Tibetan Buddhism, as peaceful and friendly with a deep insight into religious practice” (interview with 
Mr Thupten Samphel, DIIR, Dharamsala, May 2002, cited from Roemer 2008a:82).
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Despite this focal switch there is still lobbying taking place to the UN in New York and Geneva 
through the various Tibet offices (Roemer 2008a:83).
The exile struggle of the TGE is based on the principle of non-violence. “I firmly reject the use of 
violence as a means in our struggle,” the Dalai Lama (2008) states. Besides truth and genuine 
democratic governance, “non-violence became [...] a fundamental principle for the CTA to serve 
the Tibetan nation” (Roemer 2008:83) with the 12th ATPD (1995-2001). The first item of the Five 
Point Peace Plan48 communicates the TGE's commitment to non-violence to the world.
According to the Office of Tibet in New York, the non-violent approach is due to “the personality 
of the Dalai Lama and his Buddhist beliefs [...] His uncompromising attitude towards violence 
and his unquestioned moral authority among the Tibetan people have prevented the Tibetans in 
Tibet  and  in  exile  from  taking  up  arms”  (Office  of  Tibet  New  York  1).  Apart  from 
communicating a general conviction that only non-violence can lead to peaceful solutions, the 
Dalai Lama is also well aware of the absence of a chance that a Tibetan armed struggle against 
China could be successful. The TGE takes the position that an armed Tibetan uprising would be 
tantamount to mass suicide and would be “the best excuse for China to obliterate the Tibetans 
from  the  face  of  the  earth”  (ibid.).  According  to  Ram  (2004:170),  “the  Tibetan nonviolent 
struggle has indispensable pragmatic elements where nonviolence is realistically used as only one 
of several possible methods with which to respond to the conflict  situation with China for a 
mutually beneficial settlement.” 
The TGE's non-violent approach has been inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's satyagraha.49 For Ram 
(2004:167), who calls the Dalai Lama “the chief architect of Tibetan nonviolent politics,” the 
Tibetan leader is a “staunch follower of Mahatma Gandhi.”
For Gandhian satyagraha the basic precepts are: truth, nonviolence (ahimsa)50 and self-suffering. For 
the Dalai Lama, the basic precepts of middlepath are nonviolence and dialogue [which, he believes] 
can be the only basis for peaceful conflict resolution (Ram 2004:166).
Ram (2004:162) also points out that Tibetan non-violence should not be overemphasized. While 
“nonviolence as a political tool of Tibetan policy sounds very natural, given the nonviolence 
potential of Tibetans and Buddhist tradition and culture,” violence has by no means been absent 
48 See section 3.13.3 'Objectives of the TGE in Practice.'
49 Satyagraha is the strategy of non-violent resistance developed by Mahatma Gandhi. Satya is sanskrit and can be 
translated as 'truth' (Ardley 2002:97).
50 Ahimsa is a sanskrit term meaning the 'avoidance of violence' or hence 'non-violence' (Ardley 2002:98).
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in Tibetan history. For example, the “1959 Lhasa uprising witnessed many monks carrying guns 
alongside the Khampas. Later, the Khampas used the guerillas tactics of 'hit and run' with the 
clandestine support of the CIA, on and off until 1974” (ibid.).  Nevertheless, the Tibetan exile 
struggle is widely seen as a non-violent movement.
3.13.1 Introduction to the TGE's Objectives in the Exile Struggle
This paper intends to explore the soft-power resources at the disposal of the Tibetan government 
in exile, and to inquire into how these resources have aided the TGE to further the achievement 
of its objectives in the international sphere. One of the central research questions concerns how 
soft  power  has  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  the  TGE's  objectives  with  regard  to  the 
international sphere. In order to attempt at answering this question, it is necessary first to identify 
the objectives of the exile government. This is the aim of the present section. After offering a 
brief theoretical introduction to objectives of exile governments in general, the latter part of the 
section  deals  specifically  with the  TGE's  goals,  particularly with  respect  to  the  international 
sphere.
3.13.2 Objectives of Exile Governments in Theory
According to Stephanie Roemer  (2008a:4),  the  theoretical  approach of  Yossi Shain51 (of  the 
Universities of Georgetown and Tel-Aviv) is the only currently existing theory on governments in 
exile in political science. Shain defines exile governments as “opposition groups that struggle 
from outside  their  home territory  to  overthrow and replace  the  regime in  their  independent, 
occupied or claimed home country. These groups refer to themselves as governments-in-exile, 
national  committees,  provisional  governments,  national  revolutionary  councils,  national 
liberation movements, and in other ways that reflect their claim to be the sole or at least the most 
viable alternative to the existing home regime” (Shain 1991, cited from Roemer 2008a:39).
51 See Shain (1989; 1991).
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It can be deduced from this definition that the main objective of an exile government, provided it 
has  lost  its  territory, is  to  regain  it.  There  are  two crucial  factors  that  success,  in  terms  of 
achieving this objective, depends on: The ability to secure loyalty within the own community and 
the ability to gain international support and recognition. The importance of these factors derive 
from the limited room for maneuvering available to governments in exile compared to sovereign 
governments (Shain 1989, cited from Roemer 2008a:39).
The continuation of the exile struggle and the political survival of the organizational structures in 
exile rely heavily on international support. This can be material as well as diplomatic. Hence, a 
major focus of an exile government tends to be the international community: sovereign states, 
transnational organizations, NGOs and individuals.
Many exile organizations ascribe vital importance to foreign support for their struggle, and strive to 
make their case international. They endeavour to generate and cultivate international enmity toward 
the home regime and to earn recognition for themselves at the regime's expense, so as to undermine 
and eventually overthrow and replace it (Shain 1989, cited from Roemer 2008a:45).
According to Shain (1989, cited from Roemer 2008a:45), it is important for exile governments to 
take into account that international players tend to act pursuant to their own political, economic 
or social objectives. Therefore exile governments must endeavour to convince them that the exile 
struggle is related to the potential supporters' own objectives. A major goal of exile governments 
is hence to find ways of encouraging possible international patrons to act on their behalf.
Roemer (2008a:47), again citing Yossi Shain, states that “even a vague acknowledgement [of 
exile governments by international actors] in spheres of power becomes instrumentally important 
for validating the exile's claims of power because they lift up an exile community's confidence to 
continue its struggle and renews the hope to achieve the set goals.”
International developments are subject to constant change. Accordingly, exile governments must 
maneuver carefully between different political authorities in the international sphere, in order to 
achieve sustainable alliances. If an exile government cannot achieve support from the highest 
political level of a possible supporting country, it tends to address lower-ranked diplomats, sub-
systems  of  the  state  or  the  international  community, or  the  civil  society. “In  this  context, 
especially cultural, humanitarian and religious organizations, student associations, labor unions 
and political parties, are important for a government-in-exile” (Shain 1989, cited from Roemer 
2008a:48-9). Since many of these sub-groups focus more on specific issues than on the exact 
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situation of the exiles, they are easily influenced in terms of the exile government's goals, by 
providing  them with  information  specifically  related  to  their  focal  issue.  “As  a  result,  they 
provide an exile government with effective aid by communicating the exile's moral and political 
views and, moreover, with financial help” (Shain 1989, cited from Roemer 2008a:49).
Roemer (2008a:49) refers to Shain and Appadurai in stating that “[e]xile governments mostly call 
for the international community's assistance through focusing on symbolically significant global 
issues.  Universal  myths  are  presented  to  the  international  community  under  the  guise  of 
'archetypes of legitimacy', such as democracy, human rights, and self-determination.”
Summarizing this section, in accordance with the theory proposed by Yossi Shain (as cited from 
Roemer  2008a),  some  of  the  major  objectives  of  exile  governments,  in  relation  to  the 
international sphere, are to:
Overthrow and replace the regime in power in the homeland;
Make their  case international  and gain international  support  and recognition from 
governments and other levels of foreign countries including the public; and
Motivate  and  encourage  possible  international  patrons  to  act  on  their  behalf  and 
support its struggle, often by focusing on symbolically significant global issues.
3.13.3 Objectives of the TGE in Practice
The objectives of the Tibetan exile government are manifold, and it would be undue to attempt at 
producing an exhausting list. Objectives could, for instance, be split into very general categories: 
overall objective, objectives in terms of organizational survival, objectives related to allegiance 
and loyalty within the exile community or among Tibetans in the homeland, objectives regarding 
the relationship with the host country, India or with China. Many of these are naturally related. 
Each of  these categories could again be split  into minor  objectives,  the attainment of which 
would contribute to achieving the higher objective. Such an approach would exceed the scope of 
this paper. What is important here rather, is to elaborate a concise set of the major goals of the 
TGE in general, and of the more specific goals in relation to the international political sphere. 
Defining the TGE's goals is a necessary prerequisite to attempt an answer to one of the research 
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questions of this pape:  How has the TGE's soft power contributed or not, to approaching the  
achievement of its objectives?
In the 1980s, the Tibetan exile government significantly altered not only its approach, but also the 
objectives of its exile struggle. “Until 1988, the goal of the Tibetans was independence from 
China; a right, they believed, that was historically proven. From that date, the official goal of the 
Tibetan people became 'genuine autonomy'” (Ardley 2002:169). This statement must be put into 
the perspective that 'genuine autonomy' had been adopted as the official goal by the 14th Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. The approach to achieve this objective is referred to 
as the Middle-Way Approach.52 “The essence of the Middle Way Approach is to secure genuine 
autonomy for the Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC” (CTA 1). This 
change in official policy engendered substantial controversy within the exile community, as many 
Tibetan people objected to giving up independence as the prime objective. Particularly the TYC 
disagrees with this stance and continues to advocate complete independence for Tibet.53
This drastic change in TGE policy occurred against the backdrop of a statement by the Chinese 
leadership in 1979, in which it announced that it would only continue negotiations with Tibetans 
in exile, if these were willing to “shift their focus from total independence to autonomy” (Roemer 
2008a:83).  “Everything  is  negotiable  except  independence,”  Deng Xiaoping said  (cited from 
Herzer 2004:425).  The shift  occurred out of a sense of  realpolitik  by the Tibetan leadership. 
Almost three decades had past since the exile period began and no advances regarding the status 
of Tibet had been achieved, neither was there any change to the situation in sight. In addition, the 
TGE perceived the PRC's population-transfer policy as an increasingly serious threat to Tibetan 
culture (Ram 2004:171). “Based on the pressures of the current political situation and his firm 
belief that Buddhism basically advocates non-violence, the fourteenth Dalai Lama has rejected 
the notion of leading Tibet on a path to independence within the foreseeable future” (von Brück 
2004:41).
Philosophically, the 'middlepath' is also a Buddhist approach to life, to finding the appropriate 
way  between  the  extremes.  According  to  Ram  (2004:174),  the  Dalai  Lama's  “political 
philosophy, particularly the middlepath policy, [is] rooted in Buddhism, Gandhian satyagraha and 
realistic understanding of international politics.”
52 The  'Middle-Way Approach'  is  also  known  as  'Middle-Way Path'  or  'Middlepath'.  The  term  'Middle  Way 
Approach' is sometimes also used exchangeably with 'Strasbourg Proposal' (see Dalai Lama 2001).
53 See section 3.8.2 'Tibetan Youth Congress.'
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[The] middlepath does not represent or reflect the overall belief system of the Tibetans. Rather, it is a 
nonviolent technique advocated by the Dalai Lama which can be crudely compared to the Gandhian 
satyagraha. The essence of the middle path is avoiding extremes [...] Thus, taking a middle path is a 
moderate position that could guarantee the common minimum interests of all concerned parties. For 
the Tibetans, it is the protection and preservation of Tibetan culture and religion; for the Chinese it is 
the security and territorial integrity of the motherland; and for the neighbours and third parties, peace 
at their borders and peaceful international relations” (Ram 2004:162-3).
On 21 September 1987 the 14th Dalai Lama addressed the US Congress Human Rights Caucus, in 
his first decidedly political speech in the USA. “In 1987, I made specific proposals in a five-point 
plan for the restoration of peace and human rights in Tibet. This included the conversion of the 
entire Tibetan plateau into a Zone of Ahimsa, a sanctuary of peace and nonviolence where human 
beings and nature can live in peace and harmony” (Dalai Lama 1989). In this address, the Dalai 
Lama  outlined  propositions  for  a  solution  to  the  Tibet  question,  in  the  form  of  five  basic 
elements, which became known as the Five Point Peace Plan:
This peace plan contains five basic components:
1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; 
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the 
Tibetans as a people; 
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use 
of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; 
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between 
the Tibetan and Chinese peoples (Dalai Lama 1987).
The Chinese reaction to this plan was extremely negative. In a media campaign, Chinese officials 
accused the Dalai Lama of intending to “split the motherland” and denounced “US interference in 
China's internal affairs” (cited from Heath 2005:144).
The shift in the TGE's focal objective from independence to autonomy became official by way of 
a formal proposal for negotiations with the PRC formulated in an address by the 14th Dalai Lama 
to members of the European Parliament in a private  meeting held in Strasbourg on 15 June 
1988.54 He distributed a paper clarifying his intentions “for resolving the issue of Tibet” (Shakya 
1999:423).  In  this  proposal  the  Dalai  Lama  elaborated  on  the  Five  Point  Peace  Plan and 
developed it further. He proposed:
54 In fact, the Dalai Lama had already expressed the idea that he might accept some form of federal relationship 
with the PRC as early as 1978 (see Shakya 1999:375; see also Ram 2004:165).
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The  whole  of  Tibet known as  Cholka  Sum  (U-Tsang, Kham and  Amdo)  should  become a self-
governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good 
and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of  
China [emphasis added]. The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible 
for Tibet's foreign [including defense] policy (Dalai Lama 1988).
The Dalai Lama would hence relinquish his claim for independence and would seek a voluntary 
association with China. This came to be known as the Strasbourg Proposal. It caused a great deal 
of  controversy  within  the  Tibetan  exile  community;  accusations  of  betrayal  and  foreign 
involvement in the decision were voiced (Shakya 1999:423).
The Chinese again refuted the Dalai Lama's proposal. The PRC's Foreign Ministry argued that the 
Strasbourg Proposal could  not  be  the  basis  for  negotiation,  since  China  would  not  accept 
“independence, semi-independence or even independence in disguised form” (cited from Shakya 
1999:424), and the Strasbourg Proposal advocated a form of semi-independence for Tibet.
The 'Strasbourg Proposal' was a turning point in exile Tibetan politics as the 14th Dalai Lama took the 
decision to aim the exile Tibetan struggle towards autonomy rather than independence, assuming that 
this was a general wish of his national compatriots (Roemer 2008a:83).
Although the contents of the Strasbourg Proposal essentially constitute the position of the TGE 
until today (see CTA 1) the proposal was officially withdrawn in September 1991 with the Dalai 
Lama's consent by the Kashag, due to a lack of sincere commitment by China (Roemer 2008:84).
3.13.4 Summary of the TGE's Objectives
The twin imperatives of the Tibetan people are to restore Tibet's freedom and to transform it into a 
democratic country with environmental and human rights as its credo (TGE 1).
In essence, the objectives formulated in the Strasbourg Proposal are still valid in constituting the 
position of the TGE today (von Brück 2005:9; CTA 1). The Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy 
for the Tibetan People, presented by representatives of the Dalai Lama in the eighth round of 
meetings with officials of the PRC, held in November 2008, states: “We [the CTA] remain firmly 
committed  not  to  seek separation or  independence [...  and ...]  to  fully  respect  the  territorial 
integrity of the PRC” (CTA 1).
Article  15  of  the  Charter  of  Tibetans in  Exile  states  that  the  “primary aim  of  the  Tibetan 
Administration in-exile shall be to endeavor to maintain a just policy for the achievement of the 
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common goal of Tibet, and in addition, at the present moment, protect Tibetans in Tibet from 
present hardships and danger” (TGE 3). The terms 'autonomy' and 'independence' are not found 
in the charter, rather the more ambiguous expression 'common goal of Tibet' is used.
It seems valid to assume that a free and independent Tibet, if possible, would be the ultimate goal 
of the TGE. However, reality has shown that continuing to actively pursue this goal seems futile 
with regard to the power and firm stance of the PRC, and would furthermore compromise other 
very important goals. One of these is the preservation of Tibetan culture.
One immediate objective of the TGE for many years has been to enter into dialogue with China 
in order to ensure the preservation of Tibetan culture from Chinese policies.
[The] Dalai Lama firmly believes that international moral, political and economic pressure is the only 
feasible option the Tibetans are left with to find a timely solution. Therefore he has often publicly 
solicited for 'immediate international pressure [to] be exerted upon the Chinese government, with an 
aim to beginning significant negotiations as soon as possible' (Ram 2004:171).
Consequentially, a major objective of the TGE is the generation of international support. Dodin 
and Räther (2001:413) observe that “the Tibetans' precarious situation forces them to turn to the 
outside world for as much support as possible in order to deflect the imminent threat of cultural 
extinction.” The Dalai Lama, in a statement at the second Tibet Support Group conference held in 
Germany in June 1996, remarks: “Because of this lack of response from the Chinese side, I was 
compelled to publicly announce my Five-point Peace Plan for Tibet. This was the result of lack 
of response from the Chinese side and thus there was no other alternative except to seek support 
from the international community” (cited from Ram 2004:171).
When addressing the European Parliament in 2001 the Dalai Lama, along the same lines, states:
In the absence of any positive response from the Chinese government to my overtures over the years, I 
am left with no alternative but to appeal to the members of the international community. It is clear now 
that only increased, concerted and consistent international efforts will persuade Beijing to change its 
policy  on  Tibet. Although the  immediate  reactions  from the  Chinese  side  will  be  most probably 
negative, nevertheless, I  strongly believe that expressions of international concern and support  are 
essential for creating an environment conducive for the peaceful resolution of the Tibetan problem 
(Dalai Lama 2001).
The political shift that occurred in the approach and objectives of the TGE from independence to 
autonomy, the shift toward the 'middlepath' in attempting a step towards compromise, was very 
much related to a strategy of generating international support. In this respect, Ram (2004:171-2), 
summarizes the Middle-Way policy:  
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[W]ith  nonviolent  action  and  dialogue  as  central  components,  the  middlepath  policy  attempts  to 
mobilize international pressure so as to compel China to agree to a negotiated political settlement over 
Tibet.  Pressure  has  been  exerted  on  China  through  legislative  effort,  that  is,  taking  Tibet  into 
governmental  fora,  particularly  legislative  branches,  and effecting changes  in government  policies 
worldwide. This has become the core strategy of internationalization. This strategy has evolved since 
1987  by  encompassing  four  dimensions:  nonviolent  resistance  inside  Tibet,  dialogue  with  PRC, 
Constructive Programme in Exile to protect Tibetan culture and religion, and internationalization and 
media  mobilization  on  the  Tibet  issue  [...]  the  internationalization  of  the  Tibet  issue  mobilizes 
international public, political and media support to put pressure on China for a peaceful resolution 
(Ram 2004:171-2).
The summarizing list  of  major TGE objectives,  with particular  reference to the  international 
sphere, is, perhaps not surprisingly, quite similar to the list of objetives of exile governments in 
theory,55 except that the major objective of overthrowing and replacing the regime in power in the 
homeland has, in the case of the official position of the TGE, been replaced by the achievement 
of 'genuine autonomy.'
The  major  objectives  of  the  TGE  in  its  exile  struggle,  with  particular  reference  to  the 
international domain, are to:
Achieve a status of 'genuine autonomy' for Tibet;
Reduce the hardships suffered by Tibetans in Tibet;
Ensure  the  preservation  of  Tibetan culture  and religion and to  ensure  respect  for 
human rights and the protection of the natural environment in Tibet;
Enter into meaningful dialogue with the PRC;
Make the Tibetan case international and gain international support and recognition;
Encourage possible international patrons and the international civil society to support 
the exile struggle, amongst other things by focusing on shared values such as the 
protection  of  human  rights  and  of  the  natural  environment,  the  practice  of  non-
violence and the advocacy of democracy.
55 See section 3.13.2 'Objectives of Exile Governments in Theory.'
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PART 4 – International Support for the TGE and the Tibetan Cause
4.1 Introduction to International Support for the TGE
Before  analyzing  the  TGE's  soft-power  resources,  the  present  section  discusses  international 
advocacy and support for the TGE and Tibet. Part 4 focuses particularly on moral and political 
international support.  Considering the relatively small population of Tibet, and the comparably 
tiny group of Tibetans in exile, the international support for the Tibetan cause is overwhelming, 
and has manifold expressions. The Tibetan cause has attracted politicians, scholars, actors, pop 
stars,  international  NGOs  and  thousands  of  individuals,  many  of  which  have  organized 
themselves politically by forming Tibet Support Groups (TSGs). As discussed in section 3.13.3 
('Objectives of the TGE in Practice'), the achievement of international support for the Tibetan 
cause is high on its agenda. Part 4 intends to offer an introduction to the dimension that Western 
support for Tibet has reached in recent years, and looks at support from the civil society, from 
celebrities and from governments.
The term Tibet Movement refers to the transnational efforts made on the part of Tibetans and their 
non-Tibetan supporters to achieve self-determination for the Tibetan people (Anand 2007:98). 
Another  term  often  used  for  this  mobilization  is  Free  Tibet  Movement.  The  term  Tibet 
Independence Movement is  more problematic,  as  it  implies  the  goal  of  the  movement  being 
independence for Tibet from China, which is in contradiction with official CTA policy. The TYC 
and many TSGs are part  of  the  Tibet Independence Movement.  The term  Tibet Movement  is 
generally associated with the civil society, whereas support for the Tibetan cause is also manifest 
in the highest political levels of the West.
“The Tibet cause has attracted an exceptionally diverse group of people, some of whom see their 
activities on behalf of the cause as connected with Buddhist belief and practice, while others are 
concerned with human rights, opposing communism, and a range of other motivations” (Powers 
2000). In the opinion of Heath (2005:252), the
international campaign in support of Tibet is truly a 'people' campaign, nonviolent and not relying on 
governments  or  businesses.  It  has  over  330  support  groups worldwide.  Many  leading  politicians, 
lawyers and other prominent people, including some leading Chinese dissidents, are Tibet supporters. 
In scale, scope and persistence, it is unique in world freedom movements. It is also a spiritually based 
campaign, bringing out people's finer instincts, supported by many hundreds of thousands of ordinary 
people – mostly non-Buddhists – who find the continuing Chinese occupation of Tibet intolerable.
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After Tibet received considerable international attention during the 1960s, “the world largely lost 
interest in Tibet” (Powers 2000) until the events of the late 1980s when the TGE adopted its new 
political  strategy  and  the  Tibet  issue  again  appeared  on  the  global  stage. Robert  Barnett 
(2001:286) summarizes how the strategy change that occurred within the TGE towards the end of 
the 1980s, discussed above, affected international mobilization for the Tibetan cause:
There had been Tibet support groups of a kind in Europe and elsewhere since 1959, but these had been 
conservative  in  character  and  strategy,  working  within  political  elites,  and  gradually  becoming 
organizations  focused  on  refugee  relief  work  as  they  lost  active  support  after  1971  [and  the 
rapprochement that followed the meeting between Nixon and Mao the same year] from governments 
and even from right wing politicians. The great achievement, therefore, of the exiles' 1987 initiative 
was that, perhaps for the first time, the Tibetan issue became acceptable to center-leftists as well as to 
more conservative political sectors that had traditionally given it their support. The groups founded in 
1987 or afterward represented the involvement in the issue of young, politically astute people from the 
liberal areas of the political spectrum, usually from the professional classes, who had a natural alliance 
with the media as well as with some sectors of the 'New Age' movements in the West, which until then 
had been largely resistant to any political mobilization. The romantic representation of Tibet as a site 
of religious excellence or as a bastion of anticommunist resistance had been deeply alienating to this 
professionalized, left-of-center sector of Western society, just as it was to most professional politicians 
of that era and, most significantly, to the media. It was the representation of Tibet as a 'specialized' site 
of  human  rights  violations  that  seems  to  have  made  the  issue  palatable  to  a  broad,  cross-party 
community. (Barnett 2001:286)
According to Powers (2000), it was the significant amount of grass roots work being done in the 
West, after the TGE's strategic change, which lay the groundwork for an increasing awareness of 
the Tibetan cause. “Tibet support  organizations were formed all  over the world at this time” 
(ibid.). It was Western political activism that made publics and governments more aware of the 
Tibetan situation, but researchers, translators, and publishers were also instrumental in bringing 
the Tibetan cause to Western audiences.
4.2 Civil Society Support for Tibet in the West
Support for Tibet among Western civil societies has been growing and has become increasingly 
evident  over  the  past  two  decades.  Particularly  the  protests  surrounding  the  2008  Beijing 
Olympics serve as an obvious example, but there are many more manifestations of this support, 
for instance the worldwide annual pro-Tibet demonstrations on 10th of March, the anniversary of 
the Lhasa uprising of 1959. Powers (2000) calls these demonstrations the “most important focal 
symbol of the growing movement” in support of Tibet. In “recent years [they] have drawn ever-
increasing numbers of protesters [...] Typically, crowds of demonstrators gather in a conspicuous 
public place, often in front of a Chinese embassy” (Powers 2000).
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The term  Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) depicts NGOs around the world that focus on a wide 
range of subjects related to the support for Tibet, including Tibetan Buddhism, human rights, the 
environment, the spreading of awareness about the situation in Tibet, or the demand for Tibetan 
independence  or  self-determination  (Anand  2007:98).  The  so-called  Tibet  Support  Groups 
(TSGs)  are  engaged  in  political  campaigning  and  relief  work.  About  150  TSGs  “are  solely 
'political' campaigning organizations, i.e. their work is dedicated to bringing about a change in the 
political status of Tibet. The majority of these advocate independence as the primary goal of a 
process of political change for Tibet” (Reynolds 2004:448). On its official website, the CTA lists 
243 TSGs and 54 Tibet Associations throughout the world (CTA 2), although these numbers 
might be out of date. In 2005, Heath (2005:252) refers to 330 TSGs around the world.
Since around 1990, international civil society support for the Tibetan cause has seen a dramatic 
increase.  One  measure  for  this  increase  is  the  surge  in  participation  in  the  International 
Conferences of Tibet Support Groups. So far, five such international TSG meetings have taken 
place,  the first  of  which was held in  Dharamsala  in 1990,  with delegates  from 25 countries 
represented.  In  Berlin  in  2000,  almost  300  participants  were  present  (CTA 2).  The  latest 
conference  held  in  May  2007  in  Brussels,  was  organized  by  the  DIIR56 and  the  Friedrich 
Naumann-Foundation, in collaboration with the Belgian Inter-Parliamentary Group for Tibet. 315 
representatives from 56 countries and five continents participated (Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung 
1). Following Rolf Berndt, the managing director of the Naumann Foundation, it was “the most 
political Tibet Support Groups Conference ever” (cited from ibid.), due to the upcoming Olympic 
Games in China.
The International  Tibet Support  Network (ITSN) is  a  network of  Tibet Support  Groups  that 
intends to effectively coordinate their work around the world and acts as a communication hub 
between them. The ITSN was founded at the Third International Tibet Support Group Conference 
held in the Legislative Assembly of the Land of Berlin in May 2000 (von Welck 2004:476). 
[The] ITSN aims to develop campaign strategies on priority issues, determined by consensus, and 
construct  action  plans,  which  members  can  adopt  to  whatever  degree  they  feel  is  possible  or 
appropriate,  based on their resources and the cultural and national political  context in which they 
operate (Reynolds 2004:448).
56 The DIIR's participation in the organizing of the TSG conference puts into question information from the TGE's 
website,  according  to  which  Tibetan  Support  Groups  “are  entirely  separate  from  the  Central  Tibetan 
Administration” (TGE 1).
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Many TSGs that are members of the ITSN are very small, run by volunteers. In 2004 there were 
around half a dozen TSGs with one or more full-time staff members. One of these is the  Free 
Tibet Campaign (Reynolds 2004:448).
The  Free Tibet Campaign (FTC), an NGO established in 1987, campaigns “for an end to the 
Chinese occupation and for the Tibetans' fundamental human rights to be respected” (Reynolds 
2004:449). The basis for the campaigning is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
activities  of  the  FTC include  events  for  public  awareness  raising,  demonstrations,  lobbying, 
letter-writing campaigns and media work (Reynolds 2004:449).  According to its website,  the 
FTC has more than 20,000 supporters, and is financed entirely from their contributions (FTC 1). 
There are approximately 50 local groups, varying from a single person to local committees with 
regular meetings, across the UK and oversees that work on behalf of the FTC (ibid.).
When PRC President Jiang Zemin officially visited the UK in October 1999, it was, according to 
Reynolds (2004:449), the merit of the Free Tibet Campaign that “Tibet was at the top of the 
public  agenda.” Almost  every UK newspaper  featured on its  front  page an  image of  a  lone 
protestor attempting to unfurl a Tibetan flag as the PRC President together with the Queen rode 
down  the  London  Mall.  There  was  a  public  outrage  when  it  became  known that  pro-Tibet 
protestors had been apprehended and their flags and placards confiscated, while supporters of 
Jiang Zemin were permitted to wave Chinese flags. “[T]he campaign became something of a 
cause  celèbre  [...]  The  Free  Tibet Campaign  exposed  the  sensitivity  not  only  of  the  [PRC] 
President to protest, but the fear the British government had of souring relations with China” 
(Reynolds 2004:449).
In terms of palpable outcomes, the work of the FTC has achieved the early release of a number of 
Tibetan political prisoners, including, in 2002, Ngawang Choephel (who had served an eighteen-
year  sentence  for  'spying'),  Takna Jigme Sangpo (who had  spent  most  of  the  previous  four 
decades incarcerated for supporting Tibetan independence), and Ngawang Sangdrol (a young nun 
who had been imprisoned for participating in pro-independence demonstrations). The Free Tibet 
Campaign, other TSGs and human rights organizations like Amnesty International have worked 
toward raising the international profile of political prisoners such as Ngawang Sangdrol.
The effect of this campaigning has been that Chinese leaders, who recognise that there is political 
capital to be made by releasing high profile prisoners, particularly before important summits with the 
United States, have identified Tibetans as being at the 'top of the list' for release (Reynolds 2004:451).
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The work of the FTC also led to the publicizing and 'breaking the story' of the witnessed killing 
of a Tibetan nun and a youth on their way to crossing the Nangpa La Pass to Nepal: “Following 
an  unprecedented  investigation,  the  Chinese  general  in  charge of  the  troops  involved in  the 
incident was forced to step down” (FTC 2007).
The  International  Campaign  for  Tibet (ICT),  according  to  its  mission  statement,  “works  to 
promote human rights and democratic freedoms for the people of Tibet” (ICT 1). Founded in 
1988, the ICT is a non-profit member organization with offices in Washington, D.C., Amsterdam, 
Berlin  and  Brussels,  and  field  offices  in  Dharamsala  and  Kathmandu.  In  2007,  the  active 
membership of the ICT reached 100,000 (ICT 4),  making it  the largest Tibet Support Group 
(Powers  2000).  Although  many  of  the  members  are  Buddhists,  the  ICT  is  a  non-religious 
organization (ibid.). One of the chairmen of the ICT is the celebrity Richard Gere.
In terms of activities it is engaged in, the ICT:
- Monitors and reports on human rights, environmental and socio economic conditions in Tibet;
- Advocates for Tibetans imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs;
- Works with governments to develop policies and programs to help Tibetans;
- Secures humanitarian and development assistance for Tibetans;
- Mobilizes individuals and the international community to take action on behalf of Tibetans; and
-  Promotes  self-determination  for  the  Tibetan  people  through  negotiations  between  the  Chinese 
government and the Dalai Lama (ICT 1).
The ICT is  engaged in  fact-finding  missions  in  India  and Nepal  and in  reporting  activities, 
distributing the bi-monthly Tibet Press Watch to organizations and individuals involved in work 
on  Tibet.  It  has  published  reports57 on  religious  persecution,  population  transfer,  racism, 
development projects and nuclear activities in Tibet (ICT 2).
Its lobbying activities included the hosting of a roundtable at the UN Commission on Human 
Rights  in  Geneva  in  2004.  According  to  the  ICT,  the  organization  helped  “secure  the 
Congressional  Gold  Medal  for  the  Dalai  Lama  in  recognition  of  his  many  enduring  and 
outstanding  contributions  to  peace,  non-violence,  human rights,  and religious understanding” 
(ICT 4).  It  also arranged for  a  public  speech by  the  Dalai  Lama in  Washington, D.C.  after 
receiving  the  Congressional  Gold  Medal  in  2007.  “More  than  10,000  gathered  to  hear  his 
message of peace and nonviolence, and over 65,000 people around the world watched a live 
webcast of the day's proceedings on ICT's website” (ICT 3).
57 For ICT reports, see http://www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-news-reports (accessed: 24.4.2009).
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In terms of financial assistance, in 2007 alone the ICT “[s]ecured the allocation of funds for 
Tibetan refugee communities,  including $2 million for humanitarian assistance,  $600,000 for 
scholarships, and $250,000 for programs that support human rights and democracy initiatives 
[and] secured an additional $3 million for development assistance, $500,000 for educational and 
cultural exchanges, and Radio Free Asia and Voice of America funding to reach inside Tibet” 
(ICT 3).
In 2008, the ICT launched a campaign around the Olympic Games in Beijing, “to protest the 
Olympic torch relay, to gain access for international journalists in Tibet, and to highlight human 
rights abuses during the Olympics” (ICT 4). This campaign gained international media attention 
on a massive scale.
Founded in New York City in 1994, Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), another major Tibet Support 
Group,  is  a  chapter-based network of  young people around the world (SFT 1).  It  “works in 
solidarity with the Tibetan people in their struggle for freedom and independence [...] Through 
education,  grassroots  organizing,  and  non-violent  direct  action,  [Students  for  a  Free  Tibet 
campaigns] for Tibetans' fundamental right to political freedom” (SFT 1).
According to its website, the SFT consists of over 650 chapters at universities, high schools and 
elementary schools in more than 30 countries, and one permanent office in New York. Activities 
center  around two main areas:  campaigns (education,  lobbying,  media advocacy, non-violent 
direct action) which, according to SFT, mobilize tens of thousands of people around the world; 
and leadership training, which “has given thousands of young people the skills and inspiration to 
be leaders in the struggle for Tibet and for social justice worldwide” (SFT 1).
Outcomes of the SFT campaigning activities include the early release of a number of Tibetan 
political prisoners, the raising of awareness about the Tibet issue, as well as contributing to the 
prevention of a controversial $ 40 million World Bank loan to China for a project comprising the 
relocation of around 58,000 Han Chinese into Tibetan areas in 2000 (SFT 2). The project ran 
under the title 'poverty alleviation' and intended to settle Han Chinese farmers to a more fertile 
area  in Qinghai,  part  of  traditional  Amdo province  of  Tibet. The project  raised “a  storm of 
protest” from environmental and human rights groups. “Those groups contended that the bank 
was aiding China's effort to dilute the minority Tibetan population” (Sanger/Kahn 2000). The 
prevention of this loan was seen as a major success of Western civil society campaigning for the 
Tibetan cause.
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While the campaigning work of Tibet Support Groups has raised Western awareness about the 
Tibet issue for some time, the events marking the 2008 Beijing Olympics secured media coverage 
on Tibet of an unprecedented scale. Protests targeting the Olympic Torch Relay turned it into 
somewhat of an embarrassment for China, since it is surely not in the 'Olympic spirit' to require 
massive  police  protection  for  the  Olympic  torch  in  almost  every  major  city  it  passed. 
Demonstrations,  in  part  violent,  against  Chinese policies  accompanied the  global  tour  of  the 
torch.58
In its  Beijing 2008 Olympics Campaign Evaluation,  the International  Tibet Support  Network 
(ITSN 1) assumes that the uprising and subsequent repression within Tibet “was the largest single 
contributor  to  increased  public  awareness  about  Tibet  for  the  duration  of  the  Olympics 
campaign.” However, the  report  continues,  “the awareness and sympathy was magnified and 
channeled into activity because of the existence of Tibet Groups and their preparedness for the 
Olympics campaign.”
In its analysis, the ITSN (1) holds that
the situation of Tibet was covered in the vast majority of mainstream media analyses of Beijing 2008 
as one of the critical issues facing the Chinese leadership today. Attention first grew noticeably during 
the worldwide actions that took place during the One-Year Countdown, particularly those of Students 
for a Free Tibet inside China. The major western media outlets that have not given Tibet extensive 
coverage in recent years began to single out and discuss Tibet rather than lumping it with general 
human rights issues. The Tibetan uprising, and the Olympic torch relay that followed on its heels, 
brought unparalleled intensity of coverage and placed Tibet front and centre in much of the analysis of 
China and the Olympics both by journalists and experts. This decreased after May but continued to an 
extent through the Olympics. As of November 2008, it appeared that Tibet was still attracting a higher 
level of attention than before the campaign (ITSN 1).
The report also claims that increased awareness led to an amplification of the Tibet movement in 
general:
The capacity of individual Tibet Groups grew because of the Olympics campaign. Sixty-six percent of 
member  organisations  that  responded  to  ITSN’s Olympics  evaluation  survey  said  their  capacity 
increased (their budget grew, they got new volunteers, supporters and/or members, or developed new 
media contacts or contacts in government) because of the Olympics campaign. Small member groups 
were strengthened by the knowledge and resources shared by larger groups (ITSN 1).
58 For an interactive map, detailing each stop of the Olympic torch, see the website of the University of Southern 
California US-China Institute at: 
http://www.uschina.usc.edu/ShowFeature.aspx?articleID=1740&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed: 
24.4.2009). For a collection of links to media reports on the torch relay, see 
http://www.freetibet.org/newsmedia/april-2008-0 (accessed: 24.4.2009)
64
Economy and Segal (2008:56) believe that the “barrage of criticism China has endured prior to 
the Olympics may have brought a short-term gain in forcing the Chinese leadership to agree to 
meet  with  the  Dalai  Lama's  envoys,  but  real  reform  of  China's  Tibet  policy  or  a  broader 
willingness to embrace domestic reforms is unlikely to follow in the near term.” This might be 
the case, but the protests demonstrated international outrage with a number of China's policies, 
and increased international awareness of the Tibet issue.
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  campaigns  surrounding  the  Beijing  Olympics  had  effects  on 
international public opinion. A Harris Interactive poll published in May 2008 finds that:
More than three-quarters of adults in France (84%) and half the adults in Germany (51%) say they 
have heard a lot about the recent global protests surrounding the freeing of Tibet from Chinese rule; 
Pluralities in China itself (46%), Great Britain (44%) and the United States (41%) have also heard a lot  
about these protests; At least three in five adults in Italy (60%), Japan (66%), and Spain (68%) have 
heard at least a little about the protests; Three-quarters of adults in Italy (75%) and Germany (74%), 
two-thirds of adults in Japan (69%), France (67%) and Spain (64%) and a majority of adults in the 
United States (59%) and Great Britain (53%) all believe Tibet should not be under Chinese rule (Harris 
Interactive 2008).
4.3 The Internet as a Tool for Support
A fascinating  use  of  the  Internet  to  wield  soft  power  can  be  found  in  the  politics  of  diaspora 
communities. David Bollier, an expert on the impact of digital technologies, notes, 'The Internet has 
been a godsend to such populations because it enables large numbers of geographically isolated people 
with a shared history to organize into large virtual communities (Nye 2004a:92).
Support for the Tibetan cause in virtual realms is significant and has manifold expressions. Most 
of the English-language Tibet-related internet sites are pro-Tibetan. Tibet Support Groups now 
tend  to  work  and  communicate  over  the  internet.  Saunders  (2008)  cites  a  communications 
professor at Simon Fraser University, Peter-Chow White, in saying that the internet has a very 
significant role in global activism: “The internet has been a source of alternative media, not just  
in terms of alternative institutionalized forms of media, but in terms of everyday people using 
technology to spread their own information [...] FaceBook, Youtube and My Space are all central 
to how activists now work.” According to Saunders (2008), FaceBook is home to over 500 Tibet-
related groups, and the 'Free Tibet' group counts over 80,000 members.
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In an online petition arranged by Avaaz59 to Chinese President Hu Jintao, asking to show restraint 
and respect for human rights, and to open meaningful dialogue with the Dalai Lama, one million 
people signed within seven days. Response, which came from every country in the world, was 
greatest in France, where six out of 1,000 citizens signed the petition (Saunders 2008). Towards 
the end of April 2009, well over 1.6 million people had signed.
The presence of support for Tibet is particularly significant in the virtual world where most of the 
Internet sites related to Tibet are pro-Tibetan. In fact, there is an increasing realization within the 
Tibetan diaspora of the possibilities offered by the Internet as a means for disseminating information 
and mobilizing support (Anand 2007:98).
The  virtual  support  for  the  Tibetan cause,  and  the  internet  as  a  tool  for  mobilization  and 
dissemination of information seems to confirm what Joseph Nye (2004a:31) argues in relation to 
how the global information age affects politics:60
[T]he information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cut across national 
borders. Transnational corporations and nongovernmental actors [...] will play larger roles. Many of 
these organizations will have soft power of their own as they attract citizens into coalitions that cut 
across national boundaries. Politics then becomes in part a competition for attractiveness, legitimacy, 
and credibility. The ability to share information – and to be believed – becomes an important source of 
attraction and power.
4.4 Celebrity Support for Tibet in the West
Many Western celebrities are actively involved in supporting the Dalai Lama, the TGE and the 
Tibetan  cause.  The  most  prominent  is  probably  the  American  actor  Richard  Gere,  “the 
Hollywood star most identified with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan freedom movement” (Shell 
2000:44), who was also the first major celebrity who became active in the Tibetan cause.
At the 1993 Academy Awards, Gere utilized the international spotlight to draw attention to Tibet, 
calling for Deng Xiaoping to stop oppression in Tibet. “Gere, a devout Tibetan Buddhist, asked 
the audience to mentally send a message to Deng asking him to bring 'a little sanity' to the Tibet 
situation” (Powers 2000). Powers (ibid.) calls this a “key moment in the current surge of interest 
in the Tibet cause.”
59 See http://www.avaaz.org/en/tibet_end_the_violence/ (accessed: 24.4.2009).
60 See also section 2.5 'Soft Power in a Global Information Age.'
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Many other celebrities followed Gere in speaking out for Tibet, including “film star Harrison 
Ford, his wife Melissa Mathiesson, a movie script writer, and rock musician Adam Yauch of the 
Beastie Boys” (ibid.).
One of the highest-profile activists for the Tibet cause is definitely Robert Thurman, who attracts 
attention not only for being America's first ordained Tibetan Buddhist monk, but also for being 
the father of Hollywood actress Uma Thurman. He is characterized by journalists as America's 
leading Buddhist, occasionally acts as the Dalai Lama's unofficial spokesperson and is the Jey 
Tsong Khapa Professor of Buddhist Studies at Columbia University (Lopez 1998:83). In 1987, 
Thurman and Gere, along with composer Philip Glass and others, founded the Tibet House in 
New York, which “aims to promote and preserve Tibetan culture by serving as both a cultural 
center  in  New  York City  and  an  online  global  resource  for  those  interested  in  Tibetan 
civilization” (Tibet House 1). According to Powers (2000), Tibet House “has been particularly 
effective in bringing celebrities to the Free Tibet cause.” Emphasizing the position of Robert 
Thurman,  he  was  chosen  one  of  “Time's  25  Most  Influential  Americans”  in  1997   (Time 
Magazine 1997).
Adam Yauch, frontman of the American hip hop group the Beasty Boys, has been very active in 
bringing the issue of Tibet to younger audiences, mainly through the organization of the so-called 
'Tibetan Freedom Concerts.' These concerts, staged as charity and awareness raising events for 
the Tibet cause, have featured widely known artists like the Foo Fighters,  Alanis Morissette, 
Sonic Youth, Patti Smith, Pearljam, Radiohead, Red Hot Chilli Peppers, Fugees, REM, and U2 
(Penenberg 1997; Powers 2000). The first concert, held in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park in 
June 1996, attracted over 100,000 people (Shell 2000:36). According to the online encyclopedia 
wikipedia.org, citing beastiemania.com, a website of the Beastie Boys,61 these concerts that were 
held in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 attracted a total of well over 300,000 attendees, and raised 
over $ 1.5 million for the Tibetan cause.
Towards the end of the 1990s in Hollywood “there was something of a craze brewing around 
Tibet” (Schell 2000:34).  Joan Chen, a Chinese actress who moved to the United States in the 
early 1980s, explains the fascination with Tibet in Hollywood in the following way:
People in Hollywood like the idea of Tibetan mysticism because they don't really understand it and so 
can interpret  it  any way they  want.  It's  a  lazy way of  achieving enlightenment  (cited from Shell 
2000:270).
61 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibetan_Freedom_Concert (accessed: 24.4.2009).
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The Tibet movement gained unprecedented publicity through the growing interest in Tibet among 
Hollywood stars, rock musicians, and other celebrities. In 1997 two big-budget productions on 
Tibet were released:  Seven Years in Tibet and Kundun. These films contributed significantly to 
popularizing the Tibet issue in the West.
Seven  Years in  Tibet,  a  version  of  Heinrich  Harrer's  classic  released  in  October  1997  was 
budgeted at $ 65 million (Shell 2000:314). The Sony-Tristar production was directed by Jean-
Jaques Annaud and featured superstar Brad Pitt.  Kundun, a $ 28 million production directed by 
Martin Scorsese and released in December of the same year, relates the Dalai Lama's story from 
his birth in 1935 to his flight to India, and “ends with powerful images of the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet” (Powers 2000).
Seven Years in Tibet and  Kundun reached millions  of  viewers.  Shell  (2000:32) believes that 
“Hollywood films are the most  powerful vectors  of fantasy ever known to humankind,” and 
ascribes  Hollywood  “global  economic  reach  and  [the]  ability  to  animate  popular  sentiment 
around the world” (ibid:305). Indeed, the films' productions and the publicity created thereby had 
effects. According to John Ackerly, director of the Washington based International Campaign for 
Tibet, membership in the ICT surged immensely in the aftermath of the films' release (cited from 
Powers 2000). The increased popularity of Tibet fostered hopes for concrete improvements:
Among many exiled Tibetans there arose an almost millenarian hope that the release of these films and 
the identification with Tibet of such pop icons as Martin Scorsese, Steven Seagal, Brad Pitt, Richard 
Gere,  and  the  Beasty  Boys  might  precipitate  the  long-awaited  moment  when  China  would  feel 
compelled by the power of world opinion to address the question of Tibet in a more humane and 
conciliatory way (Shell 2000:305).
Shell (ibid:311) too believed that the hype around these films might rouse the world from “its 
neglect  of  Tibet's tragedy.” But,  he  concludes,  “there  was  no  deliverance  to  come.”  In  this 
connection, Richard Gere says:
In the end, they're all just movies. They will be transformative only to the degree that one wants to be 
transformed and is capable of being transformed. The dangers are that one will get a kind of wet 
catharsis from them. Namely, people will think that because they've lived through a movie, they have 
somehow lived through the Tibetan experience and had an effect on it. In that way, people may just 
allow Tibet's problems to be put back into their compartment, while they move on to the next film 
(cited from Shell 2000:57).
But despite a lack of momentous transformative power, the films played a significant part in 
popularizing the Tibetan image in the West.
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4.5 Western Government and Parliamentary Support for Tibet
Since the Dalai Lama's extensive travels began in the 1980s he has been received by numerous 
Western parliaments and has met with various politicians including many heads of state. A good 
deal  of resolutions  on  Tibet have  been  passed  by  Western parliaments,  endorsing  the  Dalai 
Lama's and the TGE's cause.
In  order  to  provide  an  introduction  to  Western parliamentary  support  the  Tibetan cause  has 
received, in the following two recent legislative resolutions concerning Tibet are dealt with: One 
from  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  passed  on  9  March  2009,  and  one  passed  by  the 
European Parliament on 12 March 2009, both marking the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's 
flight  from Tibet. Although these  examples highlight  the  tendency  of  Western parliamentary 
resolutions62 to be non-binding on executive organs, they do demonstrate significant Western 
political support for the TGE and its cause.
Adopted  on  9  March 2009,  the  most  recent  U.S.  Congress  resolution  on  Tibet  is  entitled: 
Resolution “[r]ecognizing the plight of the Tibetan people on the 50th anniversary of His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama being forced into exile and calling for a sustained multilateral effort to bring 
about a durable and peaceful solution to the Tibet issue” (USHR 2009:1).
In  this  resolution,  the  House  of  Representatives  “recognizes  the  Tibetan  people  for  their 
perseverance in face of hardship and adversity in Tibet and for creating a vibrant and democratic 
community  in  exile  that  sustains  the  Tibetan identity”  (ibid.).  This  is  inarguably a  form of 
political endorsement and, notably, a recognition of democracy in the exile political system.
The House of Representatives further “calls upon the Government of [...] China to respond to the 
Dalai Lama's initiatives to find a lasting solution to the Tibetan issue, cease its repression of the 
Tibetan  people,  and  to  lift  immediately  the  harsh  policies  imposed  on  Tibetans,  including 
patriotic education campaigns, detention and abuses of those freely expressing political views or 
relaying news about local conditions, and limitations on travel and communications” (ibid.). No 
doubt, such statements are in the interest of the TGE. This resolution is a clear sign of, if not 
more, at least moral political support.
62 For a list of resolutions on Tibet, with the respective links, see http://www.tibet.com/resolution/index.html 
(accessed: 24.4.2009)
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Finally, the House of Representatives “calls upon the Administration to recommit to a sustained 
effort [...] that employs diplomatic, programmatic, and multilateral resources to press the People's 
Republic of China to respect the Tibetans' identity and the human rights of the Tibetan people” 
(ibid.).  Despite a lack of concrete political commitment, Resolution 226 is a clear message that 
there is political support  for the TGE and its cause in the U.S. Congress.
The European Parliament “Resolution of 12 March 2009 on the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan 
uprising and dialogue between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government” (EUP 
2009) sends a strong political message. The resolution “[c]alls on the Council Presidency [...] to 
adopt a declaration calling on the Chinese Government to open a constructive dialogue with a 
view to reaching a comprehensive political agreement” (ibid.). It “[u]rges the Council Presidency 
to take the initiative of including the question of Tibet on the agenda for a meeting of the General 
Affairs Council with a view to discussing how the EU could facilitate progress on a solution for 
Tibet” (ibid.).
The legislative organ of the European Union endorses some of the TGE's interests. For instance, 
it “[a]sks the Chinese authorities to provide foreign media access to Tibet,” and “[c]alls on the 
Chinese Government to release immediately and unconditionally all  those detained solely for 
engaging in peaceful protest, and to account for all those who have been killed or gone missing, 
and all those detained and the nature of the charges against them” (ibid.). Furthermore it “[u]rges 
the  Chinese  authorities  to  grant  UN human  rights  experts  and  recognised  international  non-
governmental organisations unimpeded access to Tibet so that they can investigate the situation 
there” (ibid.).
These requests  are an explicit  indication of political  support  for  the TGE on the part  of  the 
European  Parliament.  They  do  not  result  in  concrete  changes  in  China's  Tibet  policy, nor 
necessarily  in  increased  pressure  on  China  from  the  European  Council  or  from  individual 
governments, but they are evidence of the existence of a Tibet lobby within the parliament and 
they express an unambiguous political signal to China and the world.
While Western parliamentary resolutions on Tibet indicate political support from the legislative 
side, heads of state meeting the Dalai Lama demonstrate a form of support from highest political 
levels.  Every government leader that meets with the Dalai Lama, be it  George W. Bush and 
Angela Merkel in 2007, or Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008, in a sense endorses his person and thereby 
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indirectly also the associated cause, despite the fact that Western leaders often stress the 'private' 
nature of these 'informal' talks with the Dalai Lama. Over the past decades, the Dalai Lama has 
met with numerous Western heads of state.
Since George H. W. Bush in 1991, every U.S. President has met with the Dalai Lama. Both 
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton met him unofficially, “each 'dropping in' as the monk visited 
with [sic] a senior advisor” (Klug 2009). George W. Bush, in an elaborate ceremony in October 
2007, conferred the U.S. Congress' highest civilian award, the Congressional Gold Medal, on the 
Dalai Lama “in recognition of his lifetime efforts to promote peace worldwide and a non-violent 
resolution to the Tibet issue” (USHR 2009:3). This award implies substantial political support 
and appreciation  for  the  Dalai  Lama from the  U.S.  President  and Congress.  With regard  to 
speculations whether Barack Obama will also meet the Dalai Lama, the  Agence France-Press 
asserts that “analysts in Washington believe it is unlikely Obama would shun the spiritual leader, 
who enjoys a wide following in the United States” (Anon. 2009).
When Angela Merkel met  with the Dalai  Lama in September 2007 it  was the first  time the 
Tibetan leader was received at the German chancellory. Despite the 'informality' of the talks, they 
demonstrated  an  appreciation  from the  highest  German political  level  and  caused  extensive 
publicity for the Dalai Lama. Similarly, the meeting of French President and then EU Council 
President  Nicolas  Sarkozy  with  the  Dalai  Lama  in  Poland  in  December  2008  provoked 
substantial publicity for the Dalai Lama. As always when Western leaders encounter the Dalai 
Lama, the Chinese leadership reacted furiously; it cancelled an EU-China summit which France 
was to host shortly after (Anon. 2008).
Whatever the motivation of Western heads of state in meeting with the Dalai Lama, every such 
meeting is a powerful symbol of Western appreciation of the Dalai Lama. Indirectly, it can be 
argued, meetings such as the ones discussed above endorse, beyond the Dalai Lama's person, the 
TGE and the Tibetan people as a whole, even if this tends not to be explicitly emphasized. Such 
meetings secure powerful media publicity for the Dalai Lama, and accentuate the fact that he 
enjoys political support from top governmental levels in the West.
When considering political support for the Dalai Lama and his cause from Western governments 
and parliaments, it should be kept in mind that the TGE remains unrecognized as the legitimate 
government of Tibet. Nevertheless, parliamentary resolutions on Tibet, receptions of the Dalai 
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Lama by parliaments and heads of state are all positive signs of Western political support. In a 
sense,  such  events  help  to  keep  the  Tibet issue  'alive'  in  world  politics.  Although  tangible 
outcomes remain lacking, and although the Dalai Lama is mostly regarded officially as a spiritual 
leader, such events do have strong symbolic power, particularly through the international media 
attention they provoke, in directly endorsing the Dalai  Lama, and thereby indirectly also the 
organization he heads and the cause he represents.
4.6 Summary of International Support for the Tibetan Cause
If  Tibetans  abroad  lacked  diplomatic  recognition,  embassies,  or  representation  in  important 
international organizations, they were gaining crucial access to power, money, and the media through 
their  newly  forged  partnership  with  these  unofficial  and  ardent  American  groups  and  supportive 
celebrities (Shell 2000:38).
While by no means offering a comprehensive account, Part 4 has introduced the vast international 
popular support for the Tibetan cause. As we have seen, support for Tibet in the West is manifold, 
involving various levels of Western society. No doubt, this support is limited, and it is yet to be 
seen if there are ways it can contribute to the TGE's overall objective, to regain the homeland.
Part 4 demonstrated that the TGE has successfully achieved one of the objectives in its exile 
struggle, namely the mobilization of international support. While government support remains 
somewhat faint, particularly in terms of binding, executive decisions, civil society support has 
attained astonishing levels. The question arises: How has this been achieved?
The next part argues that the achieved support has been to a large extent the result of the Tibetan 
exile government's soft power. It examines  how different aspects of the TGE's soft power has 
contributed to generating these levels of Western popular support for Tibet.
The many Tibet Support Groups are motivated by a wide spectrum of issues, including human 
rights, the environment and the attraction caused by Tibetan culture and religion. As will be seen, 
these issues,  which represent  popular  values in the  West, have been politicized by the exile 
government and thereby transformed into attractive soft-power resources.
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PART 5 – The Myth of Tibet
5.1 Introduction to the Myth of Tibet
So far, in a sense, this paper has laid the foundations for the analysis conducted in Parts 5, 6 and 
7. Part 2 offered an explanation of soft power and the term soft-power resources. Part 3 dealt with 
the Tibetan exile government, and closed with a display of the TGE's objectives in relation to the 
international  sphere.  The previous section,  Part  4,  highlighted to some degree the levels that 
Western support, particularly civil society engagement for the Tibetan cause have attained.  The 
following three parts of this paper analyze various aspects of the TGE's soft power, attempting to 
specify  the  different  soft-power  resources  at  its  disposal.  Joseph  Nye  states  that  soft-power 
resources can be at the hands of government, or can be outside of their control. With regard to the 
TGE, this is the case. Some aspects of the TGE's soft power are out of the TGE's direct control, 
others are deliberately fostered.
Part  5 explores the  Myth of Tibet as a soft-power resource for the TGE. The Myth  per se is 
outside the control of the TGE, it is in a sense 'given,' but it acts as an attractive force for the 
TGE's cause. In addition, certain elements of the Myth have been deliberately politicized to act as 
attractive power for the TGE. Part 6 deals with how the personality and position of the 14 th Dalai 
Lama act as an asset of soft-power. Part 7 enquires into values represented by the TGE which are 
instrumentalised as attractive power resources. It focusses more specifically on the ways in which 
the TGE has used the context of the Myth to actively pursue a strategy of soft power. It portrays 
how the TGE has politicized the Myth in an active endeavour to gain attention and support. But 
the present section deals with the context in which the TGE's soft power is wielded: the Myth of  
Tibet.
The context of soft power is paramount for its effective application. Nye (2004b:2) states: “All 
power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power 
depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers.” Part 5 
discusses  how  Western societies  have  become  “willing  interpreters  and  receivers”  by  the 
formation of the Myth of Tibet.
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The history of European and American projections in the creation of its image of Tibet is long. 
Tibet has been seen to offer the key to the fulfillment of Western desires. It has been seen a sacred 
place, as the refuge of the occult, the mysterious, as the embodiment of a mystical world from 
which one could expect salvation from the prosaicness of European-American culture (von Brück 
2008:26).
This section deals with Shangri-La, or the Myth of Tibet as a soft-power resource for the TGE. 
According to Nye (2004a:9), both Hitler and Stalin managed to attract foreigners through the 
fostering of a “myth of invincibility or inevitability,” based to some extent on hard power. In the 
Tibetan case, the myth surrounding Tibet is not based on economic or military power, but on 
images and representations of Tibet as a sanctuary of peace and wisdom, as a holy land, as the 
beholder of the solutions to the problems of the West. As will be demonstrated below, such a 
myth can act as a significant source of attraction for the TGE and the Tibetan case.
After discussing the origins of the term now widely used to depict the Myth of Tibet, Shangri-La, 
the Myth itself will be historically introduced. Also, negative aspects of the generally positive 
Myth will be discussed. The Myth will then be illustrated using two popular books in the West as 
examples. The current state of the  Myth of Tibet and an analysis of the Myth as a soft-power 
resource for the TGE will close this section. It will be discussed how the Myth itself acts an 
attractive force, hence a soft-power resource, and how it forms, in a sense, fertile grounds on 
which a 'soft-power strategy' of the TGE could be built.
5.2 Origins of the Term Shangri-La
One of the final and most complete embodiments of Tibet as a sacred place in the Western imagination 
was the utopia of Shangri-La described in Hilton's famous 1933 novel Lost Horizon (Bishop 1989:19).
Following Jan Magnusson (2002:196), the term Shangri-La was first established as a concept in 
Tibetan studies by Peter Bishop in his 1989 publication The Myth of Shangri-La. The term has 
become generic for myths surrounding Tibet and its culture among Westerners. These myths have 
increasingly become objects of study in Tibetan studies (Magnusson 2002:195).
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The origin of the term is literary: Shangri-La is the name of a hidden Himalayan valley, a utopia, 
in the 1933 novel Lost Horizon by the British author James Hilton. This novel was an outstanding 
bestseller in Britain and the United States, and in 1937 a film version directed by Frank Capra 
was released.
Nothing did more to popularize the notion of Shangri-La than Hollywood's version of the novel [...] 
With Capra's  film,  the  Tibet of  filth,  ferocity, arcane  religious  practices,  grinding  poverty, barren 
wastes, inhospitable weather, serfdom, disease, and theocratic absolutism vanished totally from public 
consciousness (Shell 2000:246).
Bishop (1989:211) summarizes the essence of the story:
The leading character, Conway, was one of the lost generation – burnt out by the First World War, 
disillusioned by the post-war situation, alienated from his own extroverted, materialistic and spiritually 
shallow culture. But in a remote Tibetan-type monastery, hidden in the wilderness of the Kuen Lun 
Mountains  that  formed the  northern  boundary  of  Tibet, he  found hope  [...]  It  was  imagined that 
Shangri-La would preserve the wisdom and beauty of civilization and be the faint light to guide the 
world.
The novel was particularly significant in shaping and inspiring Western and particularly European 
fantasies  about  Tibet.  Lost  Horizon  was  published  against  the  backdrop  of  general 
disillusionment with Western civilization in the West.
The  First  World  War  administered  a  profound  shock  to  Westerners'  confidence  in  their  own 
civilization. It was a time of doubt and reflection on a scale almost unknown in pre-war times. [...] By 
the close of the Second World War, [...] the disillusionment was all-embracing. Tibet seemed to offer 
hope, not just for a personal despair but for the malaise of an entire civilization, and perhaps for the 
whole world. James Hilton's Lost Horizon [...] brilliantly encapsulated and popularized this symbolic 
drama (Bishop 1989:209-211).
Lost Horizon  contributed significantly to consolidating a Western image of Tibet as a distant 
utopia. A myth that had, in one form or another, existed for centuries (McRae 2003:107).
5.3 Short History of the Myth of Tibet
In his 1989 publication The Myth of Shangri-La – Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation 
of  Sacred Landscape,63 the  Australian  researcher  Peter  Bishop  traces  the  history  of  Western 
perceptions and fantasies of Tibet and the Himalayan regions. Acting on the assumption that we 
“inescapably shape the world, even if only with our minds and not our hands” (Bishop 1989:1), 
Bishop analyzes Western travel accounts of Tibet from the end of the eighteenth century to 1959, 
63 Bishop (1989).
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situating them against the background of Western culture, in order to “assess the inner meaning 
that Tibet has held for the West” (ibid:2). Working with concepts from archetypal psychology, 
humanistic  geography, and French deconstructivism,  he demonstrates  how the  Myth of  Tibet 
became  comprised of  a  placeless  utopia,  an alternative  society and of a  criticism of modern 
society. He explores the imaginal  Tibet created by the West, “not  as an abstraction, but as a 
sensual reality: not as a series of disembodied ideas, but as a complex world of images – shapes, 
colours, textures” (Bishop 1989:19), in an endeavour to uncover “the past foundations of present 
fantasies.”
While  following  the  process  whereby  the  Myth  of  Tibet in  the  West transformed  from  a 
geographical rumour to a sacred place, Bishop is well aware that geographical or psychological 
otherness is rarely an imaginal wholeness or unity. He stresses the complex phenomenology of 
the image of a sacred space – “the fluidity of its boundaries; the shifts and realignments of its 
crucial features; its transformations across time; the often contradictory levels of fantasy-making 
(political  and  religious,  individual  and  social)  sliding  across  each  other,  contradicting  or 
reinforcing each other” (Bishop 1989:246). However, the fact that there is always a diversity of 
images about otherness does not undermine a certain imaginal coherence. Certain aspects of an 
image  tend  to  be  more  emphasized,  or  imagined,  more  clearly  and  forcefully  than  others 
(ibid:247).  To illustrate  a  profound imaginal  continuity  offered by  Tibet, Bishop  (1989:249) 
employs the metaphor of the echo. “Places echo.”
Echoes  counter  the  narcissistic  desire,  held  by  many  Westerners, to  see  a  simple  reflection  of 
themselves in the mirror of Tibet. Tibet was never a simple mirror to the West's desires. At the very 
least it gave these projections its own specific form, colour, tone and texture (ibid.).
Bishop maps the changes that have occurred in the Western perception of Tibet; how different 
myths, different Tibets have been created in Western fantasy over the centuries. While European 
travellers had previously visited Tibet, “[t]he encounter64 between Britain and Tibet in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century marked the beginning of something new: the sustained creation 
of Tibet as an important imaginal landscape for Western cultures” (Bishop 1989:25). This period 
was  characterized  by  a  rich  complexity  of  contradictions  and  oppositions,  a  “complexio 
oppositorum [which]  was  to  provide  the  basis  of  Tibet  as  a  sacred  place  in  the  Western 
imagination” (ibid:63). Landscape Romanticism dominated the early nineteenth century. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, almost the entire globe had been basically mapped. One of the few blank 
64 'Encounter' in the sense that travel accounts written by representatives of the East India Company (George Bogle, 
Samuel Turner) became available in Britain.
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spaces left was Tibet, which became a focus for mystic projections, for European longings and 
aspirations (Bishop 1989:65; 242). An aspect of these longings was also Tibet as an object of 
European imperial desire. “[T]he failure of the European powers to dominate it politically only 
increased European longing and fed the fantasy about the land beyond the Snowy Range” (Lopez 
1998:5-6). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, accompanied by “an overwhelming belief 
in the final and general scientific comprehension of nature” (ibid:242), many Westerners set out 
to aesthetically map the last unknown regions of the world. The symbolic power that had recently 
been spread throughout Tibet, became increasingly concentrated in Lhasa and eventually in the 
person of the Dalai Lama, who became “the embodiment not  only of all  Tibet's paradoxical 
mysteries and forces but of those of the wider world [...] many came to imagine him as one of the 
last remaining vessels of ancient wisdom and occult power in an otherwise disenchanted world” 
(Bishop 1989:243). A gradual demythologization of the land of Tibet set in, caused by social 
realism or political pragmatics. The image of Tibet as the sacred place became “fragmented into 
isolated points of heightened imaginative significance: the Dalai Lama of course, but also the 
yeti, Mount Everest, and remote mystic recluses” (ibid:243).
The fantasy of Shangri-La was the final chord in one line of imaginative development. It literally had 
no-place (utopia) left to go. The 'conquest' of Mount Everest also meant that by 1953 these mountain 
summits had ceased to be the untouched, mysterious preserve of the gods. The yeti, by its very nature, 
lingers on in the twilight realm as either a curious oddity or an archetypal mythologem. By 1959 only 
the Dalai  Lama and a  handful  of  high lamas  remained with  something  approaching the sense  of 
mysterious possibility previously contained within all of Tibet (Bishop 1989:244).
5.4 Negative Myths of Tibet
Shangri-La, in the sense of the Tibetan utopia, contains very positively connoted myths regarding 
Tibet. Further on it will be discussed how these positive myths of Tibet have acted and are acting 
as a soft-power resources for the TGE. First however it should be pointed out that Shangri-La has 
not been the only Myth of Tibet that circulated in the West.
Before the end of the nineteenth century, particularly Western missionaries returning from Tibet 
painted a gloomy picture of the foreign land: Aided by the light of Christianity, it should finally 
be  liberated  from  its  ignorance.  Militant  missionary  polemics  had  described  Tibet  as  a 
“stronghold of the evil,” or “seemingly impregnable Gibraltar for modern missionary activity” 
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(William Carey 1902, cited from von Brück 2008:2365). However, von Brück (ibid.) points out, 
that such descriptions were probably at least in part motivated by the desire to spur donations 
from local communities to support further missionary engagement.
British Orientalists of the nineteenth century held and dispersed similar perceptions. Among them 
it was common to view Tibetan Buddhism as a degenerate form of the original pure Buddhism of 
earlier days. Rhys Davids in 1881 for instance, described Tibetan Buddhism as a mixture of 
animistic,  speculative  and  emotional  confusions,  characterized  by  the  striving  for  power  of 
priests. The influential Buddhism & Lamaism of Tibet (London 1895) by L. Austine Waddell had 
a similar view of Tibetan Buddhism as the height of Buddhist degeneration. To some extent, 
traces of such perceptions continue to abide (von Brück 2008:24-5).
Currently, the dominant positive image of Tibet in the West is contested in some circles, and 
clichés like Tibet as a “feudal hell” are spread in the internet and some random publications. 
However, Dodin  and  Räther  (2001:415)  argue that  “the  heavily  dogmatic  character  of  these 
circles, their marginality and the poor quality of their arguments make them negligible.”
Particularly  the  pro-Tibet  movement  has  had  formidable  influence  on  the  public  opinion 
regarding Tibet in the West, so that negative views of Tibet as a “feudal hell” have been “almost 
completely eclipsed” (Dodin/Räther 2001:409).
5.5 Illustrating the Myth: The Tibetan Book of the Dead and The Third Eye
Two popular books have had substantial impact on Western myths concerning Tibet. On the one 
hand, the examples embodied by these books demonstrate how literature has contributed to create 
and foster the myths.  On the other, they illustrate how the books themselves are,  in part,  an 
outcome of the Myth of Tibet.
A  good  example  for  the  formation  of  the  Myth  of  Tibet,  of  Western understanding  and 
misunderstanding of  Tibet and its  culture,  and of  how Western images and projections have 
determined its perception of Tibet, is illustrated by the Western interpretation of  The Tibetan 
65 My translation from German.
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Book of the Dead. The text66 became known in Europe after its first English language publication 
by W. Y. Evans-Wentz in 1927, and since then has taken on a life of its own as a kind of “timeless 
world spiritual classic” (Lopez 1998:47). With over half a million copies sold in English and 
translations into various European languages, Evan-Wentz's version had become the most widely 
read 'Tibetan text'67 in the West by 1998 (von Brück 2008:28; Lopez 1998:47-8). In the meantime, 
Songyal Rinpoche's 1992 version has sold many more copies (see below).
The original Tibetan 'treasure text,'68 said to have been written in the eighth century and then 
found and translated in the fourteenth century, was traditionally used as a mortuary text in Tibet, 
“read aloud in the presence of a dying or dead person” (Lopez 1998:49). It describes the different 
phases of death and rebirth.
Lopez  (1998:46-85)  demonstrates  how  this  text  has  gone  through  a  history  of  European 
projections and interpretations, that were closely related to European issues, desires and problems 
of the respective period. Over the course of almost a century, the book has been discovered and 
rediscovered in the West. Each of the five major incarnations69 (1927, 1964, 1975, 1992, 1994), 
and several  minor  ones,  served an agenda in some way suitable for its  own time, reflecting 
cultural fashions of twentieth-century Europe and United States, rather than giving insight into 
the way the text had in fact been used for centuries in Tibet.70
For instance, in his 1935 'Psychological Commentary,' Carl Gustav Jung “declares the Tibetan 
work to be psychological in its outlook, and begins to compare its insights to the more limited 
views of Freud” (Lopez 1998:57), incorporating Asian wisdom into his psychological theory, 
which was subsequently marketed to European and American consumers in the form of therapy. 
The 1964 version The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based on the Tibetan Book of the Dead 
assumes that mental and spiritual oneness, proclaimed in the 'original' version of Evans-Wentz, 
66 Originally Bar do thos grol, which means literally “liberation in the intermediate state [through] hearing” (Lopez 
1998:47).
67 Quotation marks because the most widely read 'Tibetan text' is in fact an “amalgam of commentaries appended to 
a translation of a Tibetan text” (Lopez 1998:48), see the second footnote down.
68 A 'treasure text:' “one of the thousands of works said to have been secreted by Padmasambhava during his visit to 
Tibet in the late eighth century, works that he hid in stones, lakes, pillars and in the minds of future generations 
because  Tibetans of  the  eighth  century  were  somehow unprepared  for  them.  Thus  they  were  hidden  to  be 
discovered at the appropriate moment” (Lopez 1998:47).
69 Every published version was in some sense uniquely interpreted in terms of translation and added commentaries. 
In most cases, the original Tibetan text was dwarfed by the various prefaces, introductions and commentaries, 
making the distinction between original text and interpretation difficult. In the latest edition of Evans-Wentz's 
version over half the book is comprised by forewords, commentaries and notes (Lopez 1998:48;85).
70 With the exception possibly, of the latest version published by Robert Thurman. It can be argued, however, that  
even 'authenticity' is a Western cultural trend of the present.
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could now be confirmed through the use of hallucinogens, interpreting the stages of death as 
different stages  of  an  'acid  trip,'  offering an  esoteric  guide  to  the  use  of  psychedelic  drugs. 
Songyal Rinpoche's version of 1992,  The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, which sold over 
three hundred thousand copies within six years,71 interprets the text against the background of 
exceptional states of consciousness, connecting these with American New-Age Thinkers of the 
1960s. Songyal Rinpoche communicates the text
not  as a  Tibetan Buddhist  tradition but  [as]  a  universal  message,  a  perennial philosophy, that  has 
always been known to those who know [...  known to mystics of all traditions but preserved most 
perfectly in Tibet ...] Songyal Rinpoche has said that Tibet is lost, that all that remains is its wisdom. 
He places that wisdom in a global and ahistorical spiritual lineage of thinkers that no other Tibetan 
author has ever cited (Lopez 1998:79).
The most recent version, translated and commented by Robert Thurman, seems to be the only one 
placing the text into the context, that Tibetans themselves would see it: as a description of areas 
through which a dying human passes (von Brück 2008:29). “Only Thurman appears to believe 
what real Tibetans believe” (Lopez 1998:83).
The way in which the book has been perceived and interpreted in the West at different stages 
exemplifies how the image of Tibet has in fact been consistently subject to Western fantasies and 
projections.
The Third Eye,  by T. Lobsang Rampa was released in  Great  Britain in  1956 and reached a 
circulation  of  300,000  copies  within  eighteen  months.  According  to  Michael  von  Brück 
(2008:30),  the  most  fantastic  and  spectacular  'encounter'  of  the  West with  Tibet  has  been 
embodied by the Book The Third Eye. He argues that the great success of this book until today 
illustrates how the West prefers not to perceive Tibet historically in its own stature and self-
portrayal, but in terms of its own projections onto the land of snows and its mysteries.
The story is an autobiographical account of Tuesday Lobsang Rampa, the son of an aristocrat 
from Lhasa. After rigorous education and training, including the drilling of a hole in his forehead 
at the point between his eyes so as to create a third eye allowing him to see auras, he would 
become a  trappa, or medical priest. After further studies and travels comprising an encounter 
with the yeti, he finally becomes a lama. Before leaving for China, at the end of the book, the 
Dalai Lama warns him:
71 According to the online encyclopedia wikipedia.org, to date “more than two million copies have been printed in 
30  languages  and  56  countries.”  See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tibetan_Book_of_Living_and_Dying 
(accessed: 29.3.2009).
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As I told you once before, they believe only that which they can do, only that which can be tested in 
their  Rooms  of  Science.  Yet the  greatest  Science  of  all,  the  Science  of  the  Overself,  they  leave 
untouched. That is your Path, the Path you chose before you came to this Life (cited from Lopez 
1998:90).
Scholars immediately recognized the account as a fraud, as clearly not written by a Tibetan. After 
investigation,  the  author  T. Lobsang Rampa in  fact  turned out  to  be  Cyril  Henry  Hoskin,  a 
plumber's son from Devonshire, England, who had never been to Tibet but found the material on 
which  to  base  his  fantastic  account  in  London  libraries.  Hoskin  later  claimed to  have  been 
possessed by a  Tibetan lama,  and over  the  course of  seven years,  to  have  become Tibetan. 
According to him, his account is true (Lopez 1998:93-9).
In terms of its image of Tibet, the West has found and is continuing to find it difficult to discern 
reality and myth. Most readers do not have the appropriate knowledge to make the distinction, 
and in any case tend to be motivated by a yearning for a mysterious Tibet (von Brück 2008:30). 
Even when Donald Lopez gave  The Third Eye  to a class of his at the University of Michigan 
without telling them about its history, the “students were unanimous in their praise of the book, 
and despite six prior weeks of lectures and readings on Tibetan history and religion, [...] they 
found  it  entirely  credible  and  compelling,  judging  it  more  realistic  than  anything  they  had 
previously  read  about  Tibet” (Lopez  1998:104).  Lopez  also  points  out  that  when discussing 
Rampa with other Tibetologists and Buddhologists in Europe, he found that The Third Eye was 
the first book many of them had read about Tibet; “for some it was a fascination with the world 
Rampa described that had led them to become professional scholars of Tibet” (Lopez 1998:112).
5.6 The Myth of Tibet after the Chinese Invasion of Tibet
While previously the image of Tibetan religion had been embedded in its landscape, having been 
imagined as belonging to its place, the situation had been reversed by the mid-twentieth century. 
The landscape was no longer the coherent factor in Western fantasies of Tibet, but it was Tibet's 
esoteric religion “that gave Tibet and its landscape imaginative difference and significance. Even 
Tibetan religion  as a whole  had ceased to be the object of fascination; now only the spiritual 
masters and their most advanced techniques excited Western fantasies” (Bishop 1989:244).
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Bishop  (1989:244)  argues that  by  expelling  the  Dalai  Lama and  his  ecclesiastical  elite,  the 
Chinese also expelled the “final concentrated essence of Tibetan occult mystery and authority,” as 
perceived in the Western image. China “inadvertently seeded Western fantasy-making with what 
could prove a whole new series of transformations in its imaginings about Tibet. Spiritually and 
psychologically, many in the West provided fertile ground for these exiled Tibetan fantasies” 
(Bishop 1989:244). As will be discussed below, the  Myth of Tibet has indeed acted as fertile 
ground for the TGE's representations of Tibet and Tibetans to the West.
A fantasy of Tibet as a utopian society in the form of a physically existing land, as a possible 
exemplary model country for the spiritually shallow and materialistic West, largely ceased to 
exist upon Chinese occupation, but the Myth continued to exist, detached from the land, to some 
extent, but embodied in culture, religion, and values.
According to McRae (2003:99-100), the image of Tibet in the West during the early 1990s was 
dominated by ideals of peace and enlightened awareness. Responsible for this was a “brilliant 
image campaign by the Tibetan exile government” on the one hand, and the actual preoccupation 
with the continuing menace to Tibetan culture and religion due to Chinese policies, on the other.
5.7 The Myth of Tibet Today
Jan Magnusson (2002:198) discusses how the Myth of Tibet continues today, portrayed in travel 
accounts and in New-Age literature, both of which he describes as literary genres. The genre of 
travel accounts on Tibet emerged from early documents written by missionaries, soldiers, civil 
servants,  and  explorers.  New-Age  literature  is  part  of  a  Western reinterpretation  of  Asian 
religions, whereas it is the reinterpretative quality that makes it 'New Age.' It began with accounts 
on exotic religions, and was developed through the publishing of books on the experiences of 
Western converts, who increasingly attracted significant numbers of followers.
According to Magnusson (2002:198), contemporary travel stories about Tibet often continue the 
legacy of  the past:  Tibet continues to be  'rediscovered'  by Westerners, who present  Tibet as 
mystic, closed and inaccessible, and thereby giving the stories a heroic and adventurous quality. 
According to the exile-Tibetan historian Tsering Shakya, Chinese destruction and repression in 
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Tibet and the refugee status of the Tibetans abroad, are factors which have been integrated into 
the  Myth  (Shakya  1994,  cited  from Magnusson  2002:198).  “Recent  accounts  are  thus  often 
dramatised as  a  life  and death drama populated  with  Tibetan partisans  and Chinese  security 
forces, where the Westerner, at the risk of his or her life, is in secret collusion with the Tibetans” 
(Magnusson 2002:198).  A decade earlier, (Bishop 1989:245) stated that  the “literature of the 
popular, 'mass' adventure tourism has had a profound influence on the shaping of contemporary 
images of Tibetan landscape and culture.”
New-Age literature related to Tibetan Buddhism has a tendency to take traditional knowledge 
from Tibet to the West, adapting and presenting it as a “pure core of wisdom and mysticism 
deprived of sociocultural historic circumstances” (Hammer cited from Magnusson 2002:199). 
The result is often presented as “accessible without any intellectual effort, without any discursive 
input” (Bharati cited from Magnusson 2002:199). The example of the Tibetan Book of the Dead 
has been discussed above. Another example for how the Myth of Tibet continues today is seen in 
the  publications  of  Nepal-based  Tibetan lama  Chökyi  Nyima Rinpoche.  He  is  popular  with 
Western students in part due to claims like that the understanding of more advanced teachings of 
Tibetan Buddhism is easier for the Western than for the Tibetan mind.
Von Brück (2008:31) states that the dream of a utopian Shangri-La continues to nurture Western 
fantasies today. The Western image of Tibet in recent years has pivoted around concepts of Tibet 
as a maltreated land and people that deserves support, and of the Dalai Lama as a teacher and 
sage,  from  which  one  expects  instruction  and  advice  (von  Brück  2008:32).  These  images, 
following von Brück, tend to be based on a superficial perception of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. 
But this does not reduce the potential of the Myth as a soft-power resource.
Numerous  scholars  argue that  the  historic  paradigm of  Tibet as  Shangri-La  continues  today. 
According to Lopez (1998:6), some of the “[h]ighly romanticized portrayals of traditional Tibet” 
that have emerged historically, “continue to hold sway.” Lopez (1998:206) remarks that Western 
desires  projected  onto  Tibet have  “remained remarkably  consistent  during the  past  century.” 
Norbu (2001:373-4) concludes, from the examination of the many new travel books on Tibet and 
the  New-Age works  on Tibetan religion and 'culture'  (many with  introductions by the  Dalai 
Lama), that one is left “with the uncomfortable feeling that nothing much has changed in the 
West's perception of Tibet since the days when books such as James Hilton's  Lost Horizon and 
Lobsang Rampa's The Third Eye constituted the bulk of available literature on Tibet.”
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Rinpoche (2001:385) argues that,  on the one hand, also the negative image of Tibet persists: 
“Leftist critics still accuse devotees of Tibetan Buddhism of practicing a species of Catholicism, 
wherein the Dalai Lama is worshiped as a 'pope.'” On the other hand, he argues, “the myth of 
Tibet that arose at the end of the [19th] century also persists [...] The more the Chinese destroy 
authentic Tibetan culture, the more the West loves this myth of Tibet. Today, the cliché of the 
wise old lama thoroughly saturates the mass media” (ibid.). He claims that the concept of 'Tibet' 
“becomes a symbol for all those qualities that Westerners feel lacking:  joie de vivre, harmony, 
warmth, and spirituality. For many Westerners today, 'Tibet' is the primordial, the actual, and the 
real. It is their real 'home'. Tibet thus becomes a utopia” (Rinpoche 2001:386).
Anand (2007:98) puts it concisely:
The dominant representation of Tibetans in the West in the early twenty-first century is as peaceful, 
nonviolent, religious, spiritual, compassionate, and close to nature. A corollary to this representation is 
the idea that the inherently good-natured Tibetans are victims of forced modernization brought about 
by Chinese rule.
Lopez, in his influential volume Prisoners of Shangri-La,72 interprets the effects of the Myth on 
the Tibetan exile government as a 'prison,' from which Tibetans seem unable to escape: In order 
to win Western sympathy and support, Tibetans are forced to deliver what we expect from them.
Lopez's interpretation might be justified. In order to receive attention and support from the West, 
the TGE might be forced to adhere to certain elements of the Myth.  Magnusson (2002:211) 
argues that the Myth of Tibet is both a prison and a power for Tibet. As the following section will 
discuss, indeed the  Myth of Tibet itself acts as a soft-power resource for the TGE. It attracts 
supporters to the Tibetan cause. Moreover, it acts as fertile ground: Particular elements of the 
Myth can be deliberately politicized, and these issues in turn become soft-power resources for the 
TGE.
72 Lopez (1998).
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5.8 The Myth of Tibet as a Soft-Power Resource for the TGE
When dealing with a myth as a soft-power resource, the crucial question does not concern the 
ways in which the myth might be based on facts. The question is not: Can Tibet really show the 
way? Can Tibetan society truly be a model for achieving world peace and harmony? The extent 
to which a myth is based on facts is not decisive for its potential as an attractive force, hence a 
soft-power resource. As long as people  believe that Tibet represents all the good that has been 
lost in the spiritually shallow West, and are thereby attracted to the Tibetan cause, we are dealing 
with soft power. When people are attracted to the idea that the support of a free Tibet, able to 
adequately protect and sustain Tibetan culture, its values, its spirituality, is a worthwhile cause, in 
line to some extent with their own preferences and interests, soft power will be at work.
Part  5  has  demonstrated  that  the  Myth  of  Tibet as  Shangri-La  prevails  today, and  that  the 
destruction of Tibetan 'authentic' culture has been incorporated into the Myth. This image, this 
representation of Tibet, the perseverance of the Myth is hence a significant source of attraction 
for the Tibetan cause and therefore for the TGE which represents this cause.  Shangri-La, the 
utopia, the beholder of essential wisdom, which might one day be instrumental for the West in 
saving itself  from self-destruction,  is  threatened by extinction.  The mythical,  magical,  occult 
world that Tibet represents to large parts of the West is threatened to be incrementally demolished 
by the profanity of modern materialism in the form of Chinese 'market socialism.'
The power of attraction coming from the Myth is enforced by the fact that much of the Myth is 
the result of Western projection. Hence it is the proper dream, the own idealistic imagination of 
'Tibet' which is endangered. And there exists an effort to counteract the menace to the complete 
destruction of the ideal projected into Tibet. This effort is best represented by the Dalai Lama and 
the Tibetan exile government.
The attractiveness of a  nation,  constituting its soft  power, has been called a nation's “brand” 
(Kurlantzick 2007:5). The Tibetan nation's “brand,” being the way it has been represented and 
perceived, and, as will be seen below, the way it has been deliberately forged, has been largely 
the result of various positive aspects of the Myth of Tibet.
The Myth of Tibet acts as an asset of soft power for the Tibetan exile government. According to 
Nye's (2004a:11) theory, “[w]hen a country's culture includes universal values and its policies 
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promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired 
outcomes  because  of  the  relationships  of  attraction  and  duty  it  creates.”  Clearly, the  TGE 
represents the cause of 'saving' the Tibetan culture. “In seeking the goal of Tibet as a modern 
nation-state, the Dalai Lama invokes the universal value of Tibet and Tibetan culture” (Lopez 
1998:200). To all who are fascinated by Tibet and its culture, to all those who 'fall for' or 'believe 
in' the Myth of Tibet, the protection of the Tibetan culture will be of interest, or represent a value 
that  is  shared  with  the  TGE.  Of  course,  Nye  stresses  that  such  an  attraction  increases the 
probability  of  obtaining  desired  outcomes.  As  will  be  seen  further  below, the  Tibetan case 
demonstrates that soft power by no means automatically leads to the achievement of desired 
outcomes.
The attraction provoked by the persistence of the positive Myth of Tibet in the West might be only 
sufficient to provoke a general interest in the survival of Tibet as a culture and civilization. It 
might not be sufficient to motivate millions in the West to pressurize their governments in turn to 
seriously pressurize the PRC to significantly improve conditions in Tibet. But, as will be argued 
below, the Myth of Tibet, apart from acting as an attractive force in its own right, provides fertile 
ground for other myths to flourish and to engender tangible attraction to the Tibetan cause in the 
West.
5.9 How has the Myth been politicized by the TGE?
Lopez's (1998) view that Tibetans are caught in the Prison of Shangri-La is contested by Dodin 
and  Räther  (2001:410).  They  argue  that  his  perspective  “seems  to  ignore  the  very  active 
participation of the Tibetans in the emergence and continuing reiteration of the current image of 
their country and culture, as well as their remarkable skills in promoting it.” Indeed, aspects of 
the Myth have been used by the TGE politically. As has been demonstrated, Tibetans have often 
been seen as possessing a power to regenerate the West. Following Magnusson (2002:202), “[i]t 
is this perceived essence and power that is pivotal to the politicisation of the myth.” It is in turn a 
source of power “to influence the agenda of the global political arena” (ibid.).
Magnusson (ibid.:204) argues that “the attractiveness of the Shangri-La version can be a useful 
power resource in influencing the global agenda of the Tibet issue.”
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How does this particular soft power work? During the exile, especially since the mid-1980s, a lot of 
effort has been put into a build-up of Tibet as a transnational symbol of soft issues (e.g. human rights, 
peace, ethics an [sic] environmental protection) in world politics. Once associated with solutions to 
durable problems in the modern world, Tibet becomes a source of soft power and conferred with a 
certain legitimacy in the global community [...T]here is presently a global marketing of Tibetan culture 
as inherently good and as a protector of a wisdom needed to solve global soft issues that goes back to 
the 1980s (Magnusson 2002:205).
This  is  indicated  by  the  contents  of  speeches  held  by  the  Dalai  Lama in  foreign  countries, 
particularly after  1979 when he began to access non-religious fora.  Magnusson (2002:205-6) 
analyzes the topics of the Dalai Lama's foreign lectures in the period 1993-1994, a large majority 
of which dealt with global soft issues:
The lectures fell roughly into four categories: 1. Human Ethics, 2. Global Peace, 3. Environmental 
Issues, 4. Tibet (if topics overlap in a single lecture they appear in more than one category). The first 
two categories amounted to about 75 percent of the lectures and environmental issues to about 17 
percent. Only three out of a total of 22 lectures had the issue of Tibet as its main topic (ibid.).
Magnusson (2002:210) is convinced that to “recruit supporters in the struggle with China over 
Tibet's future the Dalai Lama is forced to play his part in the myth.” Dodin and Räther (2001:410) 
judge that the “current instrumentalization of an uncritical 'myth of Tibet' has been extremely 
successful in gaining global sympathy for the Tibetan cause.”
The issue of  how different aspects  of  the  Myth of  Tibet,  and notions of Tibetan culture and 
identity have been politicized and transformed into attractive power for the TGE starting in the 
1980s will be discussed in greater detail in Part 7. The following part deals with the way the 
person of the 14th Dalai Lama operates as a soft-power asset for the Tibetan exile government and 
the Tibetan cause.
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PART 6 – The 14th Dalai Lama as an Agent of Soft Power for the 
TGE
6.1 Soft Power of Tenzin Gyatso
His Holiness the Dalai Lama [...] creates a charismatic atmosphere of irony by expressly conveying his 
humanity [...] The Tibetan leader is rocketed to the high moral ground in the ideological battle with 
China over Tibet. The Dalai  Lama succeeds by just being himself.  This is  a  type of 'soft  power' 
(Klieger 2002:7).
Following  Nye,  the  charisma  of  a  leader  can  be  a  strong  source  of  attractive  power. “The 
personality and skills of the secretary-general can [..] affect the reputation of the organization. 
Like the pope, Kofi Annan commands few troops, but his popularity and position assure attention 
to his statements” (Nye 2004:95).
Tempa Tsering, the 14th Dalai Lama's brother-in-law, said that the Dalai Lama remains the “most 
potent weapon for the Tibetans inside and outside Tibet” (cited from Chhaya 2007:243). The only 
power this “weapon” possesses is soft.
The popularity and position of the 14th Dalai Lama have attained near popstar levels. He has often 
been described  as  an  extraordinary  and highly charismatic  leader.73 In  his  popular  book  Re-
Enchantment  –  Tibetan Buddhism Comes to  the  West,  the  American  journalist  Jeffery Paine 
(2004:184) speculates that the Dalai Lama might be “the most admired person on earth.” “He has, 
in a sense, acted as a therapist to the world's suffering [...] His exuberant spirits, his endless sense 
of humor and fun, his good cheer despite every reason not to feel it, these have not escaped the 
notice of the watching world” (ibid:186).
The Dalai Lama's popularity in the West is tremendous. When asked: “Who is the wisest human 
of the present?” in January 2002, one in three Germans answered “Dalai Lama” (Ruch 2006:17). 
In a March 2009 'World Leaders' – Opinion Barometer poll conducted in Western countries by 
the  market  research  agency  Harris  Interactive for  France  24 and  The  International  Herald 
Tribune, the Dalai Lama ranks second place of  all “world leaders,”  behind Barack Obama, in 
terms of popularity and perceived influence.74 He attracts thousands of listeners when holding 
73 For example Roemer (2008a:97), Dodin/Räther (2001:409), Chhaya (2007:171), Paine (2004:184-6).
74 The poll was conducted online among 6,538 adults within France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and the USA in 
the period 25.2.09 – 3.3.09. See Harris Interactive (2009).
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public  speeches,  and  even  before receiving  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  in  1989,  he  had  gained 
considerable popularity in the West. “Hardly any other political or religious leader of our time has 
such a positive image, and this image is almost automatically transferred to Tibet as a whole – as 
are his liberal and pacifist political ideas” (Dodin/Räther 2001:409).
Indeed, the image of the Dalai Lama and the image of Tibet in the West are highly connected. 
Barnett  (2001:299),  for  instance,  states: “In  the  political  domain,  especially  in  governmental 
documents, the dominant representation of the Tibetan issue in the late 1990s has thus become 
this representation of Tibet as the Dalai Lama. The elision of the leader with the nation runs deep 
within the Tibetan tradition.”  Following Barnett (ibid:299-300), in the West the words of the 
Dalai Lama are taken as the words of the Tibetan people, “his personal history is seen as the story 
of an exiled, religious people, even though 97 percent of Tibetans remain in Tibet and many may 
not be religious. Journalistic accounts of meetings with him tend to find meanings in the details 
of his body or attire, seeing his laugh as symbolic of the collective cheerfulness of the Tibetan 
race  and  his  robes  as  representing  their  religiosity  and  modesty.”  According  to  MacMillin 
(2001:174-5), “in the West the Dalai Lama has become the symbol of Tibet par excellence. Nobel 
Peace Prize winner, indefatigable traveler, best-selling author, the  Dalai  Lama has  become a 
household name – one of the three most widely known human beings in the world, alongside the 
Pope and Michael Jordan.” 
6.2 What does the 14th Dalai Lama represent?
“I  sincerely  believe  that  tolerance,  compassion,  and  non-violence  eventually  prevail”  (Dalai 
Lama, cited from Chhaya 2007:167).
The Dalai Lama is a spiritual, religious and political leader. In a sense, he operates as a symbol 
for  many  Tibetans and  Westerners. For  MacMillin  (2001:181),  “symbols  are  very  powerful 
things: they construct lives and selves; they shape our experience of the world and each other.”
What does this symbol stand for? Apart from representing the Tibetan people and their cause, 
which values does the Dalai Lama represent? The Dalai Lama's acceptance statement (see Dalai 
Lama 1989) after  receiving the Nobel Prize in 1989 gives good indications of the values he 
stands for:
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I believe the prize is a recognition of the true values of altruism, love, compassion and nonviolence 
which I try to practise, in accordance with the teachings of the Buddha and the great sages of India and 
Tibet.  [...]  I  accept  the  prize  [...]  as  a  tribute  to  the  man who  founded  the  modern  tradition  of 
nonviolent action for change - Mahatma Gandhi - whose life taught and inspired me [...] No matter 
what  part  of  the world we come from, we are  all  basically  the same human beings.  We all  seek 
happiness and try to avoid suffering [...] Because violence can only breed more violence and suffering, 
our struggle must remain nonviolent and free of hatred [...] Any relationship between Tibet and China 
will have to be based on the principle of equality, respect, trust and mutual benefit. [...] The problems 
we face today, violent conflicts, destruction of nature, poverty, hunger, and so on, are human-created 
problems which can be resolved through human effort, understanding and the development of a sense 
of brotherhood and sisterhood. We need to cultivate a universal responsibility for one another and the 
planet we share. [...] I pray for all of us, oppressor and friend, that together we succeed in building a 
better world through human understanding and love, and that in doing so we may reduce the pain and 
suffering of all sentient beings (Dalai Lama 1989).
What the Dalai Lama conveys in this speech, in essence, is what he stands for and symbolizes. 
These are values that  are respected and widely shared among human beings:  Altruism, love, 
compassion, non-violence, the search for happiness, the avoidance of suffering, equality, respect, 
trust, mutual benefit, understanding, the development of a sense of brother and sisterhood, the 
building of a 'better' world. These are values that maybe not all, but definitely many people can 
identify with.
In describing himself the Dalai Lama often states 'I am just a simple Buddhist monk.' That may well be 
the case; but somehow with him the term 'simple' seems pregnant with a wealth of meanings, from 
uncontrived  laughter,  heartfelt  warmth  and  human  authenticity  to  universal  compassion  and 
transcendental wisdom. I look into the Dalai Lama's simple smile, and all of these qualities seem to 
dance in the fires behind his eyes. Indeed, even in this rather cynical age he continues to embody the 
magic and mystery that is Tibet (Glenn 2001:516).
Glenn is apparently quite impressed by the Dalai Lama (as many others who have met him in 
person). He affirms Peter Bishop (1989:244), who stated that the Myth of Tibet continues today in 
the form of what the Tibetan religion, the high lamas and, in particular, the Dalai Lama represent.
In an address to the European Parliament in 2001, the Dalai Lama states:
I strongly believe that we must consciously develop a greater sense of universal responsibility. We 
must learn to work not just for our own individual self, family or nation, but for the benefit of all 
mankind. Universal responsibility is the best foundation both for our personal happiness and for world 
peace, the equitable use of our natural resources, and, through a concern for future generations, the 
proper care for the environment [...] In the context of our newly emerging global community all forms 
of violence, including war, are totally inappropriate means of settling disputes (Dalai Lama 2001).
The content of this speech, held over a decade after receiving the Nobel Prize, again highlights 
the values represented by the Dalai  Lama. Personal happiness,  world peace,  equitable use of 
resources, care for the environment, non-violent conflict settlement; these are all universal values 
that are highly attractive to many in the West.
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On the Dalai Lama's website,75 in an essay entitled  Human Rights, Democracy and Freedom 
(representing, arguably, the three most widely shared political values in the West), he states:
[R]esponsibility  for  working  for  peace  lies  not  only  with  our  leaders,  but  also  with  each  of us 
individually. Peace starts within each one of us. When we have inner peace, we can be at peace with 
those around us. When our community is in a state of peace, it can share that peace with neighbouring 
communities and so on. When we feel love and kindness toward others, it not only makes others feel 
loved  and  cared  for,  but  it  helps  us  also  to  develop  inner  happiness  and  peace.  We can  work 
consciously to develop feelings of love and kindness. For some of us, the most effective way to do so 
is through religious practice. For others it may be non-religious practices. What is important is that we 
each make a sincere effort to take seriously our responsibility for each other and the world in which we 
live  (Dalai Lama 1).
The focus on 'universal responsibility' as a solution to the world's problems is very powerful in a 
Western society  obsessed  with  the  self.  The  Dalai  Lama  offers  solutions  viable  to  both 
egocentrically and altruistically inclined people, solutions that are intended to lead to peace and 
happiness.  Religious  tolerance  is  another  aspect  of  what  he  represents,  which  attracts  those 
alienated by the dogmatic nature often associated with Christianity.
The Dalai Lama has been an active participant in the Buddhist-Christian dialogue. During the summer 
of 1996, his comments on selected passages from the New Testament were published as  The Good 
Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings of Jesus. In the introduction, he is described by Father 
Laurence Freeman, O.S.B., as 'one of the most loved and accessible spiritual teachers in the world 
today. Tibet's agony, which he carries constantly with him, has elevated him to a global spiritual role in 
which the universal religious values of peace, justice, tolerance, and nonviolence find a joyful yet 
serious embodiment' (Lopez 1998:186).
In a message on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,  the Dalai Lama, in only two sentences,  summarizes some of the major issues of the 
Western political discourse of the present, which coincide with what he stands for:
Human rights, environmental protection and social and economic equality are all inter-related. In all 
these issues, I believe a sense of universal responsibility is the key to human survival and progress. It 
is also the best foundation for world peace and promotion of human rights and a political culture of 
non-violence and dialogue in resolving human conflicts (Dalai Lama 1998). 
The Dalai Lama “stands for the values of democracy, tolerance, justice and peaceful dialogue” 
(Berndt 2007:2), his politics are “driven by Buddhist spiritual values” (Ram 2004:174), and he is 
“generally acknowledged as a well-known religious environmental advocate” (Huber 1997:107).
By appealing to these general, universal values, the Dalai Lama manages to attract hundreds of 
thousands,  if  not  millions,  of  Western sympathizers.  His  personality  and  charisma  act  as  a 
powerful soft-power resource for his, and hence the TGE's, cause. Since, as discussed above, the 
75 http://www.dalailama.com
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Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause are perceived as closely related, who is attracted by him is, to a 
certain extent, also attracted to the cause he represents.
According to Chhaya (2007:242), the Dalai Lama believes that those who are attracted by what 
he says about life “automatically enlist themselves in support of the Tibetan cause.” The Dalai 
Lama said: “Tibet is not just about being an independent country. It is about a valuable belief 
system that  is  being destroyed by China.  So when you support  what I  have to say you also 
support that belief system and therefore Tibet” (cited from Chhaya 2007:242-3).
6.3 Dalai Lama – Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
On 10 December 1989, the 14th Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.76 The Nobel 
citation reads that the Nobel committee had
decided to award the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize to the [Fourteenth] Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, the 
religious and political leader of the Tibetan people. The Committee wants to emphasize the fact that 
the Dalai Lama in his struggle for the liberation of Tibet consistently has opposed the use of violence. 
He has instead advocated peaceful  solutions based  upon tolerance and mutual  respect  in  order  to 
preserve the historical and cultural heritage of his people.
The Dalai Lama has developed his philosophy of peace from a great reverence for all things living and 
upon the concept of universal responsibility embracing all mankind as well as nature. In the opinion of 
the Committee the Dalai Lama has come forward with constructive and forward-looking proposals for 
the  solution  of  international  conflicts,  human  rights  issues,  and  global  environmental  problems 
(Norwegian Nobel Committee 1989).
The fact that the Dalai Lama was chosen to receive the award is related, in part, to his efforts 
towards finding a constructive and peaceful solution to the Tibet question. However, as becomes 
evident in the citation above, the values represented by the Dalai Lama also played a significant 
role: his general philosophy of peace and non-violence, universal responsibility, the protection of 
human rights and respect for the global environment.
Thus, while the Dalai Lama's soft power, his representing of widely shared values, contributed to 
his receiving the Nobel Prize, the deed of receiving the prize itself acted as a further catalyst for 
the soft power he possesses. The Nobel Prize is one of the world's most prestigious awards. One 
of the measures Nye (2004a:33)  cites for American soft power is that “the USA ranks first in 
76 While the Nobel Prize might be the most prestigious of awards, it is by no means the only one the 14 th Dalai 
Lama was granted in the West. For a list see Mullin (2001:493-5).
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Nobel prizes awarded in physics, chemistry and economics.” The winner of a prize as renouned 
as  that  granted  by  the  Nobel  committee  attracts  considerable  attention  and  respect.  “After 
winning the Nobel Peace Prize, the Dalai Lama's reputation soared internationally as a spiritual 
leader who made sense not just for Tibet but perhaps for the rest of the world. The prize was by 
far the most potent recognition that he was a global force to reckon with even though his cause 
was confined to a geographical territory” (Chhaya 2007:163).
Chhaya (2007:168-9) holds that what the Nobel Prize did for the Dalai Lama was to grant him a
very visible and recognizable moral platform from which to operate. Over the last decade and a half 
after receiving the prize the Dalai Lama has firmly established himself as one of the world's most 
consequential voices in favor of peace and compassion as an alternative to violence and recrimination 
and as an instrument of change.
In the years ensuing 1989, foreign travels of the Dalai Lama intensified dramatically. According 
to official records, the Dalai Lama visited over forty countries between 1989 and 1992 (cited 
from  Chhaya 2007:170). For both the TGE and the Dalai Lama this travel activity was seen as a 
necessity to ensure that the world would not forget the Tibetan cause (ibid.).
Chhaya (2007:171) offers a good overview of the Dalai Lama's importance as a resource of soft 
power for the Tibetan cause:
The more the Dalai Lama traveled, the more he was able to keep Tibet throbbing in the international 
consciousness.  In  a  world  where  even  conflicts  have  to  jockey  for  television  ratings,  having  a 
charismatic, albeit exotic, proponent for a cause is a most important element of the struggle. Although 
Tibet never really captured the world's imagination other than during its early years in the immediate 
aftermath of the Dalai  Lama's flight, it has managed to interest and attract high-profile supporters 
because of the sheer force of the Dalai Lama's personality, and they in turn have helped Tibet stay alive 
in the West. During the three years after he won the Nobel Prize, the Dalai Lama met heads of state, 
foreign ministers, important religious leaders such as Pope John Paul II, academics, and members of 
the media in Europe, Australia, North America, and Central America as part of a conscious effort to 
draw the attention of  the world to his  campaign.  'We saw that the only weapon we had was His 
Holiness's tremendous ability to convince the world to see our side of the issue. In many parts of the 
world which he visited Tibet was not even known by a lot of people. For a campaign that is decidedly 
peaceful and nonviolent, staying alive in the world's memory is a tough job. The Dalai Lama has done 
that job with outstanding resolve and results,' said Tenzin Geyce Tethong, the Dalai Lama's private 
secretary, who has worked with him closely for decades.
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6.4 The Dalai Lama invoking the Myth of Tibet 
In many ways, aspects of the  Myth of Tibet,  as discussed in Part 5 ('The Myth of Tibet'),  are 
invoked by communications of  the  TGE and the  14th Dalai  Lama.  In  this  sense,  the  current 
political situation is powerfully linked to the positive imagination and fantasies of the Western 
mind, who's image of Tibet is still  largely determined by mythical elements, as discussed by 
numerous scholars.77
In his famous Strasbourg Proposal speech to the European Parliament in 1988 for instance, the 
Dalai  Lama  states:  “For  over  a  thousand  years,  we  Tibetans have  adhered  to  spiritual  and 
environmental values in order to maintain the delicate balance of life across the high plateau on 
which we live, inspired by Buddha's message of non-violence and compassion and protected by 
our mountains, we sought to respect every form of life and to abandon war as an instrument of 
national policy” (Dalai  Lama 1988).  In 2008, when addressing the European Parliament,  the 
Dalai Lama states: “For centuries Tibet acted as a peaceful buffer zone separating the two most 
populated countries on earth” (Dalai Lama 2008).
Numerous scholars78 have demonstrated that  such a representation of Tibet as a sanctuary of 
peace,  of  Tibetans avoiding war  and respecting every form of  life and the  environment,  are 
simply not based on facts. But the representation fits well with the Western image of Tibet as the 
peaceful sanctuary of enlightened knowledge, as embodied by the Myth of Shangri-La.
By appealing to mythical elements of the Western image of Tibet, the Dalai Lama effectively 
politicizes the  Myth of Tibet. Referring  to the Dalai Lama's  Five Point Peace Plan,  MacMillin 
(2001:180) confirms the active politicization of the Myth:
When [the Dalai Lama] calls for the demilitarization of the Tibetan plateau, the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons and other armaments, the transformation of Tibet into 'the world's largest natural park or 
biosphere',  and the promotion of human rights'  organizations, among other things, the Dalai Lama 
echoes the Western fantasy of Tibet as a place that never had a standing army, and whose people 
always acted out of Buddhist principles. In effect, with this proposal the Dalai Lama reclaims Shangri-
La – a place that preserves all that is best in the world – and makes it fully Tibetan.
77 See section 5.7 'The Myth of Tibet Today.'
78 For example: Clarke (2001:341), Conboy (2002), Norbu (1994), Sperling (2001:326-7). This is discussed in more 
detail in section 7.6.4 'Universal Values associated with Tibetan Buddhism.'
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In summary, the Dalai Lama, and along with him Tibet, the Tibetan cause and the Tibetan exile 
government, represent, next to a political cause and religious / spiritual messages, certain values. 
The values that the Dalai Lama keeps referring to, in political terms, are very popular in the West: 
respect  for  human  rights,  the  protection  of  the  natural  environment,  the  adherence to  the 
principles of democracy, universal responsibility, etc.; In religious terms the represented values 
such as non-violence, compassion, tolerance, patience, etc. have the effect of rocketing the Dalai 
Lama and his case on the “high moral ground,” as Klieger (2002:7) puts it. By presenting Tibet 
and the Tibetans as in harmony with these values, the Myth of Tibet is effectively politicized and 
instrumentalised as a soft-power resource for the TGE.
If  we  recall  briefly  what  Roemer  (2008a:49)  states  concerning  the  strategies  of  exile 
governments,  that  “[u]niversal  myths are presented to the international  community under  the 
guise of 'archetypes of legitimacy', such as democracy, human rights, and self-determination,” it 
becomes evident that Roemer's depiction is confirmed by the Tibetan case. The values the TGE 
and the Dalai Lama stand for are presented as such 'archetypes of legitimacy' in the context of 
Western perception. The attraction resulting from being associated with these values is a form of 
soft  power. The  following  part  deals  with  the  way  such  values  have  been  in  part  actively 
communicated  and deliberately  politicized in  order  for  them to become effective soft-power 
resources for the Tibetan government in exile.
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PART 7 – Values represented by the TGE as Soft-Power Resources
7.1 Values as Soft-Power Resources
Popular support for Tibet in the West fixes mainly on values according to the norms of the West now – 
projections  of  the  political  ideals  and  individual  needs  of  relatively  well-educated,  wealthy, and 
emancipated populations, without much consideration of social and historical context in its own terms 
(Clarke 2001:341).
So far, two important aspects of the TGE's soft power with regard to the Western world have been 
discussed. Part 5, exploring the effect of the Myth of Tibet, demonstrated how the Myth continues 
attracting Western people to the Tibetan issue today. Part 6 dealt with how the TGE's charismatic 
leader himself represents a source of soft-power for the organization's cause. The present part 
explores  more  deeply  into  how certain  aspects  of  the  Myth  of  Tibet have  been  deliberately 
politicized to gain attraction and support  from the West. But first,  the mechanisms by which 
shared values can act as soft-power resources, shall be briefly recalled.79
Nye (2004a:7) states: “Soft power uses a different kind of currency (not force, not money) to 
engender cooperation – an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to 
the achievement of those values.” One way to engender attraction can be to appeal to certain 
values that are shared with others. Politics serves as an example: If a certain candidate represents, 
in  my  view, the  values  I  share,  a  sense  of  attraction  will  probably  make  me  support  that 
candidate. Or charity contributions: If I decide I want to donate my spare money to a 'worthwhile' 
cause, I will chose to support an organization that shares my values and endeavours to promote 
them, say world peace or environmental protection. Or career decisions: If my overriding value in 
life is money, I might decide to join an institution representing this value, say a major bank, but if 
altruism  dominates  my  value  system,  I  might  want  to  spend  my  energy  and  efforts  in  an 
organization supporting refugees. Or religion: If I truly believe in the justness of Christian values, 
I will feel a certain attraction to those truly representing Christian values, even if I never go to 
church and pay no church tax. This is an important point. Attraction does not necessarily lead to 
immediate, concrete outcomes. Attraction “often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence 
rather than producing an easily observable specific action” (Nye 2004a:16).
79 Referring back to section 2.6 'Definition of Soft-Power Resources.'
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“Seduction is  always more effective than coercion,  and many values like democracy, human 
rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive” (Nye 2004a:x). In the following, it will 
become evident that the strategy adopted by the TGE in its exile struggle starting in the 1980s 
was in effect a soft-power strategy with the objective to engender international attraction and 
support. By focusing on a set of specific attractive, popular values in the international discourse, 
the TGE deliberately fostered a representation of Tibet and Tibetans that would be in line with 
these values, and hence act as an attractive force.
A case in point is the  Five Point Peace Plan announced by the Dalai Lama.80 Four of the five 
points  are  directly  connected to  core  Western values:  Peace;  fundamental  human rights  and 
democratic  freedoms;  protection  of  the  natural  environment;  and  a  culture  of  dialogue.  By 
declaring the  Five Point Peace Plan,  the Dalai Lama powerfully associates the Tibetan exile 
struggle with some of the central values of Western culture. He thereby appeals to a sense of duty 
in the  West to comply with these  shared values  by supporting his person,  the TGE and the 
associated cause.
Furthermore,  the  TGE  has  actively  politicized  aspects  of  the  Myth  of  Tibet through 
representations of Tibetan identity disseminated from Dharamsala. In his paper  Shangri-La in 
Exile Toni Huber (2001) demonstrates how certain specific identity representations have begun to 
appear in many publications and press releases issued by the Tibetan exile community starting in 
the 1980s. They consist of claims regarding the fundamental identity and character of Tibetans, 
their traditional society and culture, and include statements such as: “Tibetans are an essentially 
peaceful  and  nonviolent  people,  who  never  developed  an  army  of  their  own,”  or 
“Environmentalism  is  an  innate  aspect  of  Tibetan culture,”  or  “Women in  traditional  Tibet 
enjoyed a higher degree of equality than in other Asian societies” (cited from Huber 2001:357).
From the contact situation imposed by exile, Tibetans have learned to express coherently particular 
concepts of 'culture' and have collected a whole range of representational styles and strategies during 
the process.  It  took some time before customs, practices,  habits,  and laws long taken for granted 
became selected and then eloquently objectified as their 'unique culture.' But, by the mid-1980s, the 
more sophisticated fruits of this process began to appear in the form of a modern, liberal, reinvented 
Shangri-la identity image” (Huber 2001:366).
Huber discusses how Tibetans in exile have “reinvented a kind of modern, Shangri-la image of 
themselves” (ibid:358). This image creation, he argues, has its precedents in a set of transnational 
discourses: environmentalism, pacifism, human rights, and feminism, and was largely the result 
80 Discussed in section 3.13.3 'Objectives of the TGE in Practice.'
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of the creation of a small political and intellectual elite in Dharamsala. “This small group of 
educated and cosmopolitan Tibetans has learned and skillfully adapted a repertoire of modern 
representational styles and strategies during the course of their enforced and prolonged contact 
with the modern world” (ibid.).
The Dalai Lama and the TGE, in the words of Anand (2007:100), have “projected their culture as 
being compatible with universalizing discourses such as environmentalism, (world) peace, and 
nonviolence.”
One of the reasons why such identity claims have been successful and credible in the West, is the 
existence of  the  Myth  of  Tibet.  Huber  (2001:358-9)  states  that  while  the  Myth  of  Tibet was 
historically a Western enterprise, new Tibetan exile identity claims have, in a sense, appropriated 
this  Western discourse and creatively reflected it  back to the  West. This  explains  why exile 
“identity claims are often so appealing to, and uncritically accepted by, many Westerners.” In this 
respect,  the  Myth of Tibet has acted as fertile grounds on which the exile government  could 
effectively build its desired Tibetan image creation.
 
Huber (2001:359) argues that the TGE adopted this strategy of Tibetan identity representation 
with the intention “to create a distinct community of sentiment to direct at a liberal Western and 
non-Tibetan audience of potential supporters in lobbying for the cause of Tibetan independence 
from Chinese  colonialism”  (Huber  2001:359).  He  maintains  that  the  “purpose  of  promoting 
oneself with such liberal identities is now becoming transparent to all observers. They are no 
longer just a signal of commitment to the environment, nonviolence, equality, and so on – they 
are a specific form of self-marketing” (Huber 2001:367).
In the following, it will be discussed how the TGE has employed this strategy of Tibetan image 
creation and dissemination. It will be demonstrated how the TGE has, by focusing on certain 
aspects of the Myth of Tibet, managed to capitalize on values that are of importance in Western 
societies, thereby operationalizing them as soft-power resources. Magnusson (2002:211) states 
that “in the service of the Tibetans the myth and Tibet's enchantment of the Western mind is [...] a 
soft power resource that can be manipulated81 to get attention and to get some access to the stages 
of world politics.”
81 With the term 'manipulate,' Magnusson (2002:195) means to “negotiate, control and influence actors.”
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Part 7 deals with how this manipulation has taken place. The analysis focuses on five specific sets 
of values, respectively associated with:  environmentalism, human rights,  democracy, women's 
rights,  and  Tibetan  Buddhism.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  environmentalist  identity 
representations (section 7.2 'Green Tibetans'), as this field demonstrates particularly well how a 
certain  set  of  values  has  been  politicized  and  a  certain  identity  representation  deliberately 
fostered. The essence of the effect of each of the values discussed in Part 7 is similar: The appeal 
to a sense of duty due to a shared value. In this regard, the more detailed analysis of 'Green 
Tibetans' is representative for the other four sets of values discussed in lesser detail thereafter: 
Human rights (section 7.3), democracy (7.4), women's rights (7.5) and the values associated with 
Tibetan Buddhism (7.6).
7.2.1 'Green Tibetans'
One of the core Western values the TGE has deliberately politicized and thereby transformed into 
a  soft-power  resource  is  that  of  environmentalism,  of  environmental  protection,  of  nature 
preservation. Toni Huber (1997) conducted extensive research on the phenomenon of Tibetan 
environmentalist identity representations, which he calls “Green Tibetans.”
The characterization 'green' is now commonly understood as a depiction for groups, institutions 
and social movements related to concerns such as ecological awareness, environmental protection 
and the preservation of nature (Huber 1997:103). In his paper  Green Tibetans: A Brief Social  
History, Huber (1997:103-119) discusses “a set of essentialist representations of Tibetan peoples, 
their culture and lifestyle which depicts them as being in harmony with nature, non-exploitative 
of  the  natural  world  and  its  resources,  and  consciously  sensitive  to  the  complex  ecological 
processes inherent in the physical environment” (ibid:103).  Such representations,  which have 
been disseminated successfully around the globe, are the product of a small circle of people in 
exile,  but “they claim to represent  all  Tibetans across space and time” (ibid).  Irrespective of 
whether such representations are factually justified, Huber treats them as “real,” as “social facts,” 
as “part of life in society” (ibid:104, emphasis in original).
The active cultivation and dissemination of a 'green' identity is not unique to the Tibetan exile 
government.  A wide range of  non-Western populations have endeavoured to be perceived in 
99
connection  to  such  identities,  for  example  indigenous  groups  of  the  Amazon,  Polynesians, 
Australian Aborigines or natives of North America, which can “readily be linked to nature by 
living materially simple lifestyles in uncultivated environments” (Huber 1997:106). Also Western 
commercial  or industrial  groups,  political parties,  civil  society organizations and other social 
movements have pursued the dissemination of 'green' identities.
The promotion of  'green'  identities in general  and in the  particular  case of  the  Tibetan exile 
government  have  taken  place  against  the  backdrop  of  the  “formation  of  a  strong  global 
environmentalist  Zeitgeist  during  the  1980s  and  1990s”  (Huber  1997:106).  Environmental 
protection and sustainability have become prime issues not only within the system of the United 
Nations or for individual politicians or political parties, but also for numerous NGOs and other 
civil  society  groups.  Mainstream  media  has  also  popularized  concern  with  the  global 
environment. The rationality behind cultivating a 'green' image can certainly be explained by a 
preoccupation  with  nature  on  the  one  hand,  but  particularly  also  by  striving  for  “strategic 
positioning  for  social,  economic  and  political  advantages,  as  well  as  competition  for  scarce 
resources within the contemporary world system” (Huber 1997:106). In the international context, 
where  environmental  protection  is  an  issue  or  value  experiencing  increasing  attention  and 
importance, the cultivation and dissemination of a 'green' identity can act as a strong attractive 
force, in other words, a soft-power resource.
7.2.2 Illustrating the Tibetan 'Green' Identity
In  the  following,  a  number  of  examples  are  presented  that  illustrate  the  ways in  which  the 
essentialist 'green' representation of Tibetans have been communicated.
The way that the Five Point Peace Plan invokes core Western values has already been referred to 
above. In his elaboration on the fourth point, regarding the environment, the Dalai Lama states:
Tibetans have a great respect for all forms of life. This inherent feeling is enhanced by the Buddhist 
faith,  which prohibits  the  harming of  all  sentient  beings,  whether  human  or  animal.  Prior  to  the 
Chinese invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment. Sadly, 
in the past decades the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost totally destroyed by the 
Chinese. The effects on Tibet's delicate environment have been devastating. What little is left in Tibet 
must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state (Dalai 
Lama 1987).
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The first  two sentences  are  a  good example  of  the  essentialist  representation of  Tibetans as 
'environmentally friendly.'
According to Huber (2001:359), “[i]nvoking an environmentalist Tibetan identity has become an 
almost obligatory aspect of publicly presenting the issue of Tibet in the 1990s. We find such 
images in pro-Tibetan political literature, especially in a range of increasingly sophisticated texts 
issued by the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India. From these sources such images 
have become globally disseminated into popular world media.”
An example of the 'green' representation in a relatively sophisticated publication is seen in the 
report Environment and Development in Tibet – A Crucial Issue released by the Environment and 
Development Desk of the DIIR in 2008. In its introduction, it states:
Prior to the Chinese occupation, Tibet was ecologically stable. Environmental conservation through 
human intervention was never felt before partly due to the sparse human population and partly due to 
the Tibetan way of life, which has been strongly influenced by spiritual beliefs in the interdependence 
of both living and non-living elements of the earth. Tibetans strive to live in harmony with nature. 
These beliefs are strengthened further by the Tibetan Buddhists traditional adherence to the principle 
of self-contentment: the environment should be used to fulfill one’s need and not one’s greed (DIIR 
2008:5). 
Such a representation exemplifies what Huber (2001:359) means when he argues that typical 
statements  of  'green'  Tibetan identity “stress  the  innateness  of  a  certain  type  of  traditional 
worldview or values and behaviour” (Huber 2001:359).
In an article featured in the Tibetan Review in 1991, Atisha states:
[W]e Tibetans have always been aware of  the interdependent  nature of  this  world. We know that 
[...f]or most of Asia, Tibet's environment has always been of crucial importance. And so for centuries 
Tibet's ecosystem was kept in balance and alive out of a common concern for all humanity (cited from 
Huber 2001:360).
This example might be a bit extreme in terms of an essentialist representation, but it conveys the 
essence of this phenomenon.
A typical  statement  for  how the  issue  of  the  environment  is  connected to Tibetan Buddhist 
tradition, is: “Both science and the teachings of the Buddha tell us of the fundamental unity of all 
things. This understanding is crucial if we are to take positive and decisive action on the pressing 
global concern with the environment” (Dalai Lama, cited from Huber 2001:361).
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Another  example is  a  statement from a document  entitled  The Tibetan Buddhist  View of  the 
Environment, published by the TGE, which goes:
For centuries, Tibetans lived in their vast, sparsely populated country in perfect harmony with their 
environment. It was not simply due to a small population and plentiful resources, but the result of an 
attitude of respect for all living creatures, fostered by the Tibetan Buddhist outlook (Yeshi 1996).
These  examples  of  essentialist  reductions  illustrate  how  the  TGE  has  connected  the 
representation of Tibetans to a popular issue or value of the dominant discourse, which is of 
concern to most Western governments and publics: The environment.
7.2.3 How did the Tibetan 'Green' Identity come about?
The Tibetan 'green'  identity is  a  complex social  phenomenon, and as  such it  is  the result  of 
manifold factors. Many people would agree that buying into a Tibetan 'green' identity does not 
seem too far-fetched in the context of a prevailing Myth of Tibet (as dealt with in Part 5). It seems 
credible that a peace-loving, compassionate, harmonious, spiritual society might also respect its 
natural environment and hence be environmentalist in nature (see Magnusson 2002:203). But it is 
difficult if not impossible to comprehensively prove or evaluate the extent to which the existence 
of the utopian Myth of Tibet in the West aided in the international reception of the 'green' identity. 
What can be said for certain, however, is that the coming about of a Tibetan 'green' identity is the 
result of “a complex of intersecting social forces and discourses mediated through the agency of a 
variety of individuals and institutions” (Huber 1997:106).
A great deal of impetus for the creation of the Tibetan 'green' image came from outside the exile 
community.  One  major  source  of  inspiration  is  what  Poul  Pedersen  termed  the  “religious 
environmentalist paradigm,” which, essentially, is the “creative linking of religion with the idea 
of ecological crisis” (Huber 1997:107) and, consequentially, the reading of ecological insight into 
religious dogmas, particularly of Asian religions (Kalland 2003:6).82 After the 1967 publication 
of  Lynn  White's  seminal  paper  The  historical  roots  of  our  present  ecological  crisis,  the 
relationship between religions and issues of ecology, biological diversity and sustainability have 
gained increasing attention.
82 For details on the religious environmentalist paradigm, see Pedersen (1995). 
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An important landmark in the coming about of the 'green' Tibetan image was the participation of 
the TGE in various institutions promoting the 'religious environmental paradigm.' One important 
project was called  Buddhist Perception of Nature: A New Perspective for Conservation, which 
was funded by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and initiated around 1985. The aims of this 
project included the study of traditional Buddhist literature regarding human interdependence, 
and to find relationships to responsibilities towards the earth and living things (Huber 1997:109). 
Although the direct outcome of this project was rather meager (“after a year's intensive research 
[... the group ...] finally found a single stanza worth quoting” (cited from Huber 1997:109)), some 
indirect consequences were quite significant: The participation in the project gave the TGE “full 
exposure to the 'religious environmentalist paradigm' in institutional operation [...] and brought 
Dharamsala  firmly  within  the  orbit  of  the  WWF, the  world's  largest  private  conservation 
organization” (ibid.).
An example of the TGE's exposure to the 'religious environmentalist paradigm' in action is its 
participation in the interfaith ceremony held in Assisi, Italy in 1986 to mark the 25 th birthday of 
the  WWF. Representatives  of  five  world religions (Buddhism,  Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, 
Judaism)  met  to  discuss  the  connection  of  their  creed  with  questions  of  ecology  and 
sustainability.83
On the occasion of the World Environment Day on 5 June 1986, the Dalai Lama produced his 
renowned  statement,  An  Ethical  Approach to  Environmental Protectionism  (see  Dalai  Lama 
1986). “The appearance and wide circulation of this short (one page) statement helped put the 
Dalai  Lama 'on  the  map,'  as  it  were,  as  a  global  religious-environmental  advocate”  (Huber 
1997:110).
The events and connections of the period 1985-1986 “provided graphic examples to the GIE 
[government in exile...]  of  how a Buddhist  identity could be powerfully linked to the major 
global discourses of our time, such as environmentalism. It also showed that the whole world was 
a potential audience for such messages. It was from this point onwards that a politicized identity 
became linked with what had mainly been talk about Buddhism and nature, but which then was 
transformed into talk about Green Tibetans” (Huber 1997:111). An indication of this is the Dalai 
Lama's announcement of the Five Point Peace Plan for which he was later awarded the Nobel 
Prize.
83 In the following decades, Tibetans regularly participated in the numerous conferences on religion and ecology 
that were held at places such as Harvard University. A Forum on Religion and Ecology was also created (Kalland 
2003:6).
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7.2.4 When did 'Green' Tibetan Representations begin?
The 'green' Tibetan identity representation began in the mid-1980s.  One factor explaining why 
the  TGE decided  to  'become  green'  at  that  point  is  definitely  the  reports  on  environmental 
destruction in Tibet that became available when restrictions on the access to Tibet were loosened. 
Fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala visited Tibet in 1979, 1980, 1982 and 1985. At first, 
the reports on environmental destruction by the PRC were merely reproduced as further evidence 
of Chinese atrocities (Huber 1997:108).
Huber  (ibid.)  claims  that  he  “heard  privately  voiced  suggestions  both  from  Tibetan  exiled 
intellectuals and Western scholars that the Tibetan [exile government] in Dharamsala was advised 
by various well-meaning foreign supporters to become 'green' at that particular time as that would 
greatly add to international sympathy for their cause. This is especially true when coupled with 
the reports of ecological damage in Tibet under Chinese occupation.”
According to Huber's (1997) research, the solid date for the appearance of the 'green' Tibetan 
image is 1986. Until 1985 at least seven full-length books had been published by the Dalai Lama, 
but none of them specifically mentions environmental issues, the connection between Buddhism 
and nature, or ecology (Huber 1997:107). “Similarly, in his published collected public statements 
to Tibetans, press interviews and articles which cover a great many subjects and issues of all 
kinds, there is not a single mention of any topic related to Green Tibetans until the year 1986” 
(Huber 1997:107-8). Until 1986, neither Shes bya, the official organ of the exile government, nor 
the English language  Tibetan Bulletin (also published by the TGE), or the more independent 
Tibetan Review covered articles on Buddhism and ecology.84
7.2.5 Communicating the Tibetan 'Green' Image
Huber (1997:106) argues that the Tibetan exile government not only generated the images of 
Tibetans as 'green,' but also continues to disseminate them. In the late 1980s, elaborations on the 
'green' Tibetan image began to occur in the major print and electronic media controlled by the 
84 “But  Shes bya reported other local 'environmental' stories very occasionally before Green Tibetans appeared,” 
e.g. concerning rubbish problems around Buddhist shrines (Huber 1997:108).
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government  in  exile.  'Green'  Tibetan  representations  appeared  in  organs  published  by  the 
Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) – in the monthly  Shes bya (in 
Tibetan) and the bi-monthly Tibetan Bulletin (in English, French, Hindi and Marathi) – as well as 
in the quarterly The Tibet Journal, published by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, and 
in Chö Yang, published annually by the Council of Religious and Cultural Affairs of His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama. In Huber's (1997:111) view, the deliberations behind the dissemination of 'green' 
Tibetan representations through these media,  including the priority target audience,  are clear: 
Most texts coming from the TGE appeared first in English and other Western languages before 
they were translated into Tibetan, and by contrast, publications produced simultaneously by the 
independent  Tibetan exile  intellectual  elite,  particularly  Zla  gsar  and  dMang gtso,  contained 
virtually no material supporting or creating the 'green' Tibetan image (Huber 1997:111).
In 1992, the Environment Desk was established within the framework of the DIIR (which, in 
1994, became the Environment & Development Desk). It represented the institutionalization of 
the production and dissemination of all environmental materials of the TGE, and began to publish 
a series of books on environmental issues, first in English, later also in Tibetan.
When comparing this new material with the content of publications issued by the earlier Information 
Office,85 a radical turnaround in the image of the exile community projected by the GIE [government 
in  exile]  is  quite  apparent.  The  full-page  photographs  of  Tibetans  spraying  pesticides  around 
agricultural settlements or accounts of the large expenditures on deforestation for clearing settlement 
lands which appeared in GIE publications in the recent past are now completely unimaginable and 
have given way to photos of tree planting ceremonies and stories of strong Tibetan Buddhist resistance 
to pesticide use (Huber 1997:112).
According to Huber (1997:111), the most impressive publication conveying the 'green' Tibetan 
image is the “handsome coffee table book” My Tibet86 by Tenzin Gyatso, which is “filled with 
evocative  photographs  [...]  and  accompanying  text  by  the  Dalai  Lama.”  It  is  “designed 
specifically to reach into the living-rooms of a wealthy Western readership.”
The production standards of Environment & Development Desk outputs are very high compared 
with other TGE publications. In general, they are produced with high quality paper, full color 
fotos and glossy covers. This indicates that “the GIE has clearly decided to allot a significant 
budget to market the environment issue” (Huber 1997:112).
85 The DIIR was formerly the Information Office. See section 3.5 'The Executive.'
86 See Gyatso (1990).
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Simultaneous  to  the  construction  of  the  'green'  Tibetan image,  there  has  been  a  strategy  of 
constructing  a  “negative,  ecologically  destructive  Chinese  'Other'”  (Huber  1997:112).  When 
considering the supporting factual evidence, such a construction has not been too difficult. “The 
political subtext here is that Green Tibetans should gain their independence because they would 
'obviously' do a better job of maintaining the environment than the Chinese have in the past” 
(Huber 1997:112).
According to Huber's (1997:106) judgement, “Green Tibetan images now circulate both globally 
and  within  the  Tibetan exile  community, apparently  accepted  on  face  value  by  many  who 
consume them.”
7.2.6 The 'Green' Tibetan Image as a Soft-Power Resource
Clarke (2001:339-355) demonstrates that “the simple polarized picture that contrasts Tibetans as 
naturally  environment  loving  versus  Chinese  as  environmentally  destructive  is  a  fiction.” 
However, the question whether the 'green' Tibetan image is based on myth or reality is not central 
when it comes to the analysis of this image in terms of its soft-power potential.
Through creating and fostering a “modern, reflexive and politicized” (Huber:1997:114) Tibetan 
identity as  ecological  and environmentally friendly, and by communicating this  image to the 
international sphere through publications, statements and press releases, the TGE has connected 
its exile struggle to one of the major international issues of the present. Environmental protection 
is  a  value  that  is  widely  shared  throughout  the  world.  According  to  a  Pew (2008:65)  poll, 
majorities in most of the Western countries believe that global warming, for instance, is a “very 
serious problem.” While in the United States 42% of the people polled saw global warming as a 
very serious problem, the percentage in Australia and Japan were 62% and 73%, respectively. 
Opinions in western Europe were also strong (Britain: 56%, Germany: 61%, Spain: 67%, France: 
72%). A Pew poll conducted in 2002 showed that about one in three people in western Europe 
believes that environmental problems are the first or second greatest danger to the world. In the 
United States it was almost a quarter, in Canada 44% and in Japan 55% (Pew 2002:48).  Due to 
the high attractiveness of environmental issues and concerns, the TGE has thus employed and 
operationalized the global concern for the environment, and hence transformed it into an asset of 
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soft power for its own purpose. The target recipient of the 'green' image, as has been discussed, is 
the West. The invoking of values associated with environmental issues has thus been part of the 
TGE's 'soft-power strategy' to increase support from the West.
Barnett (2001:276) shows how the language used in the European Parliament regarding Tibet has 
begun to include references to the environment in the 1990s. Resulting in part from the activism 
on the Tibet issue by Petra Kelly and the German Green Party, in 1992 a European Parliament 
resolution was passed, “deploring the destruction wrought on the natural environment of Tibet by 
[...] the ruthless exploitation of the country's natural resources,” which, it said, had “resulted in 
major  deforestation  around  the  upper  reaches  of  Asia's  greatest  rivers,  with  catastrophic 
implications for the future of the region.” (cited from Barnett 2001:276). Much of this language, 
according to Barnett (ibid.), came from what the Dalai Lama had written on pre-1959 Tibet, for 
instance in his elaboration on point four of the Five Point Peace Plan cited above.87
This  example  demonstrates  how  the  Tibetan  'green'  image  has,  after  dissemination  from 
Dharamsala, found entry into influential circles with the potential to advocate for the Tibetan 
cause.
Huber (1997:114) assumes that the 'green' Tibetan representation will remain “at least as long as 
environmentalism strongly influences transnational discourse.”
7.2.7 The Value of Environmental Protection as a Soft-Power Resource
In relation to the environment, not only the 'green' Tibetan identity has been politicized as a soft-
power resource. The TGE also appeals to a shared interest in protecting the global environment. 
Frequently the TGE in its communications expounds that the Tibetan environment is of vital 
importance to the entire world. A report issued by the Environment and Development Desk of the 
DIIR in 2000, for example, states that 47% of the world's population is dependent on the rivers 
originating in Tibet:
Given  the  high  altitude  and  the  extreme  climatic  conditions  of  Tibet, the  damage  caused  to  the 
environment and the fragile mountain ecosystem is becoming irreversible. This is a cause of great 
concern not only for the Tibetan people; it has much larger ramifications. More than ever before, the 
need to save the Tibetan Plateau from ecological devastation is urgent because it is not a question of 
the survival of Tibetans, but half of humanity is at stake (DIIR 2000:i).
87 See section 7.2.2 'Illustrating the Tibetan 'Green' Identity.'
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In a 2008 report, the DIIR states:
Experts predict that water shortage will create tensions in the world in the coming years. About 50 
percent of the total world population depend on Tibetan rivers. Today, these rivers are threatened by 
tapping their water and diverting them to north to fulfill the needs of the Chinese people alone (DIIR 
2008:37).
It can be debated whether such communications result in soft power, or whether they are merely 
criticisms of Chinese rule with the political subtext that Tibetans would do a much better job 
concerning the environment if they were in power. But in a sense, these communications appeal 
to  a  shared  value:  Global  environmental  protection,  or  better:  The  inhibition  of  global 
environmental degradation. In this regard, the dissemination of such information can also act as 
an attractive, soft-power resource for the TGE.
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7.3 The Values of Human Rights as a Soft-Power Resource
[T]he dominant appeal in Western political rhetoric about Tibet remains that to the principles of human 
rights. It is in this choice that, perhaps, the influence of the exile Tibetan leadership can be seen most 
clearly. (Barnett 2001:280)
It seems fair to argue that in the Western world, the values associated with human rights are 
widely shared. According to Amartya Sen (2000:227), the “idea of human rights has gained a 
great  deal  of  ground in  recent  years,  and it  has  acquired  something  of  an  official  status  in 
international discourse.” Human rights belong to the major issues of the UN. The principles of 
human rights, and their underlying values, enjoy a level of prominence that few other current 
international issues can claim. A 25-nation poll conducted by World Public Opinion (2008a) “has 
found a remarkable degree of consensus in support of the principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights.” A  Harris  Interactive (2008)  poll  found  that  “very  strong 
majorities”  in  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Spain,  Japan  and  the  United  States 
“(between 56% in Japan and 85% in Italy) believe that human rights should be a central figure of 
their country’s foreign policy.” Due to the strong international support for human rights, a focus 
on the related issues “brought the Tibetans unexpected hearings in the USA and Europe” (Roemer 
2008a:113).
A major aspect of the 'grassroots' strategy adopted by the TGE in the 1980s was a strategic focus 
on the issue of human rights. One influential factor in this decision was the coming to power of 
Jimmy Carter in 1977, because Carter was “pledging to carry out a foreign policy based on the 
principles of 'human rights' around the world. This led Tibetans to declare that, 'it is his special 
emphasis on the human rights issue that makes him a potential Messiah for Tibetans'” (Grunfeld, 
cited from Roemer 2008a:112). Unlike the 'green' Tibetan phenomenon, human rights in relation 
to the Tibet question have already been taken up by the UN General Assembly resolutions on 
Tibet between 1959 and 1965. However, when the human rights discourse increasingly emerged 
in the international sphere, considerable attention was paid to Tibet (see Anand 2007:83).
The TGE saw the human rights  discourse as  a  policy tool  of  high potential,  particularly for 
indigenous or displaced people, like themselves, to change the political situation in their home 
countries (Roemer 2008a:112). By connecting the Tibetan issue with the topic of human rights, 
the TGE has created an association of  high attractive potential.  This  section argues how the 
subject of human rights has been, and is continued to be used as asset of soft power for the TGE.
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The rhetoric of human rights as a policy tool in international relations is fairly recent. Towards 
the end of the Cold War, the principles of human rights were being widely applied in the media 
and by politicians to various situations. In 1987, “Roberta Cohen, formerly Carter's adviser on 
human rights, called for the principle to be applied to relations with the PRC. At about the same 
time, the exile leaders in Dharamsala completed their plans for the Dalai Lama to give political 
speeches abroad in order to place international pressure on the Chinese to end abuses in Tibet” 
(Barnett 2001:280). According to Barnett's (2001:281) understanding, it was around this time that 
the TGE decided that the main principle to which the Dalai Lama would appeal in his foreign 
speeches would be the principle of human rights [...] in the summer of 1987 the Dalai Lama 
began a series of speeches, mainly in Western countries, in which he invoked the language of 
threatened and violated specialness and called for support for Tibet on the grounds of human 
rights” (Barnett 2001:280-1)
The human rights approach has also shown evident advantages, particularly in that it has attracted wide 
media attention and public sympathy, and in that it allowed access to the UN through its Commission 
on Human Rights: For the planners in Dharamsala the deployment of this approach was a strategic 
success of a high order (Barnett 2001:282).
Human rights violations in Tibet had been known to occur for some time. The resolutions passed 
by the UN General Assembly on Tibet between 1959 and 1965 had already drawn attention to 
human rights violations in Tibet.88 For the 'human rights approach' to work, it was necessary to 
provide concrete evidence for human rights violations in Tibet. For this purpose, the  Tibetan 
Center for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), formerly the Human Rights Desk under the 
DIIR, gathers information on the human rights situation in Tibet, primarily through testimonies of 
Tibetans recently arrived in exile (TCHRD 1). The TCHRD releases monthly publications called 
Human Rights Update, ever since its creation in 1996,89 as well as annual reports on the human 
rights situation in Tibet (see TCHRD 1). Since the late 1980s, NGOs specialized in human rights 
such as  Amnesty International  and Human Rights  Watch regularly publish reports  and press 
releases on the situation in Tibet.
To give some insight into the extent to which the Tibetan issue has been linked to the topic of 
human rights, a Google search90 for the phrase “human rights in tibet” gives about 40,500 results 
in English.
88  See section 3.12 'The TGE's Approach to the Exile Struggle.'
89 “Since the first issue in November 1996, the readership has expanded and now 1100 copies are sent around the 
world  to relevant  human rights  organizations, Tibet Support  Groups,  embassies,  and individual  subscribers” 
(TCHRD 1).
90 On 27 April 2009. A search for the phrase “human rights violations in tibet” still produces about 6,800 English 
language hits.
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Barnett (2001:286) points out an interesting detail, an “unexpected bonus” of the TGE's strategy 
of having the Dalai Lama speak on political issues, particularly human rights in foreign countries:
It led to the reluctance or rumored refusal of Western governments to allow entry to the Dalai Lama on 
his round of tours. This created a mobilizing issue for those to whom the notion of universal human 
rights  was  of  growing  importance,  and  for  whom the  idea  of  a  Western democratic  government 
accepting Chinese dictates about whom it should meet was unacceptable.
The  ensuing  controversies91 appeared  not  only  in  international  news  but  also  in  the  more 
influential domestic pages of Western papers. Both lobby groups and opposition parties accused 
governments of “complicity with Chinese intolerance – a representation that was hard for any 
democratic government to refute so long as it refused access to the Tibetan leader” (ibid:287). 
The political  strategy of the TGE had thus “created a cross-party support  base and had also 
moved the Tibet issue from the foreign agenda to the much more potent domestic agenda of many 
Western countries” (ibid.).
Numerous statements and publications by the Dalai Lama and the TGE refer to the topic of 
human rights. In the Strasbourg Proposal for example the Dalai Lama states:
As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of 
Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly and religion (Dalai Lama 1988). 
The document Human Rights, Democracy and Freedom published on the Dalai Lama's website, 
is a message marking the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In it, 
the Dalai Lama links the topic of human rights to other highly attractive values. In view of the 
widely spread poverty, he advocates transforming the economy into one based on compassion. 
“This form of compassion affirms the principles of dignity and justice for all embodied in the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human Rights”  (Dalai  Lama 1).  Further  on,  he  states:  “Peace  and 
freedom cannot be ensured as long as fundamental human rights are violated.” Hence, along with 
advocating the importance of human rights, the Dalai Lama connects the topic with other popular 
Western issues like peace or freedom.
The human rights discourse was also conductive in giving the Dalai Lama access to the U.S. 
Congress: The Five Point Peace Plan-speech – which included the assertion that “Human rights 
violations in Tibet are among the most serious in the world” (Dalai Lama 1987) – was given at 
the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus.
91 The rumoured refusal of the UK government to issue a visa for the Dalai Lama reportedly led to the emergence of 
the first Tibet Support Group in the UK in 1988 (see Barnett 2001:311-2).
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In summary, the strategy of embracing the topic of human rights in the Tibetan exile struggle has 
proven to be successful in  many ways.  Not only has the  human rights  issue legitimized the 
Tibetan exile struggle in the view of wide sections of Western societies, it has also given the 
Dalai  Lama access  to influential  political  fora based on moral  authority. Furthermore,  it  has 
stimulated  international  media  attention  and  attracted  prestigious  international  NGOs  to 
contribute to its struggle in moral and political terms. A focus on human rights suggests itself for 
the  TGE  due  to  the  Tibetan reality. Human  rights  enjoy  a  high  level  of  legitimacy  in  the 
international sphere. The values associated with human rights are widely shared. By connecting 
the  exile  struggle  with  this  topic,  based on  the  shared  value of  human rights,  the  TGE has 
managed to attract considerable support for its cause. In this sense, human rights have acted as a 
soft-power resource for the TGE.
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7.4 The Value of Democracy as a Soft-Power Resource
[The] Dharamsala establishment has been moving toward democratization [...] for gaining legitimacy 
in the West (Anand 2007:100-1).
In Western countries,  with democratic  political systems,  the value of democracy tends to be 
highly  cherished.  A  World Public  Opinion  (2008b)  poll  finds  large  majorities  in  the  West 
agreeing with democratic ideas. For instance, in the United States 87% agree with the democratic 
principle that  “the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of  government,” and 
96% agree that “government leaders should be selected through elections in which all citizens 
can vote.” In France, the respective findings are 77% and 87%, in Great Britain 87% and 89% 
and in Spain 94% and 91%.
As discussed in  section 3.9 ('Democratization of the Tibetan Government in Exile'),  the exile 
Tibetan political system is not fully democratic, eventhough a process of democratization has 
taken place and democracy in exile Tibetan society is improving. But despite the shortcomings, 
the  Dalai  Lama  and  the  TGE  repeatedly  emphasize  the  importance  of  democracy  and  the 
democratic nature of the Tibetan exile political system. Thereby TGE appeals to one of the major 
values of Western political culture.
When receiving the US Congressional Gold Medal in 2007, the Dalai Lama states:
following our arrival in India as refugees, we have democratised our political system and adopted a 
democratic charter that sets guidelines for our exile administration. Even our political leadership is 
now directly chosen by the people on a five-year term basis (Dalai Lama 2007).
In point three of the Five Point Peace Plan, the Dalai Lama (1987) asserts that Tibetans in Tibet 
are deprived “of all  basic democratic rights  and freedoms,” and calls  for “[f]undamental [...] 
democratic freedoms” to be respected. In the Dalai Lama's speech to the European Parliament in 
October 2001, he states: “I am a staunch believer in freedom and democracy and have therefore 
been encouraging the Tibetans in exile to follow the democratic process” (Dalai Lama 2001). 
Seven years later, at the same venue, he repeats: 
I am a staunch believer in democracy. Consequently, I have consistently encouraged Tibetans in exile 
to  follow the  democratic  process.  Today, the  Tibetan refugee  community may be  among the  few 
refugee communities that have established all three  pillars of democracy: legislature, judiciary and 
executive.  In 2001, we took another  great  stride in  the process  of  democratization by having the 
chairman of the Kashag (cabinet) of the Tibetan Administration in exile elected by popular vote (Dalai 
Lama 2008). 
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In the document  Human Rights,  Democracy and Freedom referred to above, the Dalai Lama 
declares:
Where there is democracy there is a greater possibility for the citizens of the country to express their 
basic human qualities, and where these basic human qualities prevail, there is also a greater scope for 
strengthening democracy. Most importantly, democracy is also the most effective basis for ensuring 
world peace (Dalai Lama 1).
The 'democratic' nature of the Tibetan exile political system seems to be confirmed at hightest 
political levels. The United States Congress, for example, in its resolution 226 on Tibet (adopted 
9 March 2009)  explicitly  recognizes  the process  of democratization of the  TGE: The “Dalai 
Lama set out to instill democracy in the exile community, which has led to the Central Tibetan 
Administration with its democratically elected Executive and Legislative Branches, as well as a 
Judicial Branch” (USHR 2009:3). This formal recognition is a strong statement of endorsement 
of the TGE, effectively calling the Tibetan exile political system democratic.
There are numerous reasons why the Dalai Lama decided to embrace democracy. One surely 
consists of consideration on what will  happen in the event of the Dalai Lama's death. But it 
appears that the efforts to democratize “have been primarily targeted toward a Western audience” 
(Ardley  2002:172).  By democratizing,  the  TGE could occupy “the high moral  ground when 
compared with China” (ibid.). Ardley (ibid:86) notes that “the process of democratisation has 
been initiated by the Tibetan government more in the anticipation of foreign approval than as a 
specific requirement of foreign governments and organisations.” The TGE has indeed received 
Western  approval  and  legitimacy  by  democratizing  its  political  system.  By  appealing  to 
democracy which is a widely shared value in the West, and by living up to it in its domestic 
policies, at least in foreign perception, the TGE has operationalized the value of democracy and 
turned it into a potent soft-power resource.
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7.5 Women's Rights as a Soft-Power Resource
The traditionally strong position of women in Tibetan society melds seamlessly with Western feminist 
ideals to construct yet another soft power resource for the positing of Tibetan aspirations for a global 
audience (Klieger 2002:7).
Gender equality is a popular value in the Western world, both among men and women. In a 2007 
Pew Global  Attitudes Survey for  example,  between 98% and 99% of all  people  surveyed in 
Western countries believed it to be equally important to educate girls and boys (Italy was the only 
exception with only 89% agreement) (Pew 2007:47).  The fact  that  Tibetan women are often 
represented  as  emancipated  and  as  having  a  strong  position,  benefits  the  TGE  due  to  the 
attractiveness resulting from the shared value of gender equality.
A typical example of an essentialist  representation of the unique status of Tibetan women is 
Thonsur's (2004:334) statement:
Women all over the world suffer discrimination, violence and exploitation and the struggle has been 
for more equal partnership and women's rights. Fortunately Tibetan women have not been subjected to 
these inequalities and do not spend their energy struggling for equality within their society. Women in 
exile have, therefore, always believed that their first priority is the struggle for national survival and 
the return to their occupied homeland.
He asserts that “Tibetan women [...] are known for the liberal status they enjoy in their society. It 
can be said that an understanding of the role of Tibetan women may be an inspiration to women 
in other countries” (Thonsur 2004:322).
In Tibetan Buddhist monastic life  women tend to be lacking, a fact related to the question of 
celibacy of monks. On this phenomenon, the Dalai Lama commented: “It is an individual choice. 
There is no bar on women joining the Sangha. Women are treated as equal to men and in many 
ways are even superior to men” (cited from Chhaya 2007:234).
Probably the most widely known Tibetan 'feminist' symbol is Rinchen Dolma Taring, the first 
Western-educated Tibetan woman. She died at the age of ninety-two in the year 2000. In her 
autobiography Daughter of Tibet she “emerges as a heroine, both on her willingness to speak out 
on behalf of women and her continuing desire to live a spiritual life” (MacMillin 2001:202). 
What Taring offers is “presented as universal” and “connects to Western feminist ideas about 
independence and self-realization” (ibid.).  She “occupies the position of heroine for feminist, 
Western Buddhist practitioners” (MacMillin 2001:208).
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As referred to in section 3.8.3 ('Tibetan Women's Association'), the TWA is active in various 
international women's rights fora and networks, including the UN Committee for the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. By raising awareness of the situation of Tibetan 
women in Tibet, it connects the exile Tibetan struggle to the gender discourse. As of the mid-
1990s,  Tibetan feminism has  presented  a  new perspective  from which  to  promote the  exile 
struggle. However, the “Tibet activists 'politicised' women's rights in the sense that they linked 
women's  rights  to a  nationalist  cause for  sovereignty, rather  than to  a  social  goal  of  gender 
equality” (Pike cited from Roemer 2008a:111). During the last  decade,  according to Roemer 
(ibid.) “the CTA directed struggle has been literally 'feminized'.”
A publication of the TWA tells the story of a number of Tibetan women that “showed a deep 
sense of patriotism and unwavering courage” (TWA 2) in their resistance to Chinese occupation, 
that caused them their lives. It continues: 
All Tibetan women, both inside Tibet and in exile always remember the sacrifices made by those brave 
women who fought in the early years of our struggle. We are determined to follow in their footsteps 
and march forward to achieve our goal.  Our  leader, His Holiness the Dalai  Lama has introduced 
democratic principles in the governance of our country. There is equal opportunity for women to hold 
responsible political and administrative positions. We shall therefore continue with our struggle for the 
sake of our country and our people.
The introduction of a 'feminist'  aspect into the exile struggle produces a variety of effects. In 
international fora specialized in gender issues, Chinese atrocities can be presented particularly 
with  regard  to  women.  By  focusing  representations  of  Tibetan women  on  the  bravery  and 
strength, the imagination of Western feminists and others advocating gender equality is inspired. 
To the extent that Tibetan gender equality is communicated and believed, and that initiatives from 
the TGE leadership to improve the status of Tibetan women become known, the value of gender 
equality becomes a source of attractive power for the TGE in the Western world.
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7.6.1 Tibetan Buddhism as a Resource of Soft Power
Just as “Japan [...] benefits from the cultural attractiveness of its traditional spiritual disciplines 
such as Zen Buddhism and the martial arts” (Nye 2004a:86), the TGE benefits from the cultural 
attractiveness of Tibetan Buddhism. Much of the attraction resulting from the Tibetan religion 
has already been discussed in Part 5 ('The  Myth of Tibet').  After the Chinese occupation, the 
Western  longing  and  desire,  formerly  projected  onto  the  whole  of  Tibet,  concentrated 
increasingly on Tibet's esoteric religion. This longing, this Western projection of seeing possible 
salvation in the Tibetan way of life and religion, is a form of soft power that benefits the TGE.
As mentioned in 3.11 ('Religion and Politics – Tibetan Buddhism and the TGE') Tibetan exile 
culture, religion and politics are closely related. Religion is one of the major determining factors 
of Tibetan culture. The Dalai Lama is the world's  most famous and popular Buddhist  monk. 
Through the  close association of  the Dalai  Lama with the TGE and Tibetan Buddhism, this 
religion has proven to be a highly attractive soft-power resource for the TGE on three levels that 
are intricately connected: Its uniqueness; by attracting Western followers to the religion; and by 
representing universal values.
7.6.2 Uniqueness of Tibetan Culture
When statements or publications refer to 'Tibet's unique culture,' to a large extent what this refers 
to is Tibetan Buddhism, at least in the image of Western projection. In 1987 the Dalai Lama first 
began to speak on the uniqueness of Tibetan culture, and since then this phrase has appeared in 
most of his political speeches (Barnett 2001:275). Speaking to the EU Parliament in 2001, he 
remarks:
The Chinese authorities view Tibet’s distinct culture and religion as the source of threat of separation. 
Hence as a result of deliberate policies an entire people with its unique culture and identity are facing 
the threat of extinction (Dalai Lama 2001).
In the Strasbourg Proposal of 1988 he states that Tibetans in Tibet “yearn for freedom and justice 
and a self-determined future, so that they are able to fully preserve their unique identity and live 
in peace with their neighbours” (Dalai Lama 1988).
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Benjamin Gilman, a U.S.  Congressman said in 1999: “The world has witnessed the sad and 
almost total destruction of Tibet's unique culture and religion, and has done precious little to end 
the extraordinary repression” (cited from Barnett 2001:275). According to Barnett (ibid:275-6), 
“[s]imilar language can be found in resolutions put to parliaments, and in some cases passed by 
them, in Russia, France, Belgium, Germany, Australia, the United States, and other countries.”
Huber  (2001:367)  points  out  that  the  “institutionalized  mainstreaming”  of  the  new  identity 
images discussed above ('green,' 'democratic') negate the cultural uniqueness constantly claimed 
by  the  Dalai  Lama  and  the  TGE.  Despite  this  irony, the  claims  of  uniqueness  have  been 
instrumental as an 
extraordinarily effective and sustained political vehicle for the Tibetan leadership: Over a dozen or so 
years the Dalai Lama was able to visit forty countries on some 170 occasions, always amid extensive 
publicity, and often, despite strong Chinese objections and Western reluctance, meeting the political 
leaders of those countries as well (Barnett 2001:281-2).
By continuously emphasizing that  the Tibetan culture is  'unique'  and in danger of  becoming 
extinct, exile Tibetans have attracted considerable attention and support. It can be argued that the 
value  of  uniqueness  acts  as  an  attractive  force  per  se. Phenomena  with  qualities  such  as 
uniqueness, rarity or scarcity tend to be valued. Economic thinking, in a sense, is based on the 
assumption that precious resources are finite. So the uniqueness of Tibetan culture or Tibetan 
Buddhism is, in some respect, a soft-power resource for the TGE which represents this culture.
7.6.3 Western Followers of Tibetan Buddhism
The myth of Tibet and the Western crisis of the senses [...] work together to make a quick, but rather 
superficial, spread of Tibetan Buddhism possible (Rinpoche 2001:386).
The cultural attraction emanating from Tibetan Buddhism in the West is powerful. The Dalai 
Lama has become the most important medium and advertising vehicle for Tibetan Buddhism 
(Ruch  2006:19).  Ruch  (ibid.)  pledges  for  a  thorough  examination  of  what  he  calls  the 
“phenomenon Dalai Lama” and of his “extraordinary missionary effect on the West” (ibid).92
92 My translation from German. To give an impression of the dispersion of Tibetan Buddhism in the West, an 
English language Google search for “tibetan buddhist center” produces about 8,190 hits (28.4.2009).
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This attraction has its roots in the  Myth of Tibet. Before Tibetan Buddhism came to the West, 
there already existed a potential interest in anything Tibetan (Ruch 2006:19).
Though many Europeans and Americans have been captivated by other forms of 'Oriental' religion, 
Tibet's brand of Buddhism – steeped as it  is in tales of magic and mystery, including accounts of 
unbelievable spiritual feats – continues to hold a special fascination” (Shell 2000:18).
When  the  diaspora  began  in  1959  Tibetan lamas  began  to  disperse  in  the  Western world. 
Particularly in the 1970s they laid the foundation for the “globalization of Tibetan Buddhism” 
(Stoddard cited from Rinpoche 2001:400). While Tibetan religion developed specific forms in the 
West, often merging with other spiritual beliefs, “notions of Tibetan culture that prevailed (and to 
some extent still  prevail)  among Western converts  have been thoroughly positive but  largely 
uncritical” (Rinpoche 2001:400). 
When Tibetan lamas increasingly arrived in the West, people longing for Tibet, its values and 
religion no longer needed to travel across half the globe in order to search for possible truths 
offered by Tibetan Buddhism. Throughout the West, “monastic and quasi-monastic communities, 
well  stocked  with  teachers,  instructors,  sacred  texts  and  highly  skilled  translators”  (Bishop 
1989:245) were established. Apparently, Tibetan Buddhism is filling a spiritual vacuum existing 
in the West (Ruch 2006:26).
One particularly popular Tibetan lama was Lama Yeshe. He began teaching in the United States 
in the 1970s, and by the year 2000, together with his students he had founded one hundred and 
thirty centers in twenty-nine countries (Paine 2004:56). In 2000, one in every thirty-five French 
citizens was a Buddhist.  “In the United States, Buddhism keeps doubling its numbers faster than 
any other religion, and the fastest-growing form is Tibetan Buddhism” (ibid:11). According to the 
online database of the  Deutsche Buddhistische Union,  an  umbrella  organization for  Buddhist 
centers in Germany, there are currently 644 Buddhist groups in Germany, 272 of which adhere to 
the Tibetan version of Mahayana Buddhism.93
Shell  (2000:37-40) outlines the popularity Tibetan Buddhism had reached in the USA in the 
1990s. Subscriptions to Buddhist journals such as Tricycle, Shambhala Sun, and Mandala surged. 
Their  ads featured Buddhist  study sessions and retreats in dharma-centers and trips  to Tibet, 
Nepal and Ladakh. Yoga and sacred sex videos appeared, as well as baseball caps with the mantra 
93 http://www.dharma.de/dbu/frameset.php?content=http://www.dharma.de/dbu/dbu_english.php  (accessed: 
27.4.2009)
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Om mani padme hum. “[D]harma centers were springing up like Starbucks coffee bars” (ibid:39). 
In 1997, over  a thousand Buddhist  centers throughout the United States were registered in a 
database  of  the  Pluralism Project,  a  study group at  Harvard  University  researching  religious 
diversity  (ibid.).  Today,94 the  database  lists  2,218  Buddhist  centers  in  America.  Not  too 
surprisingly, the largest prayer wheel in the world is found in the USA (Shell 2000:40).
The popularity of Tibetan Buddhism in the West, resulting from its cultural  attractiveness,  is 
widely known.95 Ruch (2006:17) speaks of a sustained boom that Tibetan Buddhism enjoys in the 
West. A particularly attractive aspect of this religion to the West is its interpretation of Tantrism, a 
set  of  complex  symbolism  that  originated  in  India  and  is  also  present  in  Hindu  traditions. 
Tantrism is often seen as connecting sexuality and spirituality: Earthly pleasures can contribute to 
spiritual  development.  The careers of neo-Tantric gurus such as Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh or 
Chogyam Trungpa exemplify the popularity of Tantrism in Western popular culture (see Urban 
2000: 272-91).
Tibetan Buddhism has taken root in the Western world as a refugee culture: Besides serving the needs 
of its own small diaspora of Tibetans for whom historical Tibet is a real memory, Tibetan culture has 
also come to fill an exotic religious 'niche' in highly developed Western urban centers, and becomes 
reinterpreted and redefined in relation to that host society (Clarke 2001:341).
The popularity of Tibetan Buddhism in the West demonstrates the powerful cultural attraction it 
emminates. This attraction is a form of soft power. To the extent that the Dalai Lama and the 
TGE  are  associated  with  their  religion,  which  is  a  large  extent  indeed,  Tibetan Buddhism 
becomes a soft-power resource for the exile government and its leader.
7.6.4 Universal Values associated with Tibetan Buddhism
In Western depictions, terms such as peace, tolerance, and religion – probably borrowed from relevant 
texts of international norms – are reproduced in their adjectival forms in representations of Tibet, or 
Tibetans, to define them as peaceful, tolerant, or religious; in some cases the process is extended to 
superlatives, so that Tibetans are presented as the most advanced collective embodiment so far of this 
or that form of specialness (Barnett 2001:275).
The major values  which tend to be connected with Tibetan Buddhism include non-violence, 
94 http://pluralism.org/directory/results.php?flags=C&state=&tradition=Buddh&keyword=title&anyall=+%7C%7C
+&text=&sort=title&submit=Search (accessed: 27.4.2009).
95 One  strong  indication  for  their  popularity  is  the  existence  of  Buddhist  studies  and  Tibetology. On  the 
establishment of these scholarly disciplines in the West see Lopez (1998:156-173).
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peacefulness, compassion, tolerance and harmony. They are universal religious, humanistic and 
social values. As Tibetan Buddhism is closely associated with Tibet, the Dalai Lama and hence 
with the organization he represents, the connected values are equally associated. Furthermore, 
such  values  are  repeatedly  embedded  in  the  speeches,  statements  and  publications  by  His 
Holiness. By representing these values, due to their universal nature they become soft-power 
resources.
One aspect of Tibetan Buddhism, as represented by the Dalai Lama, appears to be tolerance 
toward other religions. The Dalai Lama repeatedly stresses that in every religion there is truth, 
and  that  Westerners should  rather  search  for  value  in  their  own  religions  than  convert  to 
Buddhism. Religious tolerance seems to be a widely shared value in the Western world. A World 
Public Opinion  (2008b) poll finds that 95% of Americans “say equal treatment for people of 
different  religious  beliefs  is  'very  important'  (77%)  or  'somewhat  important'  (18%).”  The 
respective findings for France are 94% ('very important:'  66% / 'somewhat important:'  28%), 
Germany 93% (67% / 26%), Britain 92% (70% / 22%), Italy 91% (66% / 25%), and Spain 84% 
(44% / 40%). By emphasizing his tolerance and respect for other religions, the Dalai Lama relates 
to a widely shared Western value. 
Another  major  value  that  is  often  included  in  representations  of  Tibetan Buddhism  and  in 
communications by the Dalai Lama is that of compassion. The political consequence of this value 
is non-violence. Non-violence is a central pillar of the TGE's exile struggle96 and it is closely 
related to the value of peacefulness.
To a wide Western public, Tibet symbolizes an isolated, peaceful, timeless Buddhist state. Yet [...] its 
political history is far from peaceful (Clarke 2001:341).
Sperling (2001:317-328) demonstrates how Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetans in general and the Dalai 
Lama in particular are often represented by modern writers solely in terms of non-violence, love 
and compassion. It is often ignored that indeed Tibetan Buddhism, while surely based on values 
such as kindness and compassion toward all sentient beings, has a history that is definitely not 
free of violence. The reduction of Tibetan Buddhism, in the modern, international image, to “a 
doctrine of nonviolence of the absolutist sort,” (ibid:325) is simply not historical, and “must be 
seen in the light of the Tibetan exile assimilation of common images about the East” (ibid). 
Norbu (1994) has demonstrated that armed Tibetan resistance against the PLA goes back to the 
96 See section 3.12 'The TGE's Approach to the Exile Struggle.'
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1940s. While the resistance war, particularly in eastern Tibet, was fierce and prolonged, with 
large  casualties  on  both  sides,  little  has  been  documented  on  these  events.  “Such  lack  of 
information on the Tibetan Revolt  has enabled the Tibetan leadership to successfully rewrite 
history, playing down the role of  the armed revolt  and fostering the fiction  that the  popular 
resistance was non-violent” (Norbu 1994:188).
The promotion of the image of pre-1959 Tibet as a land of peace, harmony, and spirituality is one of 
the main tasks of the Tibetan leadership in exile [... It fosters] the fiction that the popular resistance 
against the Chinese was nonviolent and was led, Gandhian style, by the Dalai Lama (Norbu 2001:377).
Sperling (2001:324) observes that Tibetan Buddhism, in its popular presentation to the Western 
world, is often “reduced (of late, by the Tibetan exile community) to an essential emphasis on 
love and compassion.”
“Kindness,  compassion,  nonviolence:  All  these  have  their  place  in  Tibetan life  and  Tibetan 
Buddhist doctrine. But prior to the last three or more decades their centrality was nothing like 
what  one  sees  now”  (Sperling  2001:326).  Anand  (2007:101-2)  sees  TGE representations  of 
Tibetans as  inherently  compassionate  and non-violent  rather  as  a  “selective  appropriation  of 
historical narratives for contemporary purposes than about specific historical truths.”
Huber (2001:363) stresses the effectiveness of Tibetan exile discourse on non-violence and world 
peace and of the projection of “an essential nonviolent Tibetan national identity” starting in the 
1980s.  The  TGE  managed  to  “quickly  and  effectively  [...  transform]  the  Tibetan Buddhist 
image.” Related identity statements often refer to “innate Tibetan spirituality or unique religious 
orientation” (ibid:364). Simultaneously, such representations construct a negative Chinese Other, 
characterized by “soulless materialism and moral bankruptcy” (ibid.).
Thus,  irrespective  of  the  factual  foundation  of  such  representations,  it  remains  a  fact  that 
Tibetans, the Dalai Lama and the TGE tend to be closely associated with the values connected to 
Tibetan Buddhism. According to the Dalai Lama, the tremendous international support for Tibet 
is due to the non-violent nature of the exile struggle. “The Dalai Lama has often acknowledged 
the media's sympathy towards the nonviolent movement and its importance to Tibet's cause. He 
has said that media interest  on Tibet has attracted 'people the world over [...  to] the Tibetan 
cause.'” (Ram 2004:170).
122
Roemer  (2008a:83-4)  sees  the  non-violent  approach  of  the  TGE  as  an  unambiguous  and 
pragmatic call on the international community as a whole to prevent war. Since the 12th ATPD 
(1995-2001),  she  explains,  the  message  of  peace  has  been  disseminated  from  Dharamsala 
throughout the world in the form of videos, radio programs and books.
Over the years [non-violence] has developed into a powerful instrument for return to Tibet, which was 
especially emphasized by the international feedback, such as the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to 
the 14th Dalai Lama in 1989. In this regard, the non-violent struggle has helped to mobilize increasing 
support from 'guilt-ridden foreigners' (Roemer 2008:84).
Whether non-violence is effectively “a powerful instrument for return to Tibet” may be disputed. 
What remains certain is that the stance of non-violence and the related peaceful outlook in the 
exile struggle of the TGE has acted as a strong soft-power resource.
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PART 8 – Conclusion
8.1 What are the Soft-Power Resources of the Tibetan Government in Exile?
In retrospect, this paper has offered a theoretical overview of soft power, an inquisition into the 
Tibetan government in exile, including its objectives with particular regard to Western countries, 
some insight into the international support the Tibetan cause and the TGE enjoy, and an analysis 
of the TGE's soft-power resources in the international context.  In conclusion,  answers to the 
research questions stated at the outset shall be provided.
The resources that produce soft power for the Tibetan exile government are manifold and this 
paper does not claim to give a comprehensive account of the TGE's soft power. The intangible, 
relative and complex nature of soft power impedes an analysis covering each and every aspect. 
Rather, the analysis in Parts 5, 6 and 7 of this paper presented some of the TGE's major soft-
power resources.
Part 5 dealt with the Myth of Tibet. The current fascination with Tibet in the Western world is a 
legacy of centuries and continues to engender attraction to Tibet and the Tibetan cause among 
many Westerners. The Myth of Tibet has been exposed as a major soft-power resource benefitting 
the Tibetan exile government.
Another major soft-power resource for the TGE, dealt with in Part 6, is the charisma personified 
in its leader, the 14th Dalai Lama. Many Westerners are attracted to the Tibetan cause simply due 
to his  person,  to  what  he stands for  and communicates  and due to the  values he represents. 
Because of the close association of the Dalai Lama with the organization he leads and with the 
Tibetan exile struggle, the attraction he engenders is a tremendous soft-power resource for the 
TGE.
Shared values can be highly attractive soft-power resources. Part 7 demonstrated how the TGE 
has politicized elements of the Myth of Tibet by forging certain Tibetan identity representations. 
The values involved in these images have been described as 'archetypes of legitimacy.' These 
universal values that Tibetans are associated with, be it due to the nature of their exile struggle – 
('human  rights,'  'democracy,'  'non-violence),  their  Tibetan  Buddhist  religion  ('compassion,' 
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'tolerance,' 'peacefulness,'), initiatives from within the exile community ('women's rights') or due 
to  the  way  the  TGE  has  represented  the  Tibetan  identity  (all  of  the  above,  including 
'environmentalism') – appeal to the justness of a shared duty. These values are widely shared in 
the Western world. By focusing the exile struggle on and linking it with these issues, the TGE has 
managed to attract enormous levels of support from a wide spectrum of people within Western 
societies.
Thus to summarize, the major soft-power resources of the TGE with respect to the international 
domain are: The Myth of Tibet (in its 'pure' and its 'politicized' form), the person of the 14th Dalai 
Lama,  as  well  as  specific  values  that  are  associated  with  Tibetans and shared  in  the  West: 
environmentalism,  human  rights,  democracy, women's  rights  and  those  linked  with  Tibetan 
Buddhism such as non-violence,  compassion and peacefulness,  as well  as Tibetan Buddhism 
itself.
Although analyzed to some extent separately for pragmatic reasons, these soft-power resources 
are all naturally connected. The Myth of Tibet, offering in a way the 'fertile ground,' overshadows 
the entirety of the TGE's soft power, as well as to some extent the Tibetan Buddhist religion. The 
attraction engendered by the 14th Dalai Lama in the West is intricately connected to the Myth. He 
is  also  closely  connected  with  the  values  associated  with  Tibet  and  Tibetans,  because  he 
represents them. The values in turn are linked to the Myth, because the Myth makes them more 
credible. In all, the attraction caused by Tibet in the West is substantial.
8.2 The TGE's Approach to the Exile Struggle: A Soft-Power Strategy
The  change  that  occurred  in  the  Tibetan  exile  political  approach  in  the  1980s97 consisted 
essentially in the embracing of a soft-power strategy. Rather than continuing to focus on the 
major  topic  of  Tibetan independence,  the  TGE split  this  topic  and  related it  to  various  key 
Western political issues, which coincide with Western core values: human rights, environmental 
protection, non-violence, women's rights and peace. By explicitly appealing to these values and 
by deliberately representing the Tibetan identity as being in line with these values, the TGE 
appealed to a sense of duty in the West. With this strategy, the TGE effectively internationalized 
97 As discussed in section 3.12 'The TGE's Approach to the Exile Struggle.'
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and popularized the Tibetan issue, with the result of an impressive attraction to the Tibetan cause 
in the West. The attraction caused by this strategy and by the TGE's soft power at large has 
evidently  had  effects.  The  extent  to  which  it  has  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  TGE 
objectives shall now be discussed.
8.3 How has the TGE's Soft Power contributed or not, to approaching the 
Achievement of its Objectives?
For  the  purpose  of  answering  the  second  major  research  question  of  this  paper,  the  TGE's 
objectives shall be briefly recalled.98 The main goals of the TGE in relation to the international 
domain include: to achieve a status of 'genuine autonomy' for Tibet; to reduce hardships suffered 
by Tibetans in Tibet; to ensure of the preservation and promotion of Tibetan culture and religion; 
to enter into meaningful dialogue with the PRC; to achieve international attention and support; 
and to encourage possible international patrons and the international civil society to support the 
exile struggle. Has the TGE's soft power contributed to achieving any of these objectives? Yes. 
Has it been sufficient to provide for the achievement of its ultimate goal, a 'genuine-autonomy' 
status for Tibet? No.
Soft power has contributed substantially to the achievement of two major objectives that are 
related, namely to gain international support and to encourage international patrons to act on the 
TGE's behalf. Part 4 ('International Support for the TGE and the Tibetan Cause') provided insight 
as  to  the  extent  of  international  support  for  Tibet.  The  comparably  vast  levels  of  support, 
particularly from Western civil society, have been attained to a large extent as a result of the 
TGE's soft power. It is important to point out that human motivations are difficult to ascertain. 
Consequentially the precise extent to which soft power contributed cannot be determined. There 
are  certainly  other  factors  involved  in  motivating  Western  support  for  Tibet  (e.g.  anti-
communism, to harm China, a general sense of justice). What has become evident throughout this 
paper however is the substantial contribution of soft power for the TGE to achieve such levels of 
international attention and support.
98 Referring back to section 3.13.3 'Objectives of the TGE in Practice.'
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The TGE's soft power in terms of cultural attractiveness has contributed to another TGE objective 
to some extent: The preservation of Tibetan culture. Due to the realities within Tibet the TGE has 
focused cultural preservation on the exile sphere. Western interest in and attraction to Tibet has 
led to the establishment of projects that engage in Tibetan cultural and religious preservation of 
some form99 and of numerous Tibetan Buddhist groups that have appeared throughout the West. 
This is not to say that these Western groups are always preserving Tibetan culture and religion in 
its 'traditional' forms, but nevertheless Western interest contributes to the preservation of Tibetan 
culture and religion in some form.
Has the TGE's soft power contributed to achieving meaningful dialogue with the PRC? No, in the 
view of the TGE there is no meaningful dialogue taking place with the PRC. Currently100 in fact 
there is no official dialogue whatsoever taking place between the two parties. However, the broad 
popular support for Tibet along with support from Western governments is a form of pressure 
exerted on China. Thus, popular support increases the likelihood of China entering into dialogue 
with envoys of the TGE. In this sense, the TGE's soft power, while not directly contributing to 
this  objective,  has  the  potential  to  be influential  in  an indirect  way, namely through popular 
government support leading to international pressure on Beijing.
Has the suffering of Tibetans decreased as a result of the TGE's soft power? To a minor extent, 
yes. Numerous Tibet Support Groups, attracted by soft power, as well as international NGOs 
have repeatedly campaigned for the early release of Tibetan political prisoners.101 On numerous 
occasions such campaigns have resulted in the release of prisoners. In these individual cases, 
suffering has been reduced.  But with regard to the entire  Tibetan population, the TGE's soft 
power has not significantly reduced the hardships experienced by Tibetans in Tibet.
What  about  the  overall  objective  of  the  TGE's  exile  struggle:  Has  the  TGE's  soft  power 
contributed to an approximation to the major objective of 'genuine autonomy' for Tibet? This 
question must be answered with a definite no. While attracting substantial levels of attention and 
support, this support has not been sufficient for it to be translated into a solution for the Tibet 
question.
99 For example the Tibet House in New York (see Tibet House 1).
100In April 2009.
101As dealt with in section 4.2 'Civil Society Support for Tibet in the West.'
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From analyzing the Tibetan exile experience regarding the Western world using the theoretical 
lens of soft power, on might draw the conclusion that while soft power is an important instrument 
that can aid in the achievement of certain objectives, particularly for militarily and economically 
'powerless'  peoples,  ultimately  it  still  remains  subordinate  to  hard  power.  China  possesses 
immense military power, and its economic position makes it  an important focus for  Western 
economics and hence politics. In the case of Tibet, so far hard power has remained the ultimate 
power.
Finally, in an attempt to put the findings of this paper into a wider perspective, their applicability 
onto other cases shall be considered. As stated in the outset, numerous peoples face a fate in some 
ways similar to that of the Tibetans. But of course in many ways the Tibetan issue is very unique 
indeed. No group of unrepresented people, apart from the Tibetans, has a Dalai Lama. The 14th 
Dalai  Lama  is  certainly  an  extraordinarily  outstanding  figure  to  have  at  the  forefront  of  a 
movement.  Furthermore,  the  Myth of Tibet is likewise quite a unique phenomenon. No other 
group has this type of legacy on which to build on. And these two factors, the Dalai Lama and the 
Myth of Tibet, are central to the success of the TGE in terms of international mobilization. But the 
Dalai Lama and the Myth of Tibet have been around for long, and the levels of partly hysterical 
attention Tibet enjoys in the West today is a phenomenon which has developed increasingly over 
the past two decades. There is little doubt that the soft-power strategy launched by the TGE has 
been very successful in mobilizing support. A focus on shared values has a high potential for 
engendering support and attention. And while support and attention might not be sufficient to 
ultimately achieve all desired outcomes, they do ensure that one's issue is not forgotten among 
the many social hardships existing in the world today.
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Abstract (English)
The present  paper  deals  with  the  Tibetan government  in  exile  and its  success  in  mobilizing 
international support from the theoretical perspective of soft power. Soft power is the ability to 
attract and co-opt others to one's own purposes. Soft-power resources are the assets that produce 
such attraction.
After introducing the theory of soft power as well as the Tibetan exile government, the paper goes 
on  to  analyze  the  soft-power  resources  of  the  Tibetan exile  government  in  the  international 
context, whereby two central research questions are addressed: What are the soft-power resources 
of the Tibetan exile government? And: How has the exile government's soft power contributed to 
the achievement of its objectives?
The soft-power resources of the Tibetan exile government are manifold and intricately linked, 
however they can be presented on three levels. Firstly, the Myth of Tibet, which acts as a strong 
attractive force for the exile government within the West until today. Secondly, the person of the 
Dalai Lama, who's charismatic personality acts as another major soft-power resource for the exile 
government. The third level is that of values represented by the exile governments that are widely 
shared in the West: environmentalism,  human rights,  democracy, women's  rights,  and values 
associated with Tibetan Buddhism. These values, along with a Tibetan identity representation 
created by the exile government in line with these values, act as further soft-power resources for 
the organization.
While the Tibetan exile government's soft power has contributed to the achievement of some of 
its objectives, such as the mobilization of support from different levels within Western societies, 
and  the  exertion  of  Western political  pressure  on  China,  it  has  ultimately  neither  led  to  a 
substantial  improvement  in  the  Tibetan situation,  nor  to  the  achievement  of  the  overriding 
objective of the exile government: a status of genuine autonomy for Tibet.
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Abstract (Deutsch)
Aus dem theoretischen Blickwinkel von Soft Power befasst sich die vorliegende Arbeit mit der 
tibetischen Exilregierung und ihrem Erfolg bei der Mobilisierung internationaler Unterstützung. 
Soft  Power  bezieht  sich  auf  die  Fähigkeit,  andere  durch Anziehung und Kooption für  seine 
Interessen zu gewinnen. Soft Power Ressourcen sind die Mittel die zu solcher Anziehung führen.
Nach  einer  Darstellung  der  Theorie  von  Soft  Power  sowie  der  tibetischen  Exilregierung, 
analysiert die Arbeit die einzelnen Soft Power Ressourcen der Exilregierung im internationalen 
Kontext. Dabei wird insbesondere zwei Forschungsfragen nachgegangen: Welche sind die Soft-
Power Ressourcen der tibetischen Exilregierung in Bezug auf die internationale Sphäre? Sowie: 
Inwiefern haben diese zur Erreichung der Ziele der tibetischen Exilregierung beigetragen?
Die  Soft  Power  Ressourcen  der  tibetischen  Exilregierung  sind  vielfältig  und  miteinander 
verbunden, lassen sich aber grob in drei Ebenen darstellen. Erstens, der Mythos Tibet, welcher 
bis  heute  als  starke  anziehende  Kraft  innerhalb  des  Westens für  die  tibetische Exilregierung 
fungiert. Zweitens stellt die Person des Dalai Lama als charismatischer Führer der Exilregierung 
eine bedeutende  Soft Power  Resource für die Organisation dar. Drittens wirken die Werte, die 
vom Dalai  Lama  und  der  tibetischen  Exilregierung  vertreten  werden  (Umweltfreundlichkeit, 
Menschenrechte,  Demokratie,  Frauenrechte,  sowie  Werte  verbunden  mit  dem  tibetischen 
Buddhismus wie etwa Mitgefühl, Friedfertigkeit, etc.) bzw. eine tibetische Identität welche von 
der Exilregierung kreiert wird und mit diesen westlichen Werten übereinstimmt, als Soft Power 
Ressourcen für die tibetische Exilregierung.
Während die Soft Power der tibetischen Exilregierung zur Erreichung mancher Ziele beigetragen 
hat,  wie  etwa  zur  Mobilisierung  von  Unterstützung  aus  verschiedenen  Ebenen  westlicher 
Gesellschaften, sowie zur Ausübung eines gewissen westlichen politischen Drucks auf China, so 
hat sie schlussendlich weder zu einer wesentlichen Verbesserung der Situation Tibets beitragen 
können,  noch  zur  Erreichung  des  übergeordneten  Ziels  der  Exilregierung:  wahrhaftiger 
autonomer Status für Tibet.
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